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The Type 95 Ha-Go tank

The Type 95 Ha-Go light tank was produced in greater numbers than any other Japanese armoured vehicle in WW2.  However, only about 2,300 were manufactured in total, as tanks were never a priority for the Japanese. Most steel production was instead used for warships. 

The Type 95 weighed 7.4 tons.  It had a 37 mm gun & two 6.5 or 7.7 mm machine guns, one in the hull & the other mounted in the turret, facing to the rear.  The hand-operated turret was small & extremely cramped for even the one man located there, the commander.  It was only able to rotate 45^o, leaving the rear to be covered by the turret machine gun.  In addition to the commander, who had to load & fire the 37 mm gun, the two other crew members were a driver & a mechanic, who operated the machine gun in the hull.  The thickness of its armour ranged from 6 to 12 mm.  Most of these tanks were not equipped with a radio. 

The armour, weaponry & road speed of the Type 95 was inferior to that of the M3 Stuart light tank, although their speeds across country were similar.  Nevertheless, the Type 95 sometimes performed well against the M3 Stuart in close range encounters in 1942.  However, Japanese tank development did not keep pace with that of the Allies. The Type 95 remained in use until the end of the war, but it was no match for the M5 Stuart light tank or the M3 medium Lees & Grants.  For example, early in the Battle of Imphal on 20 March 1944, seven Type 95 tanks ambushed a troop of three M3 Lee tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers, which was quickly joined by a second troop of the same regiment.  The clash was very unequal, with only one Japanese round causing any damage to a Lee, setting it alight after hitting its fuel tank; one crew member was killed & the other six injured.  In return, the Lees destroyed five of the Japanese Type 95 tanks & damaged another, which was abandoned by its crew & subsequently towed to Imphal.  Only one Japanese tank escaped.

M3 & M5 Light Tanks – The Stuart

Stuart was the official name given by the British to the U.S. light tank M3 and, from 1942, its improved derivative M5.  It was named after General J.E.B. Stuart, who fought for the Confederates in the U.S. Civil War.  It was also sometimes known as the Honey, apparently because it gave a ‘smooth ride’.  Nearly 14,000 M3 & nearly 9,000 M5 light tanks were built.

The Stuart weighed 16.5 tons & had a crew of four (commander, driver, gunner & loader). It was armed with a 37 mm gun & three .30 calibre Browning machine guns, one coaxial, one on the turret roof & one in the hull. The M3 had an air-cooled radial engine that had been developed for aircraft.  To relieve demand for radial aero-engines, the M5 instead used twin Cadillac car engines, which were quieter & cooler.  The M5 could travel at up to 36 mph on good roads & 18 mph off-road. Its armour ranged in thickness from 13 to 51 mm, depending on location.

Stuarts were first used in combat in 1941 by the British in North Africa & then by the Americans in the Philippines.  In neither case did they fare especially well, but this was primarily a reflection of inadequate training & tactics.  The British considered Stuarts an improvement on their Crusader tanks, which were slower & less reliable. The main drawback of the Stuart was its low fuel capacity, which limited its operational range to 75 to 100 miles across country, substantially less than Crusaders.

When Burma was threatened by the Japanese in 1942, the British 7^th Armoured Brigade was transferred to Rangoon, with 114 M3 Stuarts bearing the ‘desert rats’ insignia. They were important in allowing Allied forces to break out from Rangoon & they supported 17th Indian Division & 1st Burma Division on the retreat to India.  However, only a single Stuart made it into India.

Despite their limited firepower & armour, Stuarts were effective in the Burma Campaign.  Japanese tanks had lighter armour than Stuarts & were not available in large numbers.  On May 1 1944, a Stuart climbed up to the terrace above the tennis court at Kohima, but was quickly knocked out by a 3.7-inch anti-tank gun & the crew were lucky to survive.  The heavier armour of a Grant was needed on this exposed position.  However, the Japanese in general were not well-provided with anti-tank guns, most often relying on tactics requiring infantry to close with Allied tanks.  In such a context, the Stuart served its purpose well.  

The M3 Medium Tank – Lee & Grant

The M3 Medium Tank was developed in the USA during the late 1930s to provide a battle tank with better mobility, protection & the firepower of a 75 mm gun.  Resources & technical ability were insufficient to mount this main gun on a revolving turret, so it was instead mounted in a sponson in the right front of the hull.  This was a major shortcoming, as it limited the gun’s traverse.  Nevertheless, the M3 was rushed into production as an interim solution, until the 75 mm gun could be relocated to the turret.

The US design had a crew of seven.  The British called it the ‘Lee’ & did not like it, but were desperate to replace the loss in France of their entire tank force.  Attempts to induce the US to build British designs were refused.  However, some modifications to the M3 were negotiated, resulting in a six-crew version dubbed the ‘Grant’. It had a larger turret than the Lee, with a bustle at the rear to house a radio. 

To reduce the tank’s height, the Lee’s machine gun cupola was replaced with a simple low-profile ‘manhole cover’. The presence or absence of the machine gun cupola provides the most obvious distinguishing feature between the Lee & the Grant.

The Grant weighed 28.5 tons.  Its maximum speed on roads was 28 mph & its maximum range was 108 miles.  The front of the hull had 51 mm of armour, but the sides & rear were only 38mm. The turret armour was also 51 mm, apart from the top which was just 22mm.  The Grant’s turret housed the tank commander, the gunner of a 37 mm gun & a loader, who also operated the radio.  In the chassis was the driver with the gunner & loader for the 75 mm main gun.  In the Lee, the radio operator was an additional crew member, who sat to the left of the driver.  Nearly 900 Lend Lease M3 Mediums, both Lees & Grants, were shipped to India from the USA.

In March 1944, 149th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps was equipped with 36 Grant I tanks, organized into two squadrons, A and B.  These were attached to the British 2^nd Infantry Division & served at Kohima.  Six of the Grants were lost at Kohima, including that of Major Ezra Rhodes, B Squadron Commander.  Rhodes’s Grant had been attacking Japanese bunkers on Kohima Ridge, but slipped from the track & slid down the hill until stopped by a tree. As Japanese infantry closed in, the crew jammed the triggers of the tank’s machine guns to fire continuously, set the turret to rotate & escaped, sprinting under fire to British lines.  This Grant has remained there ever since, as a memorial.

Lee I M3s were used in the other Medium Tank Regiments of the 50th Indian Tank Brigade, as well those of the 254th.  Corporal Arthur Freer, of 3rd Carabiniers, 254th Indian Tank Brigade, told an interviewer (IWM19822):    

“It was absolutely superb. Seven men in a tank with tremendous firepower & able to do all sorts of damage to the enemy. They had a 75 mm gun in the hull, which was a beautiful gun, very powerful, very accurate, very destructive.  We thought it was a wonderful gun & we did a lot of damage with it.”

INTERVIEWER: “Were anti-tank guns good against the armour of the General Lee?”

FREER: “Not at the front.  They were at the side.  They could penetrate at the side, but the front was four inches of armour & it was sloping. The metal on the sides wasn’t terribly strong.  The Lees we had were rivetted & not welded.  If an anti-tank shell hit a rivet, it could shear off the outside edge of the rivet so that the bit going through the metal sides & the inside of the rivet would fly around inside the tank doing all sorts of damage. And I’ve lost friends through being hit by rivets.  That was the only weakness that I could see, otherwise the armament was superb, you had all round fire in the turret. The 75mm gun was limited to about 15^o of traverse, if you wanted to turn more than 15^o, you had to turn the tank round. That wasn’t a problem. We were using it as a mobile piece of artillery, which had complete self-defence with the turret guns.  I think it was ideal.”    

The M3 Medium Brigades were withdrawn to India in April/May 1945, at the start of the monsoon season. The 50th Indian Armoured Brigade was re-equipped with Shermans & the 254th was re-equipped with Churchills.    

A 1945 Allied Land Forces South-East Asia report concluded that the M3 Medium Tank “has been very successful & has been well liked by users. It has shared with the Stuart…the greater part of the armoured fighting in Burma.”

Images & information about the M3 are from this page of the Sherman Minutia Homepage.

25 November 1944: Unveiling of the Memorial at Kohima to 1st Battalion Royal Scots

The Royal Scots Memorial was constructed from local stone by the Pioneer Platoon. It is sited at Kennedy Hill, on the Aradura Spur, & was unveiled on 25 November 1944 by the Battalion’s Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Masterton Smith, who had fought throughout the Battle of Kohima.

There are 74 names on the Roll of Honour.

Creation of the 2nd Division Memorial

The British 2nd Infantry Division Memorial was designed by Lieutenant Jamie Ferris, 506 Field Company, Royal Engineers, who had been a professional architect before the war.  His sketches were developed using a wooden model.  Construction began on September 19, two months before the unveiling. The cost was met by subscription within the Division.

Near Maram, at Milestone 80, were a number of obelisk stones, erected by Nagas in days gone by.  Permission was given for one of these to be dug out by 506 Field Company to provide the main headstone of the memorial. It was about 16 feet high, 3 feet wide, 18 inches thick & estimated to weigh 17 tons.

The obelisks lay about one mile from the main road at the end of a very steep slope.  A bulldozer cut a zig-zag track, which allowed access by a huge Scammel lorry with a 45-ton winch & a 3-ton crane.  Sappers dug earth anchors behind the monolith & reeved blocks & tackle to hold the weight of the upended stone.  Then it was gradually lowered to the ground. 

Once horizontal, the monolith was harnessed & then drawn by the Scammel onto teak rollers, which were passed from the rear to the front of the stone as it rolled downhill over them, restrained by the winch.   

On reaching the Imphal Road, the Scammel lifted the stone onto a tank-transporter, where it was secured by ropes.  At one point on its journey to Kohima, the rear wheels of the transporter slid off the road at a sharp bend.  The ropes broke & the monolith slid off into a culvert.  There it remained overnight, whilst the Scammel was summoned.  This lifted the transporter back onto the road & then replaced the stone, allowing its journey to continue.

At Kohima, the monolith was lifted off the transporter near the foot of Garrison Hill & then manhandled by two hundred Nagas into its chosen position.  They refused to accept payment for this demanding task.

The monolith carries the Kohima Epitaph:

When you go home

Tell them of us and say,

For your tomorrow

We gave our today

These words were based, with minor amendments, on a translation by classicist John Maxwell Edmunds of a Greek epitaph written by Simonides of Ceos for the 300 Spartans under Leonidas who stood at Thermopylae against the vast Persian army of King Xerxes in 480 BC.

Below the verse is a copper plaque of dedication. Another plaque, on the reverse of the plinth, describes the Battle of Kohima.

The Memorial was unveiled on 18 November 1944 by Lieutenant General Sir William Slim, Commander of 14^th Army, in the presence of representatives of all the Division’s regiments.  The ceremony included hymns, a lament played by kilted pipers of the Royal Scots & Cameron Highlanders, & The Last Post played by a bugler.

Behind the monolith runs a semi-circular wall of grey dressed stone into which were set a series of thirteen bronze panels engraved with the Roll of Honour.  Chisels were made in Divisional Workshops for the engraving, which took several months to complete.  In 1974, it was noticed that three of the panels had been stolen.  The remaining ten were shipped to the U.K. for their preservation. Engraved tablets were instead installed in the wall behind the monolith.

Nine of the surviving bronze panels were received by the regiments they honoured.  The tenth is displayed at the Kohima Museum in York. 

My grandfather came back

The Battles of Imphal & Kohima were honoured at the Festival of Remembrance in the Royal Albert Hall, London, on November 10 2024.

The cameras focused on a lone figure standing in the arena.

“My name is Lauren Turner-Roden & my grandfather, Raymond Street, fought with the Royal West Kents at Kohima.

Too young to understand his stories while he lived, I will be forever grateful that he left our family his written memories. He said at Kohima

‘I was twenty-four but felt a hundred. All of us young men had seen too much in too short a time. I believe they called it living their lifetime in a day. I don’t know about that, but what we had seen during the last few months was enough for anyone. Our casualties were mounting. We lost several men that day. Not one was older than twenty-one. Would it be our turn next? Every man on this hill had been picked by fate & some, maybe all, would die.’

My grandfather came back, allowing me to stand here today to share his memories with you.

The Kohima epitaph is engraved on the memorial to the 2nd British Division in the cemetery at Kohima. It makes a simple request: When you go home, tell them of us & say, for your tomorrow we gave our today.”

My Dad Cried on Remembrance Sunday

By Robert Street

Written in memory of his father Private Raymond Street, 4 Battalion, Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment.

He didn’t take long to prepare
A cup of tea, the TV, sat in his favourite chair
At 11, he stood to attention, straight and erect
It was his way of showing them respect
My Dad cried on Remembrance Sunday
Were they tears of joy; no
Tears of regret; maybe so
Tears of gratitude for he made it home
Tears of sorrow for those left buried alone.

My Dad cried on Remembrance Sunday
It doesn’t take long to prepare
A cup of tea, the TV, sat in my favourite chair
At 11, I stand to attention, straight and erect
It’s my way of showing him respect
It’s my turn to cry on Remembrance Sunday
Are they tears of joy; no
Tears of regret; maybe so
Tears of gratitude for he made it home
Tears of sorrow for I now watch alone
It’s my turn to cry on Remembrance Sunday

From “Soldier Poets of the 2nd British Infantry Division” by Bob Cook & Robin McDermott.

The flag was captured by the Japanese when they took Singapore in 1942. Behind the flag is Countess Mountbatten. To her right is Raymond Street of the Royal West Kents.

John Young

John Young was born in Glasgow in 1919.  He became a bank clerk after leaving school, but joined the army in May 1939.  He rose quickly to the rank of Sergeant in the Glasgow Highlanders & then was commissioned into the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders in 1941. 

After completing his officer training, Young was placed in charge of a unit sailing to India in 1942.  There he was seconded to the newly-formed Assam Regiment.  

In March 1944, 400 men of 1st battalion Assam Regiment were ordered to defend to the last man & the last bullet the approaches to Kohima. They included Lieutenant John Young, now known as Jock, who was placed in charge of the 120 men of A Company, as an Acting Captain.  Although most of the Assams were situated at the Naga village of Jessami, A Company was sent 9 miles south to the village of Kharasom.  There they prepared defensive positions, with deep trenches protected by barbed wire.

At daybreak on March 27, a battalion of Japanese reached Kharasom. They approached complacently, evidently unaware that the village was defended, until their front ranks were scythed down by fire from the Assams.  Young phoned the command post at Jessami to report that Japanese were approaching his positions & that they had just opened fire.  He said he could see along the track what he estimated to be at least a battalion of Japanese with mules & elephants dragging artillery. Shortly afterwards the phone line was cut.

Three Japanese assaults before nightfall were repulsed with heavy losses.  The defenders sustained some casualties, but their defences were not penetrated.  Attacks continued for the next 3 days, with mounting losses to the Assams.

By March 30, food, water & ammunition were running low. The arrival of fresh Japanese troops convinced Young that his position would soon be overrun. To preserve the lives of his troops, he ordered them to sneak off after nightfall, whilst he remained with those too severely wounded to move.  In so doing, he would comply with the order to fight to the last man.  This instruction had in fact been rescinded, but the news had not reached the isolated outposts at Kharasom & Jessami.

After beating off a night assault, all Young’s troops who were capable of leaving slipped away quietly.  Young remained at Kharasom & was last seen on the fire step of his bunker, beside a wounded sepoy with a Bren gun.  They were piling magazines & grenades on the parapet.  Nagas reported hearing gunfire & explosions at dawn, but it did not last long.  Neither Young nor his wounded men survived.

The Japanese were greatly impressed by Young’s conduct & buried him with the rituals traditionally accorded to an honoured samurai warrior.  He was later reinterred in Kohima War Cemetery.

Of the 120 Assam troops who had fought at Kharasom, 56 made it back to Kohima two days later.  There, they made a substantial contribution to the defence. 

With regard to Young’s conduct at Kharasom, Colonel Hugh Richards, Garrison Commander at Kohima, wrote:

“As an example of complete self-sacrifice, nothing could be more magnificent.” (8)

Nevertheless, John Young was not recommended for a medal.  No explanation for this omission has been recorded.  He has, however, been honoured more recently by a bagpipe lament in his name & a memorial stone outside his home in Glasgow.  

An excellent webinar by Robert Lyman & Roy McCallum about John Young and the 1st Assams at Kharasom can be found here.

John Harman

John Pennington Harman was born in Beckenham, Kent, in 1914, son of a city financier, Martin Coles Harman.

In 1925, Martin Harman bought Lundy, an island three & a half miles long & half a mile wide in the Bristol Channel off the coast of Devon. He declared it “a self-governing dominion of the British Empire, recognising King George as its head”.

As part of his vision of the island as a dominion, Martin Harman introduced Lundy stamps, which are still in use today, by arrangement with the British Post Office; the price of a Lundy stamp covers the cost of UK postage plus the cost of ferrying from the mainland. It is the oldest private postal service in the world.

The name Lundy is derived from Puffin Island in Norse & Martin Harman invented a currency denominated in puffins. He had puffin coins minted in 1929, with his head on them, instead of the King’s. The legality of this was challenged in the High Court in 1931 & he was compelled to withdraw the coins.

John Harman did not settle at school, preferring to spend his time on Lundy, where he enjoyed farm work. He is reported to have said:

“When I grow up, I don’t want to work my guts out. I want to enjoy my life.” (19)

In search of adventure, he worked on farms in Australia & New Zealand. On his passport, he described his profession as ‘Retired beekeeper’.

John Harman enlisted in the army in 1941 & ended up in the 4th Battalion, Queen’s Own Royal West Kents. He disliked army discipline, but showed initiative & leadership which earned him promotion to Lance Corporal. However, he remained a conspicuous maverick.

As part of 5 Division, the West Kents were sent to the Arakan region of northwest Burma in 1944. Harman enjoyed scouting there & displayed indifference to danger, remaining calm when exposed to fire. He told his company commander Major Donald Easten:

“I’m going to live to be at least 79.” (19)

This belief was based on prophesies made by fortune tellers.

In April, the West Kents found themselves on Kohima Ridge, surrounded by the Japanese 31st Infantry Division. John Harman was involved in the defence of Detail Hill. On April 9th, daylight revealed that, during the night, Japanese with a machine gun had occupied a bunker 50 yds behind the West Kents’ trenches, higher up the hill. John Harman crawled alone towards the bunker & then sprinted the last few yards, despite bullets all around him, & killed its occupants with a grenade. He carried the machine gun calmly back down the hill, to cheers & applause.

When the sun rose next day, five Japanese were seen setting up a machine gun in a vacant British trench at the bottom of the hill.  Harman ordered covering fire & then charged down the hill, dodging bullets from the Japanese. He stopped a few yards short & shot four, firing his rifle from the hip, before bayoneting the fifth.  Triumphantly, he brandished their machine gun & smashed it to the ground, enjoying cheers from the British.  Then he sauntered back up the hill, ignoring shouts to run.  A burst of fire from Jail Hill hit him in the spine. Major Easten ran to him & pulled him under cover:

“I shouted for stretcher bearers, but he actually died in my arms before they arrived.” (11)

John Harman’s last words were:

“Don’t bother. I got the lot. It was worth it.” (19)

John Harman was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross. The citation in the London Gazette was as follows:

“On 8/9 April 1944 at the Battle of Kohima, British India, Lance-Corporal Harman was commanding a section of a forward platoon where soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army had established a machine-gun post within 50 yards of his company and were becoming a menace. Since it was not possible to bring fire on to the enemy post, the lance-corporal went forward by himself and threw a grenade into the position, destroying it. He returned carrying the enemy machinegun as a trophy. Early next morning, having ordered covering fire from his Bren gun team, he went out alone, with a Lee–Enfield rifle with fixed bayonet and charged a party of Japanese soldiers who were digging in. He shot four and bayoneted one. On his way back, Lance Corporal Harman was severely wounded by a burst of enemy machine-gun fire and died soon after reaching British lines.’

In 1949, John Harman’s father unveiled a small memorial to his son on Lundy. Invitations were sent to surviving West Kents.

The ceremony was attended by the island’s population of sixteen, one hundred invited guests and about six hundred day visitors.

The memorial is a slab of blue-grey stone, set on a granite base in a disused quarry that was one of John’s favourite spots.

A webinar by Stephen Snelling describing the heroism of John Harman & Jack Randle, the other VC recipient at Kohima, can be found on the website of Kohima Educational Trust by clicking here.

Robert Scott

At the Battle of Kohima, 2nd Battalion Royal Norfolks was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Scott, a larger-than-life character who had been wounded during the First World War & subsequently lost an eye whilst serving with the Palestine Police.  He was promoted Battalion Commander in 1943, an appointment that was not universally welcomed.  Sergeant Bert Fitt recollected:

“The officers used to shake in their shoes where he was concerned.” (19)

Scott’s second-in-command, Major Henry Conder, described him as:

“An Elizabethan born out of his time.  He was very well read.  Carried a pocket Shakespeare in his top pocket.  Very fond of poetry.  Hard-drinking, hard-swearing.  An amazing leader who led from the front.  He trod the battlefield like a great actor treads the stage.”  (19)

Scott’s leadership was most evident on May 4th 1944, when the Norfolks stormed onto Transport Ridge, without waiting for the pre-arranged bombardment.  Lieutenant Sam Horner, Signals Officer:

“Robert Scott decided, absolutely rightly, that the momentum was being lost & he kept it going. The battery commander said ‘What about the guns?’ ‘No, no. Forget it, we’ll just get straight on through.’ He ran off with A Company, who were then spearhead, & practically led the assault.” (2)

Sergeant William Robinson of A Company:

“Bob Scott lined us up with Bren-guns, a sling over our shoulders taking the weight & a man behind us with extra ammunition. All he had was a pistol & his khud stick. His famous words were ‘Right-ho boys, let’s go!’ That was it. The instructions were to fire at everything, spraying some down, some up & forward because there was a bunker there. Up to that time I hadn’t seen any Japanese at all. But in this semi-clearing several got up & started running away. They didn’t get far because the fire power was terrific, about twelve Bren guns. The bunker was taken.” (2)

Captain John Howard, 4 Brigade Intelligence Officer, described Scott that day:

“His foghorn voice, roaring encouragement & hurling abuse, could be heard above the sound of battle. (19)

He was about six foot two & very big. His huge boots covered in mud. His trousers covered in dried blood. He had grenades, a pistol & his dagger hanging round his huge waistline. He’d acquired a silk Japanese flag which he was using as a scarf. Like the rest of us, he had four or five days of beard & a bandaged head & his tin hat had a ragged bullet hole in it. His bravery was magnificent.” (11)

Scott was “vast in size & character”, leading from the front with “boundless enthusiasm & vigour”, disregarding his own safety.  Bert Fitt observed his indifference to a narrow escape:

“When Scott got scalped by a grazing bullet, he shook his fist at the Japanese, saying ‘The biggest bloke on the damn position & you couldn’t get him.  If you were in my bloody battalion, I’d take away your proficiency pay’.” (2)  

Scott was eventually felled on May 28th, during Operation York to take the Aradura Spur.  It was an attack the Norfolks believed was bound to fail, climbing through dense jungle up the steep slope to Charles Hill.  As they neared the crest, Japanese machine-guns opened fire, pinning the Norfolks down.  Company Sergeant Major Walter Gilding was close to Scott at the time:

“The leading lads got to within 20 feet of the top of the hill, but it was murder. Robert Scott was with the leading troops, throwing grenades like the clappers. I had the sten-gun & I was firing, scrambling up, grabbing hold of a tree, firing the Sten-gun, going a little further, & encouraging the lads. All this shouting & swearing! There was nothing to see at all, you couldn’t see bunker slits or anything as they were too well concealed.” (11) 

Lieutenant Franses:

“A Japanese grenade came down towards Robert Scott & I think he decided to kick it away. He misjudged slightly, it went off & brought him down.” (11)

Private William Cron gave covering fire as Scott was wrestled onto a stretcher:

“I had a go at the Japanese with my Bren-gun to keep their heads down.  If somebody hadn’t fired on the bunkers they’d have popped Scott & the stretcher bearers off.  I got one through the arm – it didn’t do much harm – it didn’t stop me from carrying on firing.  By that time they’d got the old man on to the stretcher & were getting him down into cover.” (11)

Bugler Bert May:

“I saw him on a stretcher coming down.  He was shouting & cursing because the lads wouldn’t let him get off the stretcher!  But he couldn’t, a hand grenade had landed at his feet & he was peppered all over with shrapnel.  It took about eight blokes to carry him.  You can imagine the weight of him because he was a big bloke & the ground itself wasn’t given to carrying stretchers up & down.  I got the side of the stretcher & carried it, helped to keep him on.  But he was doing his nut, shouting blue murder!  We got him down & took him to the first aid post.” (11) 

6 Brigade Major David Wilson saw Scott later:

“Robert, covered with blood, passed through 6 Brigade, where I met his stretcher party.  He was not pleased at being put out of the battle. ‘David,’ he said, ‘I’m too old for this ridiculous war’.” (11)

On May 26th, two days before Scott was wounded, Major General Grover submitted a recommendation that he receive the Victoria Cross:

“At Kohima Assam on 4-6 May 44, for most conspicuous gallantry, devotion to duty & disregard of danger, when commanding 2^nd Btn The Royal Norfolk Regiment in their attack on G.P.T. [Transport] Ridge.

During the advance down G.P.T. Ridge on 4 May, the leading company, accompanied by Col Scott, … came under heavy L.M.G. [light machine gun] & snipers fire on a narrow jungle path – Many were hit, & the remainder seemed momentarily dazed – Col Scott got up, & walked slowly forward, cheering & encouraging his men to shoot back.  By his personal example & disregard for his own safety, he undoubtedly imbued the attack with fresh impetus, & turned what might have been a disaster into an unqualified success.

Later, during the second bound, he was again up with his leading troops, laughing & cheering them on by waving a Jap sword which he had captured – By his immediate & brilliant grasp of the situation, & by sheer force of personality, he turned a sticky beginning into an overwhelming victory.

Throughout the operations, Col Scott was suffering from a form of dysentery & during consolidation & for the following two days, when under heavy mortar fire & sniping & although hit in the head, Col Scott carried on & kept his men & the Bde [Brigade] calm & steady by his personal example of leadership confidence & utmost contempt of danger.

Brig. Goschen reported to me personally on 6 May that he considered the success of the advance of 2 Norfolk onto the vital high ground of G.P.T. Ridge was mainly due to the magnificent & fearless leadership of Lt. Col. Scott.

The capture of the dominating GPT Ridge … was, I consider, the key to the whole of the subsequent operations for the capture of Kohima.”

Three independent reports supporting Grover’s assessment were attached to the recommendation.  However, Lieutenant General Slim, Commander of 14th Army, downgraded the award from Victoria Cross to Distinguished Service Order.        

The photograph & cartoon of Robert Scott, as well as some of the quotations above, are from an excellent webinar by Steve Snelling, that is available on the website of the Kohima Educational Trust (19).

Bert Fitt

Sergeant Bert Fitt was in charge of 9 Platoon of B Company, 2 Royal Norfolks, during the Battle of Kohima.

“I was happy as a platoon commander. I was prepared for a good scrap, if there was one coming along, & I didn’t fear anything or anybody. I was keen to learn & I was also keen to try & protect the men under my command. I wanted to go into battle with thirty men & come out with thirty men. That was my idea & as far as leadership was concerned, I never asked troops under me to do what I couldn’t bear or wouldn’t do myself. I wasn’t frightened. About a couple of minutes before the attack, you’d get a sick feeling in the stomach. But immediately you moved, that sick feeling goes away altogether as far as I was concerned. Everybody, I don’t care who he is, is nervous to a certain extent before a battle. But when it starts then you’ve got one thing in your mind, it’s either you or the enemy, but somebody’s going to get killed. At the back of your mind it’s the enemy, not you or your men.” (2)

Fitt’s platoon was part of the company commanded by Captain Jack Randle on 6th May 1944. Fitt left an eye-witness account of Randle’s death attacking the ‘Norfolk Bunker’ complex on Transport Ridge. Indeed, Fitt’s part in the attack was equally heroic:

“The plan was to attack the Norfolk Bunker from the front. It consisted of about seven or eight bunkers. My platoon was spearhead in attacking the centre & 12 platoon was on the right. Number 10 platoon was in reserve with a support platoon consisting of machine gunners & so forth. (2)

The Japanese had two light machine-gun posts which were carving us up terribly. Captain Randle had already been hit at least twice, fairly heavily in the upper part of his body, before we even got to the bottom. I shouted to him to go down & leave it to me, because I could see that he’d lost blood. He said ‘No! You take that left hand bunker; I’m going to take this right hand one.

The Japanese didn’t realise that I was coming up the slope ‘underneath’ them. I managed to push a grenade in through the slit & after four seconds it went off. Anybody inside that bunker was either dead or knocked out.

I immediately spun right. I saw Captain Randle at the bunker’s entrance. He had a grenade he was going to release into the bunker. I just stood there. I couldn’t do a thing to save him. If he could have held out for about three minutes, I would have got on top of the bunker & knocked it out without getting hurt. But unfortunately, he had been hit again at point blank-range. As he was going down he threw his grenade into the bunker & he sealed the bunker entrance with his own body. But he had got the occupants, killed them.

It was the main gun position & I am certain that’s why he went for it. He knew that if he didn’t knock it out it would be lights out for the rest of us. It was a quite deliberate act to block the opening of the bunker to save the remainder of the men. In doing so, he was unfortunately killed.” (11)

Sergeant Fitt charged 15 yards to the next bunker, where he threw in a grenade & shot a Japanese. He was then shot by someone outside his field of vision:

“He had come out of the back door of the bunker behind me. He got me through the side of the face under my jaw, took my top teeth out, fractured my maxilla & the bullet burnt along the side of my nose. I spat out a handful of teeth. He was only a few paces away. He had a rifle & bayonet & I had a light machine-gun. I pressed the trigger but found I’d got no ammunition left. He came towards me. I was an unarmed combat instructor & knew I could go hand-to-hand against anybody with a rifle & bayonet. I therefore let him come & I crashed the gun straight into his face. Before he hit the ground, I had my hand on his windpipe & I tried to tear it out. I then managed to get the bayonet from his rifle & I finished him with that.

As I stood up, I heard a shout from 12 Platoon telling me that they were pinned down by another bunker I couldn’t see. They told me where it was. I threw a grenade over the top of the bunker & a chap who could see it yelled back a correction. I threw a second one that bounced straight into it, killing the occupants.”

A fresh Norfolk platoon appeared, led by Second-Lieutenant Davies. Fitt told him that he couldn’t continue:

“I had been bleeding heavily & the front of me was pretty red with blood. I was getting weak, so I said to him ‘Well you’d better take over now, Sir.’ I went & sat just inside a bunker. Eventually someone put a field bandage around my head.” (11)

Sergeant Fitt was evacuated to the Regimental Aid Post.

“At the RAP I met Colonel Scott. The first words he said to me was ‘They got you then, Fitt?’

‘That’s right, sir.’

‘Let’s have a look.’

The MO removed the field dressing. Colonel Scott stood in front of me & he went

‘Ho, ho, ho! You never were any bloody oil painting.’ ” (2)

Bert Fitt received the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his conduct at Kohima, which he is seen wearing in the photograph below. He went on to become Regimental Sergeant Major.

After the war, Bert Fitt served with 2nd Holding Battalion of the Norfolk Regiment, 1945-1947, and the East Anglian Training Brigade, 1947-1948. From 1948 to 1953, he served with 1st Battalion Norfolk Regiment in West Germany, Korea & Hong Kong. He ended his proud service as Regimental Sergeant Major at the Norfolk Regiment Depot at Britannia Barracks, Norwich, 1953-1959.

The pictures in this post come from an excellent webinar by Steve Snelling about the Royal Norfolks at Kohima, which can be watched on the website of Kohima Educational Trust.

Jack Randle

John Niel Randle, known as ‘Jack’, was born in Benares, India, in 1917. His family moved to Oxford in 1920, where his father was a Professor of Philosophy.

Randle went to Marlborough School & then studied Law at Merton College, Oxford, graduating in 1939.  He was a boisterous undergraduate.

Although he was called up shortly before the declaration of war, Randle’s legal training was put to use in the army defending soldiers at court-martial proceedings. He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant & joined the 2^nd Battalion Royal Norfolk Regiment in May 1940.  The Battalion embarked for India in April 1942, with the 2^nd Infantry Division. 

After a long period of training in South West India, 2^nd Division was thrown into the Battle of Kohima in April 1944.  By this time, Randle had been promoted to temporary Captain.  He was awarded the Victoria Cross for his conduct during the Norfolk’s attacks on Transport Ridge.  It was detailed in a citation in the London Gazette:

On the 4th May, 1944, at Kohima in Assam, a Battalion of the Royal Norfolk Regiment attacked the Japanese positions on a nearby ridge. Captain Randle took over command of the Company which was leading the attack when the Company Commander was severely wounded. His handling of a difficult situation in the face of heavy fire was masterly & although wounded himself in the knee by grenade splinters he continued to inspire his men by his initiative, courage & outstanding leadership, until the Company had captured its objective & consolidated its position. He then went forward & brought in all the wounded men who were lying outside the perimeter.

In spite of his painful wound Captain Randle refused to be evacuated & insisted on carrying out a personal reconnaissance with great daring in bright moonlight prior to a further attack by his Company on the position to which the enemy had withdrawn.

At dawn on 6th May the attack opened, led by Captain Randle, & one of the platoons succeeded in reaching the crest of the hill held by the Japanese. Another platoon, however, ran into heavy medium machine gun fire from a bunker on the reverse slope of the feature. Captain Randle immediately appreciated that this particular bunker covered not only the rear of his new position but also the line of communication of the battalion & therefore the destruction of the enemy post was imperative if the operation was to succeed. With utter disregard of the obvious danger to himself, Captain Randle charged the Japanese machine gun post single-handed with rifle & bayonet. Although bleeding in the face & mortally wounded by numerous bursts of machine gun fire, he reached the bunker & silenced the gun with a grenade thrown through the bunker slit. He then flung his body across the slit so that the aperture should be completely sealed.

The bravery shown by this officer could not have been surpassed & by his self-sacrifice he saved the lives of many of his men & enabled not only his own Company but the whole Battalion to gain its objective & win a decisive victory over the enemy. 

Although the citation claimed that the Battalion won a “decisive victory” in this action, the reality was rather different.  The bunker complex they had attacked, which became known as the Norfolk Bunker, remained in enemy hands for another six days, until it was finally stormed on May 12^th by Royal Scots with tank support.  Jack Randle’s body had lain unburied during this time.

The night before he died, Randle had said to a fellow officer:

“If I do not come back, make it all right with Mavis & the kid, will you?”

Mavis was his wife.  Her brother Leslie Thomas Manser was in the Royal Air Force & was killed in 1942 in a bombing raid over Cologne in Germany, for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross. Jack Randle embarked for India before his son was born.

A webinar by Stephen Snelling describing the heroism of Jack Randle & John Harman, the other VC recipient at Kohima, can be found on the website of Kohima Educational Trust by clicking here.

Ursula Graham Bower, Queen of the Nagas

Ursula Graham Bower was born in London in 1914.  Her father commanded a submarine during the 1^st World War, winning a DSO for his conduct. 

At the age of 23, Ursula Graham Bower seized an opportunity for adventure & travelled to Nagaland, where she became fascinated by the indigenous people. 

Supported by her dress allowance, she worked as an amateur anthropologist, living amongst the Naga & studying their ways.  Many of them believed that she was a local religious figure reincarnated.

When the Japanese captured Burma, the British established a Watch & Ward network of frontier scouts along the border with India.  Graham Bower was invited to join the network with a group of Nagas & given the rank of acting captain.  To avoid capture, they lived in the jungle.  The Japanese knew about her & put a price on her head.  She described her arrangement to prevent reprisals against Naga suspected of concealing her.   

“My parents could not afford to send me to Oxford, so instead I went to live among the Naga tribes and carried out ethnographic work. When war broke out I … helped start a Watch and Ward scheme in Nagaland. My job was to collect information on the Japanese and send it back by runner. But it had problems. There was no hope I could conceal myself in the Naga village. I am too tall and light skinned. In Burma when British officers were occasionally hidden, the Japs tortured the villagers until the officer gave himself up. I fixed up with Namkia, the headman, that I wasn’t going to be taken alive. So I would shoot myself, and he would take my head in, if the pressure on the villagers became unendurable”. (2)

The Watch & Ward network was stood down in November 1944, when the Japanese threat was considered to have ended.  Namkia was awarded the British Empire Medal for his role in the war effort.

Graham Bower’s exploits grabbed attention from the press, who dubbed her ‘Queen of the Nagas’.  A comic strip appeared in Time magazine that was based upon her story.      

Immediately after the war ended, Graham Bower married Lieutenant Colonel Betts, a British officer from the V Force intelligence-gathering organisation.  They had only known each other for three weeks.

When Ursula Graham Bower died in 1988, three Nagas were pall bearers at her funeral in Hampshire, England.  

Ursula Graham Bower’s daughter can be heard describing her mother’s story in a webinar hosted by Kohima Educational Trust.

Charles Pawsey

In 1944, Charles Pawsey was the Deputy Commissioner for the Naga Hills.  As such, he was responsible for colonial administration of 6,400 square miles of territory (80% the size of Wales), home to more than 40,000 indigenous people, the Naga.  Pawsey cared deeply about the welfare of these people, to whom he showed a deep empathy that they recognized & valued.  He spoke their lingua franca fluently & travelled amongst them by mule, acting as magistrate to settle disputes.

Pawsey was born in Surbiton in 1894 & matriculated in 1913 to study classics at Wadham College, Oxford.  He volunteered when war broke out & was commissioned to join 1/8 Worcestershire Regiment in France in 1915.  He was awarded the Military Cross, for repeatedly crawling into no-man’s-land in broad daylight to rescue the wounded, until caught in a gas attack & invalided from the front.  He received a bar to this MC in 1916, for his conduct on the Somme.  In 1917, his unit was transferred to the Italian front, where he was captured by the Austrians in a melee on the Asiago plateau, above Lake Garda. He remained a prisoner-of-war until the Armistice. 

Despite his absence from Oxford, Pawsey was awarded a degree in 1918 as Declared to have Deserved Honours (DDH), a system that persists to this day.  He joined the Indian Civil Service in 1919 & became Deputy Commissioner for the Naga Hills in 1935. 

Pawsey worked with eminent anthropologists & took many photographs of the people around him & how they lived.  He was based in Kohima, living in a spacious wooden bungalow with a red tin roof, surrounded by rhododendrons. 

Behind the bungalow, a series of terraced gardens, with a tennis court & club house, rose to a hill with a summerhouse.  In 1944, the hill was dubbed Garrison Hill, the tennis court was bitterly contested, & the bungalow reduced to rubble.     

As a civilian, Pawsey had been invited to leave Kohima before the Japanese arrived.  He insisted on staying, believing this an important demonstration to the Nagas that the British would not abandon them.  He based himself on Garrison Hill & displayed inspiring courage by calmly visiting the troops in their trenches, despite the constant danger from snipers.  In a trilby hat, carrying an umbrella and escorted by two Nagas, Pawsey made a strong impression on Private Ray Street of the Royal West Kents:

“He was a kind chap & moved around the hill lifting our spirits as he moved between our trenches & Battalion HQ. He stopped & talked to us saying that relief would get through & told us not to worry too much … He seemed without fear of bullets & shells as he strolled along in the open, as if defying the enemy.” (6)

After the siege of Kohima was lifted, Pawsey moved to Dimapur to organise aid for the Nagas who had been displaced from their homes by the war.  When the fighting moved away, he oversaw the rebuilding of Kohima & creation of its war cemetery.  He conveyed to the Nagas the gratitude of Lieutenant General Slim & presented to them Lord Mountbatten, Supreme Commander, South East Asia.

Charles Pawsey was knighted in 1948, became Companion of the Indian Empire and received the Star of India.  He settled in Suffolk as a gentleman farmer & married in 1954, at the age of 60.  He always maintained a close interest in the unsettled politics of the Naga Hills, which he visited again in 1965 to assist in negotiations.  

 An excellent webinar by Stephen White about the life of Charles Pawsey can be found on the Kohima Educational Trust website by clicking here.

Masao Hirakubo

Masao Hirakubo joined the Imperial Japanese Army in 1942. 

“At the beginning of the war I was a very right-wing nationalist. Everybody was at that time. Everybody intended to give their lives for the nation.

The official purpose of the war was to chase the colonial powers out of the Far East.

We were told that the British & Americans were animals, with hairy bodies. We used to call them monkeys because they had hairy chests, unlike most Japanese men.” (18)

Hirakubo became a Supply Officer in the 3^rd Battalion of 58th Infantry Regiment, part of 31st Infantry Division that attacked Kohima in April 1944.

“I was told there was no plan to supply food from the rear.  It was left to me to concoct enough food for 1,000 men. Where was I to get it? From the sky? From the villagers? From the enemy?  From that point on, my belief in the government & the Army was completely destroyed.

After Kohima we were saved by our commander, General Sato, who decided to retreat even though his superior General Mutaguchi said we should keep fighting to the last man.” (18)

The retreat was gruelling & by the time Hirakubo had crossed the Chindwin, he was too sick to travel further & was left behind.  His orderly & local Burmese cared for him.

“My Battalion reached the Chindwin River.  We were not allowed to cross it, but ordered to travel south alongside it before going west to support other units trying to escape. I was at the rear of the Battalion & still responsible for finding them food, so went across the river towards a food depot.  That night I had a temperature of 40 degrees.  I found the depot that morning, but had no men to transport any food to the Battalion somewhere on the other side of the river.  I was then so ill I had to lie down.  I could not move.  By a miracle, my orderly found me seven days later & looked after me for another thirty days.  Meanwhile we managed to contact the battalion, who then arranged to collect some supplies from the depot.  I then was fit enough to walk east with my orderly until we reached a railway line.  This took a month, sleeping in Burmese village huts, looked after by the Burmese who gave us food & sometimes primitive medicine, usually refusing payment, possibly because they were Buddhist.  We finally managed to rejoin the battalion at Shwebo.” (11)

Repatriated from Burma in 1946, Masao Hirakubo returned to his family home in Yokohama, but found it had been destroyed by Allied bombing.

Eventually, he tracked down his father to Tokyo.

“We met at Shinbashi station, but he couldn’t recognise me. I was muddy & my face was thin & he just didn’t realise it was me.

I told him he had been right about the war.  He had always said Japan was a trading nation. He said we had no natural resources, but by trading we could buy anything, even iron ore & coal. He said trading nations must not use military power & we could not win a war with the British & Americans.” (18)

His former employer, Marubeni, re-employed him & he worked in their Tokyo branch, before eventually moving to Britain as a company representative. It was then that he began a mission of reconciliation with his former enemies, the British. 

 British veterans visited Japan with Hirakubo & were shown great kindness by members of the All Burma Veterans Association of Japan, who in turn sent parties to Britain that were escorted by members of the Burma Campaign Fellowship Group. Acts of reconciliation took
place at Kohima & Imphal, Westminster Abbey, Canterbury & Coventry Cathedrals, & also in Japan & Burma.

Hirakubo went back to Kohima many times.  In 1984, he brought a group of Japanese 31st Division veterans to the British 2nd Division annual reunion in York, where they laid a wreath at the Kohima Memorial.

They also visited the Kohima Museum.

In May 2004, to mark the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Kohima, wreaths were laid on the Indian Divisions’ Memorial in the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, jointly by the Japanese Ambassador, the Commandant, Masao Hirakubo, representing Japanese veterans, & Patric Emerson, representing British & Indian veterans.

Masao Hirakubo was honored by his Emperor & also at Buckingham Palace, where he received an honorary OBE.

Kohima revisited in July 1944

Captain W. Machlachan had served with the Burma Regiment as part of the garrison throughout the siege of Kohima, until relieved on April 20. Three months later, he returned to the scene of his ordeal. Below is an abridged version of his description of Kohima in July 1944.

“Though much has been done in the last month to restore a peaceful atmosphere to Kohima, we are forcibly reminded at every turn of the War, although nature is doing her best to efface the gashes that man had made on the earth.

The end of the battle coincided with the monsoon. The lush undergrowth which appeared with the rain has grown over trenches & shell craters. Rain has washed away the earth from the roofs & walls of hastily dug fox-holes, causing them to collapse into shapeless pits with roof timbers jutting out where they subsided. Because of this, it was only with difficulty that my orderly & I have discovered the bunker in which we had spent nearly three weeks in April & with which we were so familiar that we thought we would remember it in every detail for years to come.

Though nature is doing its best to remove traces of the battle on the ground, it will take many years before the trees which grew thickly on the hill on which the Garrison stood firm can be replaced. They point skywards in bleak & charred nakedness &, with hardly one exception, are completely denuded of leaves, silent witnesses to man’s outrages.

Already many of the shattered buildings have been bull-dozed away. This includes the Deputy-Commissioner’s Bungalow at the foot of Garrison Hill, around which there was much fighting during the first week until the garrison withdrew up the Hill. On its site a cemetry is being made for troops who fell in the original defence & the subsequent relief.

The Hill is still strewn with the aftermath of battle, such things as it had not been worth anyone’s while to pick up. The barbed wire that we had so hastily strung in front of our trenches is hanging tangled with signal cable that had fallen from trees. Parachutes which had brought us medical supplies, water & ammunition from the air, flap in shreds from tree branches where they had been snagged during dropping. Blackened petrol drums are still at the foot of a cleft where they had been flung & set on fire to prevent their falling into the hands of the Japanese.

Here & there are still enemy corpses, recognisable as such now only by the rags of uniform which hold bundles of bone together. One was warned to leave such bundles severely alone in case they covered booby traps.

I find it odd to walk freely about the site of our defences unhampered by the attentions of Japanese snipers. We find it even odder to drive about the roads & tracks which had been in areas occupied by the Japanese.

Driving round the Naga Village itself, not a single undamaged building can be seen. The majority of the huts have at least one of their plaster walls torn away & not one corrugated roof has escaped the riddling shrapnel & bullet fire.

To leave a picture of post-invasion Kohima as the shambles of a battlefield would, however, be false. Already new buildings are replacing those destroyed & the holes in the roofs of sound buildings are being stopped with pitch.” (11)

I shall never forget

Senior Private Manabu Wada, of 3^rd Battalion, 138 Infantry Regiment, 31 Division, recalled:

“I shall never forget the date of 15 March 1944. This was the dry season and the great Chindwin River was now so shallow that we were able to walk across to spearhead 31 Division’s rapid advance to attack the British and Indian forces beyond the Arakan Mountains and capture Kohima in India’s Manipur State.  At that time we thought only of victory, never of defeat.” (5)

The survivors of 31 Division who made it back to the Chindwin in July found a very different scene. The river was swollen by the monsoon rain. All the crossing points were chaotic & the starving, exhausted soldiers had to wait to be ferried to the other side. British planes attacked regularly & corpses accumulated along the banks.

As soon as the planes departed, vultures descended from the trees to feast.

Driven to lunacy

Staff Sergeant Yasumasa Nishiji, 20th Independent Engineering Regiment:

“At the river-crossing point, having tired of queuing for the boat for three days or more, many soldiers ventured to cross the river using a rope strung across it.

Those who managed to reach the middle of the river found that their weight & the looseness of the rope combined to lower them into the river. The strong current prevented them from holding on to the rope; they were swept away & eventually drowned. This scene was repeated again & again.

Although everybody saw exactly what happened, why did so many follow suit? And nobody tried to stop them. Every single one of them was driven to lunacy.” (5)

One more step

Senior Private Manabu Wada, of 3^rd Battalion, 138 Infantry Regiment, 31 Division, recalled:

“Our path to safety lay beyond the Arakan Mountains covered in dense jungle. In the rain, with no place to sit, we took short spells of sleep standing on our feet. The bodies of our comrades who had struggled along the track before us lay all around, rain-sodden & giving off the stench of decomposition. The bones of some bodies were exposed. Even with the support of our sticks, we fell amongst the corpses again & again as we stumbled on rocks & tree roots, made bare by the rain, & attempted one more step, then one more step in our exhaustion.” (3)

Staff Sergeant Yasumasa Nishiji, 20th Independent Engineering Regiment:

“Those struggling along this road were almost all in their twenties, yet they stooped like old men. The sight was one of total misery. Nobody could have believed that these men had once possessed the strength to survive a series of intense battles.

I could not imagine that this was a man who had fought successfully in battles in Hong Kong & Singapore. He looked to be deep in thought; in fact, having been exposed to the monsoon, he had reached the limit of mental exhaustion & was merely gazing intently at the water trickling down to his feet. Though I prayed he would make it to the river-crossing point, he passed away at the roadside only a short distance from it.” (5)

Carrying out orders

Staff Sergeant Yasumasa Nishiji, 20th Independent Engineering Regiment:

“During the retreat, my unit came across a field hospital in the jungle. The condition of the hospital was absolutely appalling. Hundreds of sick & wounded soldiers were lying on the ground, under the trees on both sides of the road.

We recognised our sergeant, who had an injured arm following a severe battle. I had anticipated that, provided he was treated quickly, he would recover completely & return to us. In fact, the skin from the elbow up to his neck was coloured purple & was infested with maggots. It was obvious that he would not survive. Although he looked blank, he realised who we were & gave us a faint smile – but he could not speak.

A barefoot army nurse came into a section of the field hospital, took a syringe from his rucksack & gave injections to those on the verge of death. They would all be dead in about seven seconds. The nurse said that he was carrying out orders, clearly trying to convince himself that he was morally right in freeing them from pain. Having completed his task, he turned his back on us & moved on.” (5)

Much better today

Staff Sergeant Yasumasa Nishiji, 20th Independent Engineering Regiment:

“‘I feel much better today, I’ll move on now; you can catch me up later.’ After saying this, the soldier went off alone.

We came across him dead. He had committed suicide in the middle of the road. Since he knew that we would walk past, he must have been hoping that we would attend to his body. As he had still been able to walk, we all felt dismayed at his decision. However, knowing his nature, he probably did not want to become a burden to his unit. In tears, some of our young soldiers held on to him. He was married with children & was good-natured & amicable; even more so when he had been physically healthy & strong. Having witnessed what had happened while resting, a sick soldier told us that he saw the man pull the trigger of his rifle with his big toe.” (5)

Smiling slightly

Staff Sergeant Yasumasa Nishiji, 20th Independent Engineering Regiment:

“‘Isn’t he a member of your unit, lying dead over there?’ a soldier from another unit asked us. He was; there was no doubt about it. He was lying under a portable tent, the four corners of which were tied to branches of trees.

Suffering from malnutrition & diarrhoea while fighting at the front, he had been sent back behind the lines; one of the luckier ones at that time.

I assumed that, on reaching this point, he had sensed his imminent demise, put up his tent & waited to die beneath it. In his rucksack there was a postcard, a toothbrush, toothpaste & a pipe made of ivory.

Before we buried him next to others of our unit, I managed to cut off one of his fingers to send to his family. It was not at all easy & bloodless pieces of flesh fell off. Just then, the moon appeared in the sky. As it shone down on his face, he seemed to be smiling slightly. Having had to die alone, he would be buried by his close friends. We felt that his smile showed his appreciation.” (5)

A vision of hell

Staff Sergeant Yasumasa Nishiji, 20th Independent Engineering Regiment:

“In our position at the very rear of the retreating troops, I saw many exhausted men unable to keep up with their units & their comrades too weary to help them. It became a routine that a soldier who was emaciated & crippled, with no hope of recovery, was given a grenade & persuaded, without words, to sort himself out. Taking one’s life seemed the only way out. Soldiers who had no chance of recovery were increasingly pressured to take this path.

We called the road the ‘Human Remains Highway’. It was a vision of hell.

This soldier gave his money to his mates & light-heartedly told them to buy something to eat when they got away from the front. After a while, he crawled to the foot of a tree, holding a grenade. Without any sign of hesitation, he activated the grenade & ended his life. Some of his mates who had witnessed the incident cut off a part of his body & left.” (5)

The Japanese custom was to cremate soldiers killed in battle & return the remains to their homeland. This was not often possible in WW2, so instead comrades would cut off a dead man’s fingers & try to return them to their families for burial in Japan.

Allied soldiers searching the packs of fallen soldiers would be horrified to discover severed fingers. Such discoveries fueled rumours of torture and/or cannibalism.

Everyone appeared wounded or sick

Supply officer Masao Hirakubo, 58 Infantry Regiment:

“During the retreat, everyone appeared wounded or sick with beri-beri, malaria & dysentery (often all three at the same time, as I was) & we had no remaining food & medical supplies. We left men scattered along the tracks. We had no time to bury the dead soldiers.

As an officer, I was looked after by my orderly. He was also sick, but not as bad as me. We tried to walk at least 15 miles a day to keep ahead of the enemy. We were taught that we had to kill ourselves with hand grenades rather than be captured. One of my officer colleagues did just this even before the retreat, as he was so sick he did not want his orderly to be burdened further. I would have done this if I had no way to escape.” (11)

July 16. Too weak to fight

On July 16, the Indian pursuit of the defeated Japanese was called off. The total collapse of the defeated army was now certain, with all heavy equipment abandoned & paths littered with corpses.

The victors themselves were badly in need of the chance to recover. Major John Shipster of 33 Brigade, 7 Indian Division, recalled that the

“… rigours of the march had put a great strain on men & mules, most of whom were tired, weak & sick. The health of the Brigade was beginning to deteriorate rapidly & 1st Queen’s were almost too weak to fight. The Gurkhas, with their amazing stamina, still remained remarkably fit. The mules were also in a poor state, for disease was rife among them & a number had died. Plans had been based on reaching Ukhrul & little margin remained. Many men were too weak to digest or retain their food & chronic diarrhoea was rife. For days on end, many officers & men lived on a diet of rum & hot tinned milk, which was all they could manage.” (3)

Far to the east, the Chindits of 23 Long Range Penetration Brigade toiled up & down mountain ridges in the monsoon rain, trying to cut off the Japanese escape to the river Chindwin. Their gruelling trek was described by Lieutenant Philip Brownless of 44 Column:

“The weary column of men & mules plodded down & then up the slippery mountain tracks, waded through torrents, trudged for miles through thick mud. It was here that some begain to suspect the extent of the defeat being inflicted on the Japanese army. An occasional corpse or the carcass of a dead pack pony had been a fairly common sight, but here the column was marching over corpses, corpses sunk into the mud, with a helmet or a piece of equipment or a limb showing, & past an almost continuous line of dead pack animals This continuous line of dead stretched for twenty to thirty miles.

The extreme misery of the march is impossible to describe. The men staggered through the mud & up the slopes, borne down by the weight of their great packs. All were tortured by exhaustion because all were sick. Many were marching with temperatures & tick typhus had begun to break out. We had been sodden for weeks, were covered in mud & we stank. Hollow-eyed, wasted, hungry, & yet incapable of eating more than a minute meal, we talked of nothing else but food.” (3)

But by mid-July, the Chindit columns were withdrawn to Imphal & Kohima, from where they could be trucked to hospitals & rehabilitation centres in Dimapur, to try to recover their shattered health. In many cases, this proved to be impossible.

July 14. A sorry sight

20 Indian Division pursued the retreating remnants of 15 & 31 Divisions, intent on destroying them. They set ambushes to intercept scattered groups of escaping Japanese. One cluster limped into a trap on July 14, losing ten men killed and three captured. The following day, thirteen were killed and four more captured.

The capture of Japanese troops was unusual. Of the 65,000 who invaded India, only 600 were taken prisoner. Most chose suicide as more honourable than surrender. Soldiers who could not keep up during the retreat would routinely be handed a grenade with which to kill themselves.

Sometimes they embraced a comrade with the grenade between them, sharing their final moments.

Those captured during the retreat were mostly too weak to resist, due to starvation & wounds or disease. Lieutenant Peter Toole of 20 Field Company recorded the excitement when news spread amongst his men that a Japanese had been caught:

“One day, word came that a prisoner had been taken. This capture was rare & we had not until now seen a live Jap. The soldier was a sorry sight, small, in tatters, emaciated, scared stiff & bowing left, right & centre, being escorted to the rear”. (3)

Their never having seen a live Japanese reflects their being an artillery unit, which would engage the enemy from afar.

Although some felt sorry for the wretched specimens they captured, others behaved brutally, perhaps in retribution for fallen comrades. Earlier in the campaign, a wounded Japanese prisoner sent by truck from Kohima was shot dead by his guard en route to the Hospital in Dimapur.

July 13. Most loving memory

The bleached bones road

As the exhausted, emaciated survivors of Japanese 15 & 31 Divisions dragged themselves towards the frontier, they passed countless corpses in various stages of decay. They came to refer to the path as the ‘bleached bones road’. Private Masaoki Okoshi recalled

“There were dead bodies everywhere. All along the road as we travelled back. They all collapsed & died by the roadside.” (3)

A moment of shock & revulsion never left Senior Private Manabu Wada:

“In my thirst, I looked for clean water as I struggled to catch up with the division’s remnants. Filling my cupped hands, I was about to drink when I saw maggots floating in them & in disgust I threw it down. It was then that I found it was a stream where ten or more soldiers had come for water. Thousands upon thousands of maggots crept out of the bodies & were carried away by the fast-flowing waters.” (3)

Private Zenta Makioka could not forget how desperately men struggled for sustenance:

“If you notice that some guy has rice, you kill him to get the rice & you eat it & stay alive. That was how it was. If you looked like you had rice, you’d get killed. So you couldn’t appear to be carrying any rice. Many people were killed that way.” (3)

July 8. Screams of the Japanese wounded

South East Asia Command (SEAC) produced a newspaper that was delivered to its troops to keep them informed of progress.

On July 8, the SEAC services newspaper reported that

“Japanese parties are still holding out in the northern outskirts of Ukhrul, resisting fiercely as our troops push forward from the south of the village. Japanese artillery & machine-guns are active. Five hundred Japanese entered from the north-west on Wednesday.” (11)

However, the Japanese were forced to abandon Ukhrul on July 10, leaving behind abandoned weapons & countless putrefying bodies.

They were pursued by 20 Indian Infantry Division, which set road blocks & ambushes for the retreating survivors of 15 & 31 Divisions. The Japanese fought furiously to escape these traps.

Ken Cooper of 2nd Border Regiment, part of 20 Division, recalled

“On patrol near Ukhrul, amid tall, dripping jungle & dark menacing shadows, we heard the cries & screams of the Japanese wounded. In one clearing … there was a lotus pool, blasted by the monsoon torrent: it was full of Jap corpses rotting, emaciated yellow hands clutching at the empty sky.” (3)

Sympathy evaporated upon discovery of a dead British officer pinned to a tree using bayonets.

At Kohima we were starved & then crushed

When 31 Division began to withdraw from Kohima, the men tried to keep discipline & march in an orderly manner, but this effort eventually collapsed. Senior Private Manabu Wada of 3rd battalion 138 Infantry Regiment recorded

“At the beginning of the Imphal Operation, the regiment was 3,800 strong. When our general gave the order to withdraw we were reduced to just a few hundreds. Without shelter from the rains, with boots that had rotted & had to be bound with grass, we began to trudge along the deep mud paths carrying rifles without ammunition.

Icy rain fell mercilessly on us & we lived day & night drenched to the skin & pierced with cold. I remember how we longed for a place, any place at all, where we could take shelter & rest.

In the rain, with no place to sit, we took we took short spells of sleep standing on our feet. The bodies of our comrades who had struggled along the track before us lay all around, rain-sodden & giving off the stench of decmposition. The bones of some bodies were exposed. Even with the support of our sticks we fell amongst the corpses again & again as we stumbled on rocks & tree roots made bare by the rain & attempted one more step, then one more step in our exhaustion.” (5)

Caught up in the retreat, war correspondant Shizuo Maruyama recorded bitterly

“We had no ammunition, no clothes, no food, no guns … the men were barefoot & ragged & threw away everything except canes to help them walk. Their eyes blazed in their lean bodies … all they had to keep them going was grass & water. At Kohima we were starved & then crushed.” (3)

July 5. Lieutenant General Sato sacked

Lieutenant General Sato’s command of 31 Division was terminated on July 5, the day after his opponent’s command had been ended. His valedictory speech to his staff stated:

“It is clear that this operation was scheduled by the foolish desire of one man: Lieutenant General Mutaguchi, commander of the 15th Army. I do not intend to be censured by anyone. Our 31st Division has done its duty. For two months we defended our positions against strong enemy forces & not one of their men during that time passed down the Imphal Road.

Before God, I am not ashamed.

Now I must say good-bye to you. I remember the hard time we had at Kohima & how you helped me do my duty there. I thank you sincerely.

I ask the forgiveness of those who lie dead at Kohima because of my poor talent. Though my body is parted from them, I shall always remain with them in spirit. Nothing can separate those of us who were tried in the fire at Kohima. Now the moment has come when I cease to be your commander; but I hope we shall meet again at the Yasukuni Shrine. I pray for your health & happiness. Goodbye.” (11)

The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto shrine that commemorates those who died in the service of Japan.

Immediately after his speech, Sato left for 15 Army Headquarters in Maymo, Burma. He took with him a detailed critique of 15 Army’s inefficiency & justification of his own actions. On arrival, a court-martial began against him, but this was stopped by Tokyo when medical examination found him mentally unfit to stand trial. He was eventually transferred to the Reserve, initially in Java & later in Japan, where he survived the war.

In December 1944, Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi’s command of 15 Army was terminated. He survived the war in charge of a military academy in Japan.

July 4. Major General Grover sacked

Lieutenant General Montagu Stopford was Commander of 33 Corps, which included the British 2nd Infantry Division. Throughout the Battle of Kohima, Stopford had been frustrated by the time it took 2 Division to relieve the garrison, displace the Japanese & then open the road to Imphal. On July 4 1944, Stopford terminated the command of 2 Division by Major General John Grover, who was sent back to Britain to become Director of Army Welfare.

Major General Grover expressed his gratitude to the men of 2 Division & his pride in having commanded them.

Grover’s sacking caused surprise & anger amongst the British troops he had commanded. For example, John McCann of 1/8 Lancashire Fusiliers wrote that having just

“inflicted on the enemy a massive defeat … it is totally unjust that ‘The Powers That Be’ have separated from each other John Grover & his men”. (8)

The troops greatly resented the criticism of their performance that was implicit in sacking their commander. But Grover had made himself look foolish by declaring on his arrival at Kohima that his task would take only a matter of days. The caution with which he then proceeded provoked the snide accusation from 33 Corps staff that 2 Division was “frightened of shadows”. Doubtless the same staff would have been far more damning if Grover’s men had rushed incautiously into a Japanese trap. It is easy to criticise those in charge, especially with the benefit of hindsight.

Was Grover’s advance too slow? The Japanese road block at Zubza was 10 miles from Kohima & was stormed on April 14 by the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders. By April 16, 2 Division was at Jotsoma, just 2 miles from Kohima. On April 17, 1/1 Punjab could be seen from Kohima Ridge, just half a mile away, but the beleagured garrison was informed by radio that their relief was postponed because Major General Grover wanted time to concentrate his units. That night, the Japanese took Kuki Picquet, driving all the survivors back onto Garrison Hill, fully expecting to be overwhelmed by the next assault. No more attacks came that night & relief arrived the following morning. Under those desperate circumstances, the delay in relieving the garrison seems hard to comprehend by we who were not there, squinting through the fog of war.

John Grover died in 1979, but in 2014, citizens of the Naga village at Jotsoma dedicated a monument to him, his officers and soldiers. The monument praises General Grover’s “exceptional talent” & how he “skillfully orchestrated his plans to win the Battle of Kohima in 1944”. The general’s daughter-in-law Mrs Celia Grover was present.

In 2024, Mrs Celia Grover visited the Kohima Museum on the day of the annual service of remembrance. She is pictured below, in front of the cabinet that contains Major General Grover’s war diary from the Battle of Kohima.

The Nagas go home

Hundreds of the native Naga people were displaced by the war. As the armies moved away, they were able to return to their villages that had been caught in the battle zones. The poignant recollections of Neidelie, aged thirteen, have been recorded:

“We were elated at the thought of going back home. But on the way back, we saw many dead Japanese soldiers … After some time, I grew tired of counting & looking at the dead soldiers, all of whom looked alike now that they were bloated & decomposing by the roadside.

The group that we were travelling with was a large body of our villagers, so we buried the dead bodies when we came upon them on our way. But after some time, we gave up this effort because there were just too many dead Japanese for us to bury all … Dead bodies were strewn over the countryside & the stench from the bodies was more than anyone could bear.” (3)

Several Naga villages that had been occupied by the Japanese had been completely destroyed by Allied shelling & bombing, such as the one at Kohima.

June 26. Mutaguchi seeks permission to withdraw 15 Army

From 15 Army Headquarters at Maymo in Burma, Lieutenant General Mutaguchi had instructed Japanese 31 & 15 Divisions to mount a joint attack on Imphal. This order took no account of the state of these units, which were starved of rations & ammunition, severely depleted, & utterly exhausted. The divisional commanders knew that such an attack was impossible & made no attempt to comply.

Finally bowing to the inevitable on June 26, Mutaguchi sought permission to withdraw 15 Army from Lieutentant General Kawabe, his superior in Rangoon. Kawabe ordered him to continue fighting until approval had been obtained from the Commander of Southern Army, Field Marshal Count Terauchi. Permission was eventually granted on July 8. Initially, Mutaguchi tried to organise the fighting withdrawal, but this proved futile & so on July 20 he ordered a general retreat back across the Chindwin.

Pursuit

Lieutenant General Slim, Commander of Allied 14th Army, was determined to press home the advantage won by his troops. He would not allow the remains of Japanese 15th Army to withdraw to fight another day, but insisted on its complete destruction. He ordered 7th Indian Division to pursue Sato’s 31st Division from the north-west, whilst 80th Indian Brigade pushed towards Ukhrul from the direction of Imphal, aiming to cut the line of retreat of the Japanese 15th & 31st Divisions.

But 7th Division was physically & mentally exhausted. In February, it had fought for its survival in the Arakan, at the Battle of Admin Box, & then it was air-lifted north, to be thrown into the Battle of Kohima. Sickness was widespread. Furthermore, the rugged terrain would not allow a rapid pursuit, especially in monsoon conditions. Air drops were needed to keep the troops supplied, as the paths were inadequate to support motor transport. Fighting was restricted to small-scale clashes between Allied patrols & Japanese support troops defending their lines of communication.

Sato’s men search for food

The tattered remains of Lt General Sato’s 31 Division dragged itself south-east across brutal terrain towards the Naga village of Ukhrul, where they expected to find supplies. The British 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade of chindits was heading south to try to cut the Japanese line of retreat.

Attempts by Japanese 15th Army Command to deliver rations to Ukhrul were severely curtailed by monsoon rains that rendered the roads impassable for lorries. Some of the rations were taken by mule, but they could carry far less than motor vehicles. Furthermore, men of Japanese 15 Division got to the supplies at Ukhrul first, so there was nothing remaining when 31 Division arrived.

On June 21, Lt General Sato was visited near Ukhrul by Maj General Kunomura, Chief of Staff to Lt General Mutaguchi, Commander of 15 Army. Kunomura brought orders for 31 Division to deploy alongside 15 Division & take the offensive against Imphal. Lt General Sato reacted with fury:

“We are in an appalling situation through lack of supplies. To attack Imphal as we are is the height of absurdity. Please acquaint the Army command with this fact.” (15)

Kunomura explained that the supplies sent to Ukhrul had been taken by 15 Division. More food was at Humine, where the Japanese lorries had been forced to stop. So 31 Division trudged on through the rain & mud. Beside the gnawing hunger, almost all of them were racked with fever & diarrhoea due to dysentry. Corpses accumulated by the roadsides as they passed.

They found rice when they reached Humine, but only enough to feed them for two days. An order came on June 23, with instructions for deployment of 31 Division for the proposed attack on Imphal. Sato instead dispersed his men to forage for food in the mountain villages.

June 22. We’d done our job

The Armoured Column of 2 Division set off again towards Imphal at first light, starting from Milestone 97. They were accompanied by 2 Durham Light Infantry in lorries, with a few riding on tanks, & followed by the rest of 6 Brigade. They engaged some disorganised groups of Japanese in the process of withdrawing; these were not from 31 Division, which had fought at Kohima, but from 15 Division that had attacked Imphal.

The Armoured Column passed an abandoned Japanese field hospital. Major David Wilson, of 6 Brigade Headquarters:

“I don’t remember taking any prisoners, but then I don’t remember any of them wanting to surrender either. Even in the field hospital that we overran near Kanglatongbi the patients had either been killed by their friends or had killed themselves to escape the shame of being captured.” (11)

However, Sergeant-Major Tochihira of 15 Division had a very different perspective as he watched from a hillside. He counted about 120 Japanese hospital casualties who had been lined up by the road & then abandoned as the British tanks arrived. Some had tried to make their own way but then fallen. Tochihira saw a soldier from the Advanced Column with a container of petrol, which he poured over the sick & wounded Japanese. He then bent forward & ignited it, using a cigarette that he had been smoking. Tochihira could hear cries of anger, fear & pain, as black smoke began to rise from the burning men. The appalling scene reminded him of paintings of the Buddhist concept of hell, where the damned roast in agony. (15)

The road carried the Advanced Column of 2 Division onto the Imphal plain. Captain Sean Kelly of the Durhams:

“Our tanks spotted movements away forward where elephant grass gave way to trees & began to brass it up properly. Soon they stopped. A plaintive message relayed through many sets had reached them: we were brassing up the advance elements of the 5 Indian Division of the beleaguered 4 Corps!” (11)

Brassing up was British vernacular for shelling. At 10.30, the 2 Division tanks & Durhams met men of 1/17 Dogras of 5 Division, 26 miles north of Imphal, near Milestone 109.

The Dogras had beaten the tanks coming from Imphal by rejoining the road after moving through hills to the west. But the Stuart tanks of 7 Light Cavalry weren’t far behind. Hand shakes were immortalized by an official photographer.

Captain Harry Swinson described the day in his diary, from the perspective of 5 Brigade Headquarters:

“The sun was shining as we rode forward. The whole Army was surging forward with the knowledge that the Japs were beaten & soon, soon, there would be rest. Nights spent in comfort unbroken by a sentry-go; time to dry clothes; time to bath; time to write letters home; time to become human again; and, most of all, time to sleep. You could hear the troops singing on the crowded trucks.

We arrived at M.S. 102 to find an order awaiting us to push on to M.S. 106. On we went. The defeat of the Japs became now more evident. Piles of kit were strewn along the road in great disorder; enough to equip whole battalions. Most of the clothing, I noticed, was British; they must have captured it all at Kohima. The road was choc-a-bloc with traffic. I noticed some armoured cars and carriers coming towards us. They were caked thick with mud and dust as if they’d been in action for days; their crews looked as if they’d been in action for weeks. I suddenly realised they weren’t our chaps. The road was open; they must have come from Imphal. I waved as we passed. They straightened up slightly & a grin crept over their dirty faces. Then they put up their thumbs & went trundling past us. Well, that was that. We’d done our job.

Eventually we established H.Q. on a grassy bank near the M.S. 102. Here we are this evening chatting, drinking our rum, & thinking that perhaps life isn’t so bad after all. By a stroke of luck I’ve had a pile of mail. An order came through an hour or so ago to clear the road for sixty 8-tonners that are rushing beer and canteen stores through to Imphal. The first few trucks have just gone past us. Up on either side in the hills the troops are having the occasional scrap, but there’s not much fight left in the Japs & they are being carved up. Our men have got their revenge all right.” (17)

Captain Sean Kelly, who was there when they met the Dogras:

“Imphal was relieved. We sat alone in the sunshine & smoked & ate. Soon the staff cars came purring both ways. It was a lovely day.” (11)

June 21. Great stuff

Captain Harry Swinson at 5 Brigade Headquarters recorded in his diary that

“The Brigadier says we must get the road open right away, as the Division at Imphal are in a bad way.” (17)

There was much more than a Division cut off at Imphal – around 60,000 Indians, Gurkhas & British of 4 Corps. Surely they knew this?

At Karong (milestone 92), the road to Imphal crossed a ravine by a 120-foot girder bridge. Seizing this was the day’s principle objective for the Armoured Column leading 2 Division’s advance. A serious delay would ensue if the bridge were destroyed. The Japanese had made preparations to demolish it, but delayed too long & it was captured intact by the British without a fight. The advance continued as far as Milestone 97.

Back at 5 Brigade HQ:

“The Armoured Column has been sweeping on, the news kept on filtering through. Then we heard that the bridge at Karong had been captured intact. Great stuff, this. Speculation is rife among both officers and men as to when we shall link up with the column pushing North from Imphal, and what will happen when we do link up. At 5.0 o’clock came word that the tanks were laagering for the night by M.S. 102. The gap is only three miles wide now.” (17)

This information exaggerated progress, probably reflecting excitement that the mission was almost accomplished after so much blood, sweat & tears. Harry Swinson recorded the party atmosphere prevailing as the Worcesters showed off their trophies from the assault on Maram:

“The Worcesters brought back their captured Jap gun to-day and have mounted it by their H.Q. Permission has been asked to keep it & the Corps Commander has put the request forward. They are keeping the odd Jap machine gun. One, I saw, is very like a Bren Gun and has a curved magazine. The troops love shooting the Japs with their own weapons. Met Edward Tooby, who had won a saki bowl with a delicately tinted drawing of the sexual act. He was very proud of it!” (17)

The Japanese machine gun that resembled the British Bren was probably their type 96 or type 99.

June 20. Very proud

Captain Harry Swinson described in his diary the mood in 5 Brigade Headquarters after the Worcester’s success on the previous day in overcoming the Japanese rearguard’s attempt at Maram to halt the advance towards Imphal:

“This morning moved the H.Q. up into Maram. By 1000 hours the fighting had moved on to M.S. 82, where a few Japs were desperately trying to hold up the Dorsets. At 1100 hours the Brigadier held a conference. Everyone in good form and the conversation would not have been sub-standard in a salon. [Major] John Brierley’s stories of the attack were most amusing. Very proud of capturing a field gun. It was dug right into the ground and camouflaged up so that it only had a 6 degree traverse. The Japs had sited it to cover the road in an anti-tank role, but as “D” Company with their left hook worked round the back of it, this didn’t help much and the officer in charge was shot dead by Sjt. Plumley, M.M. The Japs never did know how to use guns in batteries or regiments, but to employ them like this shows utter panic.” (17)

Most armies concentrated their artillery for maximum impact, but the Japanese generally dispersed theirs for use as infantry support.

June 19. A great day for the Worcesters

Indian 4 Corps at Imphal had been sustained by air since March, when the Japanese had cut the only road to its supply depot at Dimapur. However, the amount that could be flown in had fallen considerably because flying conditions were impacted by the monsoon & many transport aircraft had been reclaimed by their American owners. The situation put British 2 Division under pressure to race southwards & re-open the road from Dimapur to Imphal. The rearguard of Japanese 31 Division was fighting to delay them, thereby keeping Imphal cut off & buying time for their comrades to escape.

At the village of Maram, the Japanese rearguard made a stand, taking advantage of the defensive potential of a ridge. British patrols determined that substantial force would be required to dislodge the Japanese. This began with an artillery barrage supported by Vickers machine-guns of the 2nd Manchesters. Captain Harry Swinson watched progress from 5 Brigade Headquarters:

“About mid-day the battle really got going. The Brigadier was squatting on a camp stool on a grassy bank by the side of the road. He was soon joined by the Divisional and Corps Commanders and more stooges than you would have thought could exist. The air was thick with orders and instructions. One shell here would have destroyed no end of military talent.

By two o’clock the Worcesters’ forward companies were putting up recognition smoke. We watched it anxiously. It appeared in small puffs without any apparent pattern, but slowly (oh, so slowly) it was moving up the hill. I could imagine the small infantrymen sweating and swearing their way up the slope. Then a small puff appeared in the scrub at the top of the ridge. Then another. Then another. Soon there was no end of it. The Brigadier lowered his glasses to mop his brow. A message came over the set from a company commander to say his men were fighting their way down the reverse slope. By 1500 hours it was all over, and the position had been taken. We found out later that a gun and miscellaneous kit and weapons had been taken and many Japs; our losses were one killed and seventeen wounded. A great day for the Worcesters, this.” (17)

June 18. A thrilling ride

On June 18, the 2 Division column progressed sixteen miles towards Imphal, eventually stopping for a bridge to be repaired at milestone 78 near the village of Maram. By this stage the road was going downwards from the Naga Hills & the terrain was becoming more open, as it approached the Imphal plain. Japanese corpses & abandoned equipment lay beside the roadside.

The advance was described in the diary of Captain Harry Swinson, a Staff Officer with 7 Worcesters & 5 Brigade Headquarters:

“Pushed transport forward for Worcesters & Camerons. Not easy, as what seems like the rest of the 14th Army is trying to race down this mountain road. Even bulldozers are well up and going strong. The Brigadier and his Command Post went forward at 0700 hours. I followed him soon after in the Jeep. It was a thrilling ride. The day was fair, the light was dancing on the mountains & we were racing forward after an enemy who was too demoralised to fight & too exhausted to run. Mile after mile we rode gaily along, passing troop-carrying 3-tonners, 15-cwts., and all manner of vehicles, until we found ourselves well up in the Armoured Column & were lucky not to get crushed between the Grants. Occasionally a landslide delayed us, but not for long. A frenzied half-hour with the Sappers & the whole force moved forward, on, on, into the mountains.

About 1600 hours we were at M.S. 76. The tanks in front halted & word came back that a bridge was blown. I parked the Jeep off the road & took out my glasses. There was a valley stretched below us about a mile wide &, opposite, a grassy ridge with an occasional white basha or dark green copse silhouetted on the sky-line.

The Brigadier came up & said that the ridge was held & it would need a set-piece attack to capture. The gunners came up into position behind us, & the Manchesters on our flanks, while the Worcesters pushed out patrols to probe the Jap positions.

The Brigadier held a conference this evening. He was in good form and it was difficult to imagine we were planning a battle. His theme was this: if the patrols find the place is lightly held, we will push forward the Armoured Column with close infantry support. If it is strongly held, the Worcesters will have to do a pincer movement on Maram (the name of the village) & the tanks will smash through the road later. The composition of the column was thrashed out in detail. The gunners’ tasks were outlined. Conference broke up about 2200 hours and we crawled to bed.” (17)

So far, Major General Miyazaki’s rearguard had kept the British away from the main body of the retreating Japanese 31 Division. But the invaders’ escape was severely hampered by flooding of the road, causing mud-slides down slopes & quagmire at the bottom. Miyazaki sought assistance from 15 Division, which was struggling to contain Indian forces pushing north from Imphal to link up with the approaching British. However, all the Japanese units were in a desperate state, chronically depleted and starving, so little succour could come from 15 Division.

June 17. Deep in our hearts

After the Japanese rearguard had been displaced on June 14 from its stand at Viswema, 2 Division’s advance towards Imphal was led by 2 Recce Regiment & 6 Brigade (1 Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1 Royal Berkshires & 2 Durham Light Infantry). They were harassed at every opportunity by the retreating Japanese, with mines, sniper fire & ambushes by small units of defiant men.

On June 15, five men of 2 Recce Regiment & one of the Royal Berkshires lost their lives. On June 16, three more Royal Berkshires were killed & four Durhams. Another three Berkshires & four more Durhams died on June 17, as well as one Worcester (5 Brigade) & one from 2 Division’s Royal Corps of Signals. This steady toll of lives was a constant reminder that the Japanese remained dangerous, despite being beaten.

June 16. These hands

Gunner Richard George of 99 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, had a distressing experience whilst supporting the vanguard of 2 Division’s advance. One of the Royal Scots’ casualties had been put in a shallow grave, but the monsoon had washed away some of the soil placed over him & exposed his hands. Gunner George recorded how he had covered them up:

“Some of their bodies had been hastily buried and it was over one of these graves I stumbled when we moved in later. The village was still burning, and I knelt and covered the exposed hands of the dead Scotsman in his shallow grave.”

Moved by the experience, he wrote a poem that same night, which he called “These Hands” (16)

Beside the burnt-out remnants of this place
I saw the lifeless hands above the earth
Here then was war the horror of its face
For this, for this, a man was given birth
The shallow grave would scarce the body hide
Akimbo sprawled the hands were still and grey
I could not pass but knelt down by his side
To scrape the soil and cover from the day
These hands, I said, once moved and felt and knew
The warmth of other hands, and touched things dear,
Perhaps had picked firm fruit or flowers grew
Or turned bright wheels or trailed through water clear
But now no life beneath my burning touch
I tried to hide which might have been my own
Dead fingers here which once at life did clutch
But now I press them down, alone – alone
It seems so strange, the unexpected things
Which one is called to do in times like these
My mind revolves and childhood memory brings
The tears I shed, and know I cannot grieve, Only some deep-down pain I cannot show
Wells in my heart and floods without a sound
For this quiet heap where grasses soon will grow
For him who knows me not beneath this mound.

June 15. Major General Miyazaki

The Japanese rearguard that had held up the British for 6 days at Viswema consisted of two infantry battalions, supported by 37mm & 75mm field guns & some engineers. They stood up to the British 2nd Division of nine infantry battalions, with tanks & superior artillery support. The British were certainly much weakened by the fighting at Kohima (1/8 Lancashire Fusiliers were less than 150 strong), but that was undoubtedly also true of the Japanese, who had been fighting for longer & starved. The rearguard’s protracted stand at Viswema should be recognized as a considerable achievement. It illustrates the formidable ability of Japanese infantry to resist attack by superior forces, as long as they resisted the urge to squander their lives in futile charges.

Credit for the rearguard’s achievement goes to Major General Shigesaburo Miyazaki. He was short of stature & respected by the troops for his great personal courage. They also liked the charming eccentricity of his pet monkey, called Chibi, who perched on his shoulder. Miyazaki was loyal to the Divisional Commander, Lt General Sato, with whom he shared contempt for Lt General Mutaguchi.

Miyazaki spent much of his early career in Manchuria, where he had fought against the Chinese. In 1939, he commanded an infantry regiment in the Battles of Khalkhin Gol, where the Japanese fought the Soviet Army over a disputed border.

In March 1944, Miyazaki was in charge of the left (most southern) column of the 31st Division, as it invaded India. It was this column that had discovered the unexpected presence of 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, which it eventually overran in the Battle of Shangshak. The battle delayed the Japanese arrival at Kohima by a week, which was crucial in allowing reinforcement of the garrison. Miyazaki has been criticised for halting his column for so long, as he could have left the Indians to be dealt with by part of the Japanese 15th Division, which arrived 3 days after Miyazaki’s men.

Miyazaki became Commander of 54th Division in 1945 and fought against 14th Army’s invasion of Burma. After the war, he was detained in a camp in Burma until 1947, when he was returned to Japan. He ran a ceramics shop & died in 1965 at the age of 73.

June 14. A military exercise

After days of frustration, an assault by 7 Worcesters managed to drive the Japanese from Viswema at last. Captain Currie of 1 Royal Scots watched in admiration:

“The 7th Worcestershires put in a ‘set-piece’ attack on the fort on our left. A heavy barrage supplemented by the Brigade mortars was put down & the Worcestershires attacked behind it. We could see the whole attack quite plainly from the village & it looked fantastically like a military exercise. They came in hard up against the barrage & cleared the eastern end of the village with hardly a casualty. At about the same time, the Japanese left the heights on the west of the road.” (11)

The Royal Scots & the Manchester machine-gunners shot down many Japanese as they tried to escape from Viswema village. 1 Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders seized the high ground to the west of the road, which had been abandoned. They found unoccupied bunkers made of steel & concrete, as well as a cookhouse & a lot of equipment.

June 13. All that he had, he gave

The advance of 2 Division towards Imphal had been held up at Viswema since June 9 by the stubborn Japanese rearguard. This bought valuable time for 31 Division to escape its pursuers & deprived Indian 4 Corps of urgently-needed supplies. To break the deadlock, an assault was planned for next day by the Worcesters & Camerons, supported by a barrage from 16 Field Regiment Royal Artillery.

June 12. Yosegaki Hinomaru flags

4 Royal West Kents were following the track to Jessami, in pursuit of the retreating Japanese. Private Ray Street described what happened:

“One early misty morning at first light we overran a Japanese camp. The enemy had left in a hurry, leaving everything as it was. They couldn’t have been gone long. A billy-can of water was still boiling on the fire. Rifles were stacked neatly in threes & uniforms still hung on bushes. I kicked the tin into the fire & we took the bolts out of the rifles & threw them down the jungle covered hillside. We went through the pockets of the uniforms for information, but most were empty.

A dead Jap was on a stretcher & I walked past leaving him alone, kicking a blood-stained white rag as I went by. My friend behind picked it up & to my disappointment shook it out to find it was a large Japanese battle flag with a tiger on it, a fine souvenir, nice & light & easy to carry. We continued to search the camp, but found nothing & started to go back. That so-called dead Jap had got up & gone. He was lying dogo & waited for the opportunity to leave. We wouldn’t be so foolhardy next time.” (6)

Many Japanese soldiers carried their own flag for good luck. The flags are known as “Hinomaru”, which translates as “circle of the sun”. Flags presented early in the war were made of silk, but cotton became more common as resources became scarce. They would be bought in a shop & then personalised with the name of the recipient, friends & family, as well as messages of hope, good luck & patriotic slogans.

The flags were popular souvenirs for Allied soldiers, in most cases taken from dead Japanese.

The flag above was found in 1944 by men of 1/1 Punjab Regiment. Its messages include “divine fighting spirit”, “defeat the US and UK”, “leadership spirit will reach thousands of miles”, “huge accomplishments in distant lands”, “for construction of world history”, & “beautiful death with honour and loyalty”.

A feature by the National Army Museum is the source of the above images & provides more examples & information about Yosegaki Hinomaru flags.

June 11. It didn’t seem true.

At the village of Viswema, the Japanese rearguard continued to block the road to Imphal. Attempts by a company of 2 Royal Norfolks to push them from a spur above the village ended in frustrating failure.

Kenneth Parkhurst, the chaplain to 1 Royal Welch Fusiliers, was missing his dead friend, Captain John Rostron, who had been killed in action on April 22. He wrote the following poem:

TO JOHN ROSTRON DSO

They said you had gone but it didn’t seem true
I couldn’t believe it – it couldn’t be you
With your eager mind
And your humour gay
And your heart so kind
And your friendly way
I thought of the things you were planning to do and I couldn’t
believe it
No Johnny – not you
And I didn’t believe it was true, until
I saw the sun on a little green hill
And I thought of the downs that I knew far away
And remembering something I wanted to say
To you, because you’d know what I’d mean
And see exactly what I had seen
Something I wanted at once to share –
I turned to tell you – but you were not there
And then I knew that you had gone
And I was left to watch alone.

The above is one of many war poems written by members of 2 Division, that were collected by Bob Cook & Robin McDermott, curators of the Kohima Museum. The poems are available in a book “Soldier Poets of the 2nd British Infantry Division”.

June 10. The hearts he left at home

With the support of divisional artillery, the Royal Scots & Lancashire Fusiliers made slow progress in prising Viswema village from the hands of the Japanese. The defenders fought fiercely & inflicted multiple casualties. Additional losses were caused by sniping from a spur over-looking the village.

June 9. Viswema

Progress of 2 Division towards Imphal had been stopped at milestone 60 by the Japanese rearguard, which held ground overlooking the road from both sides. They also occupied the village of Viswema on the east side of the Imphal road. With tank support, 1/8 Lancashire Fusiliers tried to advance up the road, but were driven back by machine-gun fire & grenades from the Japanese on the higher ground beside the road & a 75 mm gun further ahead. A company of Fusiliers & a company of Royal Scots together succeeded in establishing themselves in part of Viswema nearest the road, but much of the village remained in Japanese hands. On the west side of the road, 2 Royal Norfolks pushed the defenders back a little & then had to fight off a determined counter-attack.

Whereas 2 Division had headed south, 7 Division & other units had marched east from Kohima, aiming to prevent the Japanese from escaping in that direction. Amongst them were 4 Royal West Kents. The excitement about the Normandy landings had left them feeling neglected:

“We wished we could get more help out here, feeling that we were not getting the praise nor backup we deserved.” (6)

Their mood was not improved by the sight of a burnt-out British tank with a shell hole in its turret. Later they passed the skeletal remains of about thirty British & Indian troops scattered over a slope below some blown-out bunkers. Inside sprawled the skeletons of Japanese, with grinning skulls beneath their helmets. The West Kents trudged by in silence.

On June 9, Lt General Sato received an order from Lt Gen Mutaguchi that whilst his rearguard should continue to delay the British drive south, the remainder of 31 Division, by June 10, should

“… link up with … 15 Division & prepare to attack towards Imphal.” (8)

This order failed to acknowledge that both divisions were now starving & desperately low in ammunition. Sato thought it madness:

“I was flabbergasted … This incredibly nonsensical plan simply appalled me. I could not help questioning the Army HQ’s sanity.” (8)

Although aware of the plan, Mutaguchi’s superior, Lt General Kawabe, made no attempt to interfere.

June 8. We wonder why

At dawn on June 8, 1/8 Lancashire Fusiliers crossed the nullah (stream) at Kigwema unopposed & discovered that the bunkers overlooking the road had been abandoned. The Royal Engineers quickly repaired the bridge & cleared some landmines to allow the advance to continue. The Dorsets stayed behind to occupy Kigwema, where a mobile bath unit was established that furnished passing troops with clean clothes & beer.

After three miles of progress, the Column was again delayed at Milestone 58. The Royal Engineers cleared 33 landmines & repaired another bridge that the Japanese had damaged. As soon as it was possible to continue, the Lancashire Fusiliers pressed forward, but soon ran into an ambush with a field gun supported by automatic fire. The Fusiliers suffered six fatalities, including their Commanding Officer, Lt-Col Maurice West, who was killed by a shell.

The quotation is from “O Valiant Hearts”, a poem by Sir John Stanhope Arkwright (1872–1954), that contains the lines

Splendid you passed, the great surrender made;
Into the light that nevermore shall fade

The poem was published in 1919 in “The Supreme Sacrifice, and other Poems in Time of War”. It was set to music as a hymn that is often included in services of remembrance on armistace day. It begins

O valiant hearts who to your glory came
Through dust of conflict and through battle flame;
Tranquil you lie, your knightly virtue proved,
Your memory hallowed in the land you loved.

June 7. Advance towards Imphal

Having discovered that the Japanese had left Aradura Spur, 2 Division began advancing down the main road to Imphal. In their vanguard were tanks, armoured cars, personnel carriers and trucks containing Royal Engineers & the Royal Scots infantry battalion. Progress was slow, due to road blocks & blown bridges, which the engineers had to repair.

5 Brigade had been working its way across country in parallel to the Imphal road, but was able to join the road at milestone 52, after dislodging some Japanese who had stayed to delay them. These milestones measured the distance from Dimapur.

The advance got as far the village of Kigwema, at milestone 55. In that day’s advance, the Royal Engineers had cleared three landslides and five road blocks, work that was greatly facilitated by the presence of bulldozers. They had also repaired several damaged bridges. At Kigwema they encountered another bridge that had been demolished by the Japanese. In this case, repair was prevented by Japanese machine-guns in bunkers overlooking the approach to the bridge. Neither tank fire nor infantry attack were able to dislodge the occupants before nightfall.

There was a military hospital at Kigwema, that had been abandoned in March when the Japanese arrived. It was out of sight of the bunkers & so provided a convenient place to spend the night. Lt-Colonel Wilbur Bickford recorded:

“The billets were in most cases extremely comfortable & some people were lucky enough to sleep on hospital spring beds after some dead Japanese had been cleared away.”

The troops were surprised & delighted when a van arrived bearing members of the Women’s Auxiliary Service. This was an organization of British & Australian volunteers who delivered food in mobile canteens.

Whilst 2 Division moved south, 7 Division was heading east on the track to Jessami, where 1 Assam Regiment had made its heroic stand two months previously.

June 6. How are they doing in France?

A patrol by 1/8 Lancashire Fusiliers was unable to find any live Japanese on Aradura Spur. Other units sent patrols to check & all came back with the same answer. The Japanese had gone.

As if to confirm that the ordeal was over, the rain stopped & the sun came out. Then news of the Normandy landings swept through the British troops. Everybody was buzzing with the feeling that the war was going their way at last. Staff Captain Arthur Swinson:

“The sunlight was streaming across the mountains, stretched west & south as far as the eyes could see. All the troops have been coming up to our signallers asking ‘How’s it going? How are they doing in France?” (3)

The mood was very different at 15th Army headquarters in Burma. One of Lieutenant General Mutaguchi’s officers recalled that their commander had taken to prayer:

“Near his house, he had a special place for prayer in Shinto style, a flat narrow square area covered with white sand with bamboo poles on four corners. Every morning he sat there & recited Shinto prayers loudly. As the Japanese advance was beaten back … he spent more time there; he was praying for God’s help for victory.” (8)

On June 6th, Mutaguchi held a strategy meeting with his superior Lieutenant General Kawabe, Commander of Burma Area Army. Kawabe recorded in his diary that

“Mutaguchi was in good health, but his eyes were filled with tears. “We are at the crossroads, but have no fears” he greeted me.” (8)

Both men knew that the Japanese invasion was failing, at Imphal as well as Kohima, but Mutaguchi failed to disclose that Lieutenant General Sato had defied his orders. In fact, of the three divisional commanders who had invaded India in March, Sato was the only one that Mutaguchi had not yet sacked. Despite the calamitous situation, the strategy meeting passed without either man having the moral courage to admit that it was time to cut their losses & withdraw the battered, starving 15th army. Although tens of thousands of lives depended on their decisions, it was more comfortable for these senior officers to carry on as normal, rather than lose face by acknowledging their catastrophic failure.

Years later, Mutaguchi claimed

“I guessed Kawabe’s real purpose in coming was to sound out my views on the possibility – or otherwise – of continuing the Imphal operation. The sentence ‘The time has come to give up the operation as soon as possible’ got as far as my throat, but I could not force it out in words. But I wanted him to get it from my expression.” (8)

The starving Japanese troops deserved much better than this. Brigadier Mike West hit the nail on the head when he described them as “first class soldiers in a third class army.” (12)

June 5. You could feel the elation

The Japanese on Big Tree Hill were pounded by seven batteries of 25 pdrs & four tanks firing from Kohima, supported by the mortars of 5 Brigade. After this preparation, the Camerons were able to ascend & capture the hill. They & the Dorsets then pressed on, in parallel to the Imphal road. They encountered no further resistance, but caught up with & killed some Japanese laden with equipment.

7 Indian Division & the Chindits of 23 Longe-Range Penetration Brigade were further east of the Imphal road & now moving south, aiming to cut off the line of Japanese retreat towards Burma. They found extensively prepared positions that had been abandoned, along with mortars, guns & other equipment.

It was now very clear that the Japanese had left Kohima. The battle was over at last.

“The spirits of the troops soared. You could feel the elation. People talked out loud, joked, laughed. Ours was a different army.” (3)

June 4. Our dearest only son

The Royal West Kents were cautiously checking for pockets of Japanese resistance. They uncovered a complex of abandoned bunkers that appeared to have been a Headquarters, but there were no signs of life.

5 Brigade was not so lucky. They were proceeding south in parallel with the Imphal road, to bypass the Japanese rearguard on Aradura Spur. However, their progress was halted by a strong force of Japanese on features dubbed Pimple & Big Tree Hill. Pimple was subjected to artillery bombardment & then attacked by the Dorsets, who reached the top but were forced to withdraw by heavy fire, with 14 wounded & 5 dead.

The Camerons took over & succeeded in capturing Pimple. Their assault was led by Major Angus Douglas, the battalion’s second-in-command, but he was fatally wounded by a bullet in the neck. Gordon Graham watched as

“He was carried past me on a stretcher, a death pallor on his face. I learned afterwards that he had asked for a drink. The sergeant accompanying him had only whisky in his flask. Angus took a gulp, smiled, & died.” (12)

Big Tree Hill remained heavily defended & would need to be taken.

June 3. Spent bullets

5 Brigade were ordered to march south parallel to the Imphal road, but a mile further east, with the aim of bypassing the Japanese on Aradura Spur. This meant working through jungle terrain, made slippery by torrential rain. Private Tom Cattle of the Dorsets:

“We marched all day in single file, slipping & sliding down, until we reached the low paddy fields. We knew that the Japanese could see us from the hills above & were firing at us, but we were out of their range. We could hear the hum of spent bullets.” (11)

As nightfall approached, the Dorsets halted & began to dig trenches to spend the night, when they came under attack. Tom Cattle again:

“We took up defensive positions & started to dig in. I had got down about two feet & had taken off my steel helmet as the sweat was pouring off me, when suddenly the Japanese started to attack us with mortars & machine-guns. Before I could take cover, a mortar shell landed near to me with a deafening explosion. I felt a sharp blow to the back of my head & was knocked out. I remember coming round. I put my hand to the back of my head & knew I had been hit because my hand was covered in blood. My mates bound up the wound with my field dressing. I was put on a stretcher & carried down the hill, back along the way we had started from earlier that day. I can’t remember much about that journey as I had been given an injection.” (11)

Evidently the Japanese rearguard remained dangerous.

June 2. They died apologising

An NCO of the Japanese 58th Infantry Regiment recalled:

“In the final stages of the battle, many soldiers stayed in their bunkers because they were so far gone with starvation, malaria & beriberi that they did not have the power to move. Their clothes were soaked with rain, sweat & were filthy dirty. They could never get out of the bunkers to dry them. All they could do was rest against the fire slit & pull the trigger whenever attacked.” (11)

The last signs of Japanese resistance at Naga Village were at Hunters Hill. This was pounded by artillery, tanks & Hurribombers & then successfully stormed by 1 Queen’s Royal Regiment.

As far as could be ascertained, there were no more Japanese left alive at Naga Village. The triumphant Queensmen & 4/1 Gurkhas climbed into lorries & were ferried to the rear to recuperate. They were replaced by 4/5 Gurkhas & 2 South Lancashires of 114 Brigade, 7 Indian Division.

161 Brigade of 5 Indian Division was mopping up to the west of Naga Village. The 4/7 Rajputs had occupied Merema & 4 Royal West Kents opened the track from Merema to Kohima.

Having suffered so grievously at Naga Village in May, the news that it had been liberated would have impacted 5 Brigade. They were now based on Transport (GPT) Ridge, supporting 1 Burma Regiment & 1/8 Lancashire Fusiliers on Aradura Spur. They were poised to advance if the Japanese withdrew from the Spur, as explained by Major Peter Everidge:

“The plan was not to assault Aradura, but to move in immediately the Japanese moved out. 5 Brigade therefore had to occupy GPT Ridge in a state of defence, but at the same time had to be prepared to move forward. Every day for five days, patrols from GPT Ridge reported no signs of Japanese on Aradura & then at night patrols reported that Japanese were still there. Everybody was rapidly going dizzy from being ordered to pack to move after dusk & then having it cancelled before midnight. The troops were very browned off.” (11)

The nightime activity of the Japanese at this stage probably reflected attempts to gather supplies, according to Captain Shosaku Kameyama of 3/58 Infantry Regiment:

“Although we kept fighting, it was very lonely & miserable to stay isolated in a foxhole on the mountain in the situation when a chance of winning seemed too remote. We ran out of ammunition & food, so sometimes we went out to attack an enemy position at night, & when the enemy ran away, we collected rations, bullets & grenades, & used them the next day. In this way, we held out stoutly day by day, but inevitably someone got hurt or killed. It was heart-breaking that even if one did his best, nothing could help. And it was even more heart-breaking that one’s comrade had to do more work if one became unable to move.  If he were heavily injured he would regret over-taxing his mates. Those men passed away saying “Excuse me. I regret dying.” They died apologising & weeping. The battlefield takes the life of such brave men, & there is no way of helping them.” (5)

June 1. The fate of the Empire

To save face by pretending that withdrawal of 31 Division from Kohima was his decision, Lieutenant General Mutaguchi issued an Order of the Day that was full of stirring rhetoric claiming that 15th Army could save Japan & its divine Emperor:

“Withholding my tears & painful as it is, I shall for the time being withdraw my troops from Kohima. It is my resolve to reassemble the whole army & with one great push capture Imphal … ON THIS ONE BATTLE RESTS THE FATE OF THE EMPIRE … Everyone must unswervingly serve the THRONE & reach the ultimate goal so that the Son of Heaven & the Nation may be forever guarded.” (3)

Lieutenant General Sato’s order for 31 Division to withdraw did not reach all his men. On the evening of June 1, 138 Regiment supply officer Lieutenant Chuzaburo Tomaru returned from a foraging expedition to find troops abandoning their trenches. He initially thought they were deserting, until given the news of the order to withdraw.

Isolated pockets of Japanese continued to fight because they were unaware of the order. In addition, a rearguard of about 750 men under Major General Miyazaki was detailed to cover the retreat. It included a troop of mountain artillery, engineers & infantry from 124 & 138 Regiments.

Reconnaisance by 4/1 Gurkhas had identified a position at Naga Village that was occupied by an estimated thirty Japanese with a 75 mm gun. It is not known whether they were acting as a rearguard or were unaware of the order to withdraw. A platoon led by Jemadar Patiram was sent to deal with them. The attack was described in a detailed report by the Gurkha’s commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Derek Horsford:

“The raid was preceded by a ten minute shoot by one tank. Jemadar Patiram led his platoon along the side of the feature & formed up just below the hill. A Japanese MMG [medium machine-gun] opened up from a bunker on a flank. Patiram stalked this himself, threw two grenades inside, killed the four Japanese in the bunker, & knocked out the MMG. The platoon continued blitzing its way through the position & finally came upon the 75 mm gun, manned by four Japanese. Led by Patiram, a section rushed this gun, killed the four Japanese with their kukris, & then threw five grenades down the barrel of the gun to render it unserviceable.

Patiram then collected his platoon & was starting to withdraw when a counter-attack came in from the rear. This was beaten off & the platoon then withdrew to the Battalion, having killed a total of twelve Japanese without any loss to itself, not even one man wounded.” (11)

Jemadar Patiram was awarded a Military Cross for his courage & leadership. The raid was so successful that other platoons begged permission to emulate it.

Also at Naga Village, 1 Queen’s Royals tried yet another assault on Church Knoll, which had resisted capture for weeks. This time, however, they encountered very little opposition, an early sign that resistance was waning.

The direction of Japanese retreat was initially south, along the main road to Imphal. This meant that 31 Division continued to block the delivery of supplies by road to Indian 4 Corps at Imphal, where the situation remained grave. 4 Corps rations had already been cut because the monsoon weather conditions restricted the ability to fly in food. Furthermore, the transport fleet would lose eighty American planes by June 15, as these were wanted elsewhere. It therefore remained imperative that the road to Imphal be opened quickly, to allow supplies from Dimapur to be delivered by truck.

Requiem. By Robert Louis Stevenson (1850-1894)

Under the wide and starry sky,
Dig the grave and let me lie.
Glad did I live and gladly die,
And I laid me down with a will

This be the verse you grave for me:
Here he lies where he longed to be;
Home is the sailor, home from sea,
And the hunter home from the hill.

May 31. I now leave Kohima

1 Royal Berkshires supporting 1 Burma Regiment on Aradura Spur were relieved by 2 Durham Light Infantry. The Berks were withdrawn to a reserve position.

At Naga Village, 1 Queen’s Royals managed to occupy a bunker that had repeatedly defied them on previous days, after it had been shelled by tanks. Subsequently, Japanese artillery & mortar fire forced them to withdraw. Later, under cover of heavy mist & rain, they took the bunker again & this time managed to hold it.

Whilst the soldiers grappled over small gains & losses such as these, a decisive moment had been reached beyond the scenes of carnage, squalor & misery. Lieutenant General Sato, commander of 31 Division at Kohima, took a courageous decision that would save thousands of lives.

In response to his threats to withdraw, Sato had received a signal from the Chief of Staff of 15th Army:

“I am deeply pained that, forgetful of the brave deeds of your division, & adducing difficulties of supply, you have decided on a withdrawal from Kohima. I want you to maintain your present position for ten more days. The Army will take Imphal & reward the distinguished service of your division. Before a resolute will, even the gods give way.” (15)

Sato was infuriated. His men were starving & very low on ammunition. He decided to take control:

“I wish to inform you that, according to the situation, the divisional commander will act on his own initiative.” (15)

Although it was unprecedented for a general of the Imperial Japanese Army to disobey a direct order, he instructed his division to leave Kohima at midnight on May 31st. This done, he sent another message to 15th Army:

“We have fought for two months with the utmost courage, & have reached the limits of human fortitude. Our swords are broken & our arrows spent. Shedding bitter tears, I now leave Kohima. The very thought is enough to break a general’s heart.” (3)

Lieutenant General Mutaguchi, commander of 15th Army, replied furiously that he would be court-martialled if 31 Division retreated. Sato was beyond caring:

“Do as you please, I will bring you down with me!” (3)

Soon after, he followed up contemptuously:

“The tactical ability of the 15th Army staff lies below that of cadets.” (3)

Sato then ended communication with his superior.

May 30. The new flame-throwers

On Aradura Spur, the Burma Regiment came under repeated attack during the night. This endangered the Royal Berks, who were higher up the Spur & liable to be cut off if Burma Regiment was displaced. Accordingly, the Berks were ordered to withdraw & establish a new perimeter lower down the slope.

4/1 Gurkhas consolidated their positions on the eastern side of Naga Village. Supported by tanks, they systematically knocked out a series of bunkers using pole charges. They had received two No 2 flame-throwers, which they had not used before. These proved very difficult to ignite, simply spurting fuel. When only 10 yds from a bunker, the operators had to resort to matches to light the fuel. One of them was killed by machine-gun fire & the other hit three times in the leg, leaving him helpless in the open, in great danger of the flame-thrower exploding. Subedar Narjang Ghale ran to save him, tied up his wounds & carried him back nearly a hundred yards under a shower of bullets. 4/1 Gurkhas did not attempt to use their flame-throwers again. Subedar Narjang received a Military Cross.

Supported by tanks, 1 Queen’s Royals attempted to infiltrate a bunker on Church Knoll, a site in Naga Village that had resisted former attacks. As previously, their attack was unsuccessful.

May 29. It had bloody well better work

The British attacks on Aradura Spur had failed miserably & many of the sodden, exhausted, decimated troops were deeply disillusioned. They felt that the Battle of Kohima was already won & the Japanese should give up & go. Men who will risk their lives for a cause in the balance, greatly resent having to do so once the eventual outcome is certain. The Royal Welch Fusiliers had fled in such a way that their commander was replaced. The surviving Norfolks of 4 Brigade were sent back to Dimapur; their fighting at Kohima was over.

However, the Royal Berks of 6 Brigade were established on Aradura Spur & 1 Burma Regiment was dug in behind them, with Japanese around their perimeter. The positions of the Japanese were communicated to British artillery, allowing them to deliver a precisely-targeted barrage.

Despite the costly failure of the decimated 4/15 Punjabs to make headway at Naga Village, 33 Brigade commander Brigadier Loftus-Tottenham ordered 4/1 Gurkhas to attack in the same way. The Gurkhas’s newly-appointed commander, 27 yr-old Lieutentant-Colonel Derek Horsford, declined & suggested instead that they infiltrate Naga Village from the opposite direction to previous assaults. His patrols had identified apparent weak spots. The brigadier concurred, commenting sourly that

“It had bloody well better work.” (11)

It did. After careful reconnaisance, 4/1 Gurkhas silently occupied a position at the back of the high ground at Naga Village during the early hours of May 29, completely unopposed. From there, they attacked an adjacent feature, Basha Hill, that was strongly defended by Japanese bunkers. Before the assault, their target was pounded by artillery & tanks. Lieutentant-Colonel Horsford:

“As the attack went in, the tanks fired in front of the troops, the leading flank men of B Company wearing white towels on their backs to indicate their positions to the tank commanders. There was a cloud-burst as the attack started &, not being able to see the white towels, it was thought B Company was late. In fact, the company had started on time & the shells were landing barely 10 yds in front of its leading troops, with the result that many of the Japanese were still crouching in their trenches when the attacking troops arrived. Twenty Japanese were killed, most being bayoneted or grenaded while sheltering in their holes. A further twenty were probably killed by the barrage & twenty got away.

B Company was then held up by six inter-supporting bunkers on the top of Basha, & proceeded to dig in below the crest. The Gurkha casualties had been none killed & twelve wounded, most only slightly.” (11)

An important advance had been made, with minimal loss, thanks to this change of approach that was instigated at battalion level, rather than higher up the chain of command. The rest of 4/1 Gurkhas established themselves nearby. They were counter-attacked three times during the night, but held on to their new positions.

May 28. I felt angry

After postponements due to atrocious weather, Operation York began on May 28, aiming to drive the Japanese from Aradura Spur.

The Norfolks climbed through dense jungle up the steep slope to Charles Hill, which was bombarded ahead of them by British artillery. As they approached the crest, Japanese machine-guns opened fire from two bunkers, inflicting casualties & pinning the Norfolks down.

Meanwhile, the Royal Scots approached Charles Hill from a different direction, but came under fire from machine-guns & a 75 mm gun. The Norfolks moved across to join up with them & supporting fire came from tanks on the road below. The British clawed their way up the treacherous slope. Walter Gilding, Norfolks Company Sergeant Major, was close to Lieutenant Colonel Robert Scott:

“The leading lads got to within 20 feet of the top of the hill, but it was murder. Robert Scott was with the leading troops, throwing grenades like the clappers. I had the sten-gun & I was firing, scrambling up, grabbing hold of a tree, firing the Sten-gun, going a little further, & encouraging the lads. There was nothing to see at all, you couldn’t see bunker slits or anything as they were too well concealed.” (11)

Lieutenant Franses:

“A Japanese grenade came down towards Robert Scott & I think he decided to kick it away. He misjudged slightly, it went off & brought him down.” (11)

Stretcher bearers wrestled Scott onto a stretcher & carried him down “shouting & cursing because the lads wouldn’t let him get off the stretcher”. (11)

Gilding’s comment that he “felt angry” is worth noting. The Norfolks had been convinced that the attack would fail & saw their prediction proved right, despite heroic efforts & much bloodshed. When shown the plan, Lieutenant Sam Horner had written:

“This is a straightforward nonsense from start to finish. There was a very steep hill, we knew the Japs were on top & we were going to assault straight up the front – not a hope in hell.” (3)

As they were unable to progress further up the steep slope, Scott’s second-in-command ordered 4 Brigade to withdraw. Private William Cron was in the Norfolk’s rearguard:

“Everybody else had gone, so I turned & made a dash because I had no more ammunition. I scarpered more or less head over heels down the hill.” (11)

The withdrawal was covered by 2 Manchester Machine-Gun Regiment. Amongst them, Lance-Corporal Partington won the Military Medal & Lieutenant King won the Military Cross. The citations for their awards stated:

“Lieutenant King’s platoon moved forward & assisted the assaulting infantry who were pinned down. Lance-Corporal Partington was carrying out the duties of rangetaker when a Japanese 75 mm opened fire on the section, shells landing very close to him & severely wounding the section commander beside him. Lieutenant King then bound up the section commander & supervised his evacuation in full view of the Japanese.

Lance-Corporal Partington coolly continued to carry out his task of observation & despite more shelling in his locality, spotted the Japanese weapon & reported its location to Lieutenant King. King then personally led a tank round a bend in the road to a place from where the Japanese 75 mm gun could be engaged & directed the tank fire from the open until the gunner had picked up the target.” (11)

At the same time as 4 Brigade’s costly & abortive assault, 6 Brigade attacked Aradura Spur a little further to the south. 143 Special Services Company took the vanguard, with the Royal Berks behind them. The Royal Welch Fusiliers moved into the trenches vacated by the Berks, where they were joined by Brigadier Shapland with his Tactical HQ. The Welch were badly depleted to begin with & quickly came under heavy machine gun & mortar fire from thick jungle nearby. Shapland was shot through the neck & blacked out, then woke to find the Royal Welch being overrun:

“When I came to, the forward company had broke. I saw Braithwaite trying to rally his men, but without success. I joined Braithwaite & ordered him to gather up the remnants of them & form a rearguard. My next clear recollections are being helped into the Burma Regiment Box perimeter.” (11)

Lieutenant Colonel Garnett Braithwaite, CO of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, ordered his men to withdraw, as many of them were wounded. They streamed in disorder down the hillside, severely shaken. The following day, Major General Grover relieved Braithwaite of his command.

The Japanese occupied the position vacated by the Royal Welch, but it was promptly recaptured by 1 Burma Regiment. Meanwhile, the Royal Berks had encountered heavy resistance. In view of this, & the disorder behind them, they dug in where they were rather than attempting to proceed any further.

The 4/15 Punjabs of 33 Brigade were ordered to attack once more at Naga Village. Their assault was again preceeded by a bombardment from artillery, tanks & Hurribombers. Major Arthur Marment of 4/15 Punjabs described what followed (notice the segregation of different ehnic groups):

“The attack went in, the Sikh Company onto Church Knoll & the Punjabs onto Hunter’s Hill. The Sikhs got to the top of Church Knoll, but were again driven off by heavy mortar fire & a tremendous amount of defiladed fire. Then the Jats of C Company, led by Colonel Thomas himself, reached the top, but it was just impossible to stay. The Japanese held every bit of cover.” (11)

The attack was reinforced by the Musselmen of B Company, but it was eventually called off after 83 men had been wounded & 12 killed.

Although it belonged to 7 Indian Infantry Division, which was commanded by Major General Frank Messervy, 33 Brigade had been placed at the disposal of Major General John Grover, Commander of 2 British Infantry Division. An Indian Army Officer, recorded that Messervy was furious at the way 33 Brigade had been used:

“General Messervy, having visited … 33 Brigade, went off to see first General Stopford, then General Slim, to demand that 33 Brigade be removed from the control of 2nd Division, because of the unnecessary high casualties which were occurring in consequence of what he, General Messervy, said was inept handling by General Grover. I was present when General Messervy, in a furious rage, saw Brigadier Warren & spent a few minutes in his headquarters fuming at the overall situation.” (8)

Lieutenant General Stopford, Lieutenant General Slim & Brigadier Warren commanded 33 Indian Corps, 14th Army, & 161 Indian Brigade, respectively. It is worth remembering that Grover was under pressure from Stopford & Slim to re-open the road to Imphal as a matter of great urgency. Haste was always likely to bring more casualties than a cautious approach.

May 27. A place is vacant

The besieged Allied 4 Corps at Imphal was surviving on minimal rations, flown in by fleets of Dakotas. Many of these were American aircraft that had been commandeered by Lord Mountbatten, Supreme Commander South East Asia. But the Americans insisted that eighty of their planes be returned by June 15. This increased the urgency to open the road to Imphal, so supplies from Dimapur could be delivered by trucks.

To this end, preparations were underway for Operation York, which was intended to drive the Japanese from Aradura Spur, a jungle-covered ridge that dominated the Imphal road. The attack was to be made by 4 Brigade, with 6 Brigade on their right. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Scott, commander of 2 Royal Norfolks, was unhappy with the plan. His battalion was exhausted & severely depleted, with only 14 officers & 366 other ranks remaining, many of whom were suffering from dysentery, but refusing to be evacuated. A reconnaissance patrol by the Norfolks warned that their objective was strongly defended.

Because of its heavy losses on Kohima Ridge, 6 Brigade had been reinforced by the 1st Battalion Burma Regiment. Torrential rain had delayed the Brigade’s approach:

“Aradura Spur was covered with thick jungle. It rained almost continuously & the jungle tracks consisted of mud & water. All supplies were carried by mule or Nagas, two steps up & sliding back one. A number of mules fell over the side, including the one carrying the telephone-exchange. Wherever we went the Japanese was always uphill of us, a beastly situation. There was a steady drain of casualties from snipers.” (11)

1 Royal Berkshires were to lead 6 Brigade. The attack was scheduled for May 27, & they were to be led to their starting point by 143 Special Services Company. Their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur Bickford:

“By midday we had moved about three quarters of a mile. The SS Company had lost the way. I ordered the gunners to fire smoke shells & high explosives on to our objective to give us some indication of the direction. The map turned out to be so inaccurate that to trust in it any further was asking for trouble.” (11)

By 16.30, Special Services Company were still lost & the scheduled attack time was long gone. Bickford decided that it would have to be postponed:

“We had spent a very miserable time drenched to the skin since 03.00 hours that morning & it was bitterly cold. I therefore ordered the Battalion to form a perimeter for the night. In the evening, Brigadier Shapland arrived & agreed with me that the SS Company should start off at first light the next day to reconnoitre the route.” (11)

33 Brigade at the Naga Village were again attacked after dark, but the assault was weaker than on the previous night & was repulsed.

Meanwhile, nightime patrols by the 4/1 Gurkhas of 33 Brigade probed the Japanese defences at Naga Village in attempts to discover areas that might be vulnerable to attack.

May 26. We could self-detonate

The Japanese positions at Naga Village were again bombarded & attacked from the air by Hurribombers. The 4/15 Punjabs then attacked, using flame-throwers & pole charges to try & destroy the bunkers that opposed them. As on the previous day, they met fierce resistance that drove them back.

After nightfall, the Japanese retaliated with determined counter-attacks. Private Nobuyuki Hata of 58th Infantry Regiment described the reckless ferocity of their assaults:

“When we mounted close-range attacks, we’d take three, four or five hand grenades & pull the safety pin out.  And we’d put them in our pockets.”

With the safety pin out, striking the firing pin against a tree, helmet or boot would ignite it, ready to throw.

“When we charged the enemy, we’d have grenades in one hand.  You usually pull out the safety pin with your mouth, but we didn’t have time for that.  The pin would already be out, so we’d bounce the grenades against the soles of our shoes.  We went out knowing full well we could self-detonate.  When you’re charging the enemy, you’re driven into this state of madness.  Of course it’s terrifying, but you can’t just hang back & not do anything.  When you charge the enemy, you just become this crazed being.” (3)

To arm their grenades, Japanese soldiers had first to remove the pin & then depress the top by pushing it against something solid. British soldiers learned to take cover if they heard the metallic sound of a grenade being struck against a helmet. Once activated in this way, black smoke was emitted, as well as a speck of blue light that was visible at night. The grenades were fused to explode after four or five seconds, but the fuses were somewhat unreliable. If tempted to use captured grenades, Allied troops were advised to throw them as soon as they were activated. The Japanese grenade pictured above is Type 91 & weighs 1lb 5oz. It is displayed in the Kohima Museum.

May 25. We ran like hares

It was the turn of 4/15 Punjabs of 33 Brigade to try to drive the Japanese from Church Knoll in Naga Village. Their attack was preceded by artillery bombardment & strafing by Hurribombers. Major Arthur Marment of the Punjabs:

“We ran like hares under our own 25 pdr barrage. I don’t think I have ever got in so close under a barrage. The shells were all dropping about 10 yds ahead of us. One eventually dropped short, wounding several men. Unfortunately, my right-hand platoon could not cross the start-line on time owing to the very heavy 75 mm fire. We were stopped by heavy sniping from our right. When the rest of the Company came up & there had been another tank bombardment, we had another go. We reached the top, only to be beaten off by heavy defensive fire.” (11)

The 4/15 Punjabs fell back after 58 men had been wounded & 8 killed.

Although the Japanese had withstood another attempt by the Allies to displace them, their ability to hold on was approaching its limit, as the troops starved & their ammunition ran out. Whereas Major Marment believed that his Punjabs had come under “very heavy 75 mm fire”, the Japanese were reporting that their artillery had exhausted its ammunition. Senior Private Manabu Wada of 3/138 Infantry Regiment recorded his frustration:

“Our losses were dreadful. Our soldiers fought bravely, but we had no rations, no rifle or machine-gun ammunition, no artillery shells for the guns to fire, & above all, we had no support from rear echelons. How could we have continued in such dreadful circumstances? The monsoon season had also started & the Kohima region is notorious for having the heaviest rainfall in the world. In the unceasing rain there was no shelter.” (11)

Lieutenant General Sato signalled 15 Army Headquarters:

“My Division’s rations are now exhausted. We have completely used up ammunition for mountain artillery & heavy infantry weapons. The Division will therefore withdraw from Kohima by 1st June at the latest & move to a point where it can receive supplies.” (11)

May 24. A little unhealthy

At Naga Village, the Queensmen were settling into their new positions. They had not been impressed with the state in which they found it. Major Lowry, Commander of B Company:

“It had rained a great deal during the night. Early next morning, B Company continued with digging & wiring, except between 10.00 & 11.00 hours, when we organised a large-scale clean up. That hour’s hard work made a whale of a difference. There were fewer flies, not so much smell & no tins to trip over.

During the morning, 25 pdr smoke was put down all around the Naga Village to enable tanks to get up the track to the top of the hill. Three tanks came up preceded by a bulldozer that widened the track. This activity produced some Japanese harassing fire. One of the tanks on top of the hill suffered two direct hits soon after the smoke cleared. Another shell landed in amongst the 6 pdr anti-tank gun ammunition, which caught fire & made the Battalion Headquarters area a little unhealthy.” (11)

Major Lowry was suffering from recurrent bouts of malaria & was evacuated later that day to hospital in Dimapur. By contrast, a Japanese officer with malaria, beri-beri & dysentry killed himself with a grenade, to avoid becoming a burden.

May 23. Fight on with your spirit

5 Brigade had been clinging to Naga Hill since May 4, where they had endured heavy losses but failed to displace the tenacious Japanese. On May 23, they were relieved by 33 Brigade of 7 Indian Division, composed of 4/1 Gurkha Rifles, 4/15 Punjab & 1 Queen’s Royal Regiment. Whilst the Gurkhas remained in support on Treasury Hill, the Punjabs & Queen’s moved onto Naga Hill. They found a scene of utter devastation, as described by Major Lowry of the Queen’s:

“The town & bazaar were mostly heaps of rubble, with corrugated iron strewn around everywhere. The place smelt of decaying matter, was generally filthy, the barbed wiring was inadequate & virtually non-existant, & no slit trenches or light machine-gun posts had been connected up within the sectors.” (11)

The new arrivals spent the afternoon digging & installing barbed wire, to make their positions more secure. As they did so, they suffered casualties from sniping & shell fire.

Nearby, Lieutenant General Sato issued an extraordinary order to his starving troops, to strengthen their resolve:

“You will fight to the death. When you are killed, you will fight on with your spirit.” (3)

Spirit was one of the few things that the Japanese soldiers still had in abundance. What they needed was food & ammunition.

May 22. Long Range Penetration

Throughout the long, bitter battle of Kohima, 23 Long Range Penetration (LRP) Brigade operated in the Naga Hills to the north & east of Kohima itself. This was a Chindit brigade, composed of men who had endured a gruelling training regime of exhausting marches through dense, unforgiving jungle. Corporal Stanley Hutson:

“We were force marched all day until we were ready to drop, then made to carry on through the night, with a possible river crossing so that we were wet through, cold, hungry & tired out, before making a mock bayonet charge as dawn broke. We practised receiving air drops of food & ammunition until we & the RAF were perfect. We were made to go without food for two or three days at a time & made to cover extra distance just to prove that we could do it. We were taught to read signs like Red Indians & to hide our tracks, so that if the Japs did cross them, they would be unable to follow us.” (3)

23 LRP was 3000 men strong & commanded by Brigadier Lance Perowne, a striking character, tall, gaunt & sporting a monocle. It was organised into nine ‘columns’ of 300 to 400 men, drawn from 2 Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, 4 Border Regiment, 1 Essex Regiment, 60 Field Regiment & the Royal Engineers. Each column operated independently & was supplied entirely by air.

They had set off on April 12, with the aim of protecting Dimapur against attacks by Japanese who might approach it from the north, after bypassing Kohima. The columns trudged slowly eastwards through the dense rain forest that covered 6,000-foot Naga Hills. Lieutenant Philip Brownless:

“Moving across hundreds of miles of this mountainous, thickly jungle-covered country, with our mules, & carrying packs weighing more than 60 lbs, in addition to our rifles, grenades, ammunition & machine-guns, was an exhausting business. In places the mules had to be unloaded & they & their loads hauled up separately by the ropes used to tie on their loads. Several mules were lost falling down mountain sides.” (3)

As they progressed, they fought intermittent skirmishes against Japanese foraging parties, to choke off potential sources of sustenance that might help feed the starving invaders. Private Ken Keen:

“How we kept going, I honestly don’t know. I think it was the fear of being wounded & the Japs catching you. There was no chance of evacuating you. It’s unbelievable what the human body & flesh can stand, but at the back of your mind that knowledge was there, that you WOULD win & would be going home.” (3)

May 21. Blamed by the soldiers

5 Brigade at Naga Village received much of its supply by parachute, dropped from low-flying C47 Dakotas. Food was delivered in cardboard cartons containg American ‘K rations’, in which individually packaged meals included a tin of meat, powdered soup, biscuits, chocolate, chewing gum, cigarettes & matches. In addition, ‘Compo’ rations came in 4-gallon tins intended for eight men, which contained ‘bully’ beef, ‘spam’ or sausages, potatos, vegetables, fruit, porridge oats & milk.

The sight of these daily deliveries falling from the sky was galling for the starving Japanese, who had received no food from their mythical supply lines since reaching Kohima, despite promises. They obsessed about filling their aching stomachs. An anonymous diary discovered on a corpse recorded that:

“Even to think of what we used to eat at home makes my mouth water & my mind swim.” (8)

Although they were not responsible & they shared the hardships of their men, Japanese supply officers felt humiliated by their failure to feed the soldiers. Lieutenant Masao Hirakubo of 58th Regiment recalled:

“Mr Ito couldn’t get food & was blamed by the soldiers. He decided to kill himself.” (8)

May 20. Aradura Spur

After the Worcesters’ unsuccessful attack the previous day, 5 Brigade stayed on the defensive. A patrol by the Camerons came under fire & promptly fell back to the battalion’s perimeter.

Roughly parallel to Transport Ridge ran the Aradura Spur, which was cut by the road to Imphal. Intelligence gathered from patrols & scouts indicated that the Japanese had concentrated in the jungle on the spur. They would have to be evicted before the British & Indian troops defending Imphal could be supplied by road.

On May 20, Major General Grover gathered the senior staff of 4 Brigade to discuss the best way to drive the Japanese from Aradurar Spur. A plan was formulated that involved 1 Royal Scots & 2 Royal Norfolks attacking up steep slopes, but the commanders of these units were very concerned that their men would sustain heavy casualties.

May 19. Naga village

At 08.00 hours on May 19, the artillery of 2 Division began bombarding Hunter’s Hill & Church Knoll, two hills in Naga village that were held by the Japanese. Simultaneously, bunkers on the forward slopes of these hills came under fire from the tanks that were supporting 5 Brigade, mortars & machine-guns of the Manchesters, Camerons & Lancashire Fusiliers. The barrage lasted until the target area was

“… like a ploughed field littered with crumpled pieces of corrugated iron, tree trunks, burning foliage & scattered rocks & stones.” (11)

Two companies of 7 Worcesters then attacked, which required scrambling up terraced slopes & over walls. Once they were within thirty metres of the nearest bunkers, the Japanese opened fire, scything down their assailants, who were caught in crossfire. The Worcesters’ Regimental History recorded that

“The Japanese, making skilful use of the five-foot terraces, were able to site their bunkers so that as each terrace was scaled, the attackers came under withering fire from bunkers in the next terrace. The bunkers afforded each other mutual support.

Lieutenant Woodward was storming a bunker from which he had driven the Japanese with a flamethrower. Another bunker from behind fired on him & he was killed while making straight for it with a grenade.” (11)

After sustaining forty casualties, the Worcesters were ordered to withdraw.

May 18. Remembered always

The units of 6 Brigade still on Kohima Ridge were relieved on May 18 by 268 Brigade, comprising 2 Bombay Grenadiers, 5 Bombay Grenadiers & 17 Rajputs, under command of Major General Grover. The arrival of these fresh troops was timely, as Garrison Hill received a strong Japanese attack, which was repulsed by its newly-arrived defenders.

At Naga Village, Major Elliot of 7 Worcesters watched with trepidation an air strike by 24 Hurribombers against Japanese who were very close by:

“The target, Church Knoll, was only 170 yds away from us, so the pilots were releasing their bombs right over our heads. That gave us the impression that they would drop into our trenches, instead of swishing low overhead onto the enemy bunkers.” (11)

The tanks sent to Naga Village to support 5 Brigade were moved into position along a track made by Royal Engineers with bulldozers. Winches were required to pull the tanks up the terraces of the hill. The Japanese attempted to disrupt this maneouvre with mortars.

May 17. I’m in ‘eaven

Whilst they were on Treasury Hill, the 4/1 Gurkhas were shelled every day & attacked most nights. Nevertheless, they maintained daily patrols & set nocturnal ambushes. During the thirteen days they stayed there, six Gurkhas were killed & nineteen wounded & one of their majors was also wounded, whilst on reconnaissance. Nevertheless, the battalion’s British officers made themselves at home:

“Our Mess on Treasury caused great interest to visitors, as it was almost completely underground. It contained a piano that had been skilfully ‘acquired’ by Major Nixon from a neighbouring hut, in full view of the Japanese. When Chris Nixon’s piano had been installed, even the rain, which had a habit of pouring in through the earth roof, could not take away the look of luxury & splendour which the piano gave the Mess. A private of the Queens called Freshwater took refuge in the Mess when shelling started one morning. His remark in Cockney when he heard an officer start playing confirmed our own feeling of uplift: ‘Cor blimey, I’m in ‘eaven’.” (11)

The piano was eventually damaged beyond repair by shells falling onto the Mess.

May 16. We will remember him

On May 16, the 4/1 Gurkhas consolidated their position at the Treasury, which had only been contested by a lone brave Japanese sergeant. They then were subjected, somewhat belatedly, to shell & mortar fire, which caused a few casualties.

The 2 Norfolks on Transport Ridge received a hot meal for the first time since they embarked on their arduous right hook trek on April 25. Although this was gratefully received, many suffered upset stomachs, perhaps caused by the change in diet. Nevertheless, they sent patrols to explore the slopes of the Aradura Spur above them, which remained occupied by the Japanese. Shots were exchanged by snipers.

A Japanese soldier approached the British, wanting to surrender. On interrogation, he explained that he had passed the limit of his endurance & no longer believed that they could win. His battalion was much depleted, especially amongst the officers, & their guns had no ammunition.

May 15. To respect the dead

Major John Shipster had been seconded to 33 Brigade, now under command of Major General Grover at Kohima. He had grown accustomed to the sight of Japanese corpses & had learned

“…to respect the dead, but did not mourn for them … it was essential for our own mental well-being.” (8)

Lance Corporal Angus Taylor of 1 Royal Scots discovered a wallet on the corpse of a Japanese soldier, with photographs inside. One showed the dead man, posing for the camera, proud in his immaculate uniform. Another his wife, appearing shy in traditional costume. A third was of their young daughter, happy beside a tree in blossom.

It was the Dorsets turn to recuperate at Dimapur, a rest they well deserved. Private Tom Cattle recalled the first stage of that break:

“We hobbled out of Kohima unwashed, lousy, wet, unshaved & undernourished. We went back to Zubza, where we had the luxury of hot baths out in the open. Fifty gallon petrol drums had been cut in half & filled with disinfected water. All of our clothes & boots were discarded, all the hair on my body was shaved off & after relaxing in the bath, we were treated with ‘powder’ & jungle sores covered with gentian violet liquid. We had new clothing & boots &, after a medical check, were treated for our various ailments. My feet were blistered & septic. The boils on my arms were treated & my arm was put in a sling.” (11)

For other units, the struggle continued to evict the Japanese & open the supply route to Imphal. 4/1 Gurkhas of 33 Brigade occupied Treasury Hill, after patrols had concluded that the Japanese had withdrawn. They found just one man alive there, a sergeant of 124 Regiment, who defiantly attacked the Gurkhas with grenades, but was promptly dealt with.

Strong points of resistance remained, including at the Naga Village. Brigadier Mike West took charge of 5 Brigade there, to replace the wounded Brigadier Hawkins. Since May 4, 1st Battalion of the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders had lost 35 killed, 10 missing & 60 wounded. Major General Grover sent the 2nd Battalion Durham Light Infantry to reinforce them. He also decided to send tanks, once a suitable track had been prepared by the Royal Engineers. The arrival of tanks had been crucial in prising Kohima Ridge from the clasp of the invaders.

May 14. The most unearthly scene

The debris on Kohima Ridge was combed for useful information that might have been left behind by the Japanese. The Intelligence Officer of 33 Brigade found this a horrible task:

“The dead are heaped up in their shattered fox-holes. Searching them has been an arduous & stinking job. Just one quick glance at Jail Hill gives a complete picture of a war & its utter destructiveness. It is the most appalling mess I have ever seen. The red earth is torn & churned by the thousands of shells pumped into it & the deeper craters, like filthy abscesses, are quickly being filled by muddy water. Dead & smelling Japanese are festooned on tree-stumps & inside the flooded foxholes lumps of flesh splash around. Not a blade of grass or a green leaf remains on the trees of this once lovely well-wooded slope. The clammy rolling monsoon mists now rolling over it makes it just about the most unearthly scene ever.” (11)

The Dorsets’ Intelligence Section searched the Bungalow Sector.

“We had collected documents including maps produced by the Survey of India, overprinted in Japanese, one being of Calcutta. Were the front-line Japanese troops expecting to reach so far into India?” (11)

The maps were thought to have been bought before the war.

As the men of 1 Queen’s Royal Regiment departed from Jail Hill, an attack by enemy aircraft made clear that their opponents remained defiant. Major Lowry:

“While we were leaving, a Japanese Zero plane came over & dropped a bomb in the area of 33 Brigade Headquarters. Ten minutes later, about a dozen 97s & Zero escorts came over & also bombed & strafed the area. They were driven off by anti-aircraft fire & met by Spitfires as they left. Half-an-hour of dog-fights broke up the morning.” (11)

Although they had been expelled from Kohima Ridge, Lieutenant General Sato’s 31 Division still held positions that blocked the road to Imphal, preventing the delivery of urgently-needed supplies from Dimapur. However, Sato was disguted that his men had never received the food & ammunition promised by Lieutenant General Mutaguchi. He signalled Mutaguchi:

“Because of the heavy rain & starvation, this Division should move to a point where it can receive supplies.” (11)

The response was unsympathetic:

“It is very difficult to understand that your Division should evacuate under the pretext of difficult supply. Maintain the present position for ten days. Within ten days, I shall take Imphal & reward you for your services.” (11)

It is doubtedful that Mutaguchi believed this, as the battle at Imphal was not going his way. If he retained any expectation of success, then he was seriously deluded.

May 13. ‘Old on!

The Grant tank chosen to attack the tennis court was commanded by Sergeant Waterhouse of 149 RAC. Lieutenant Highett of the Dorsets joined the crew, as he was familiar with the terrain. The day previously, the tank had been driven onto the Club House terrace, which was 10 yds above the tennis court.

On May 13, after a preliminary bombardment, it drove off the edge of the terrace into thin air. Whether a Grant could withstand a 10 yd drop had never been tested. If it had landed on its side, the crew would have been at the mercy of the Japanese. Sergeant Waterhouse:

“I remember my driver shouting ‘old on!’ and bump, we’re smack in the centre of the tennis court itself. As we came over the top onto the tennis court we crashed right on top of one of the Japanese main positions & buried at least a few Japanese.” (11)

The ‘bump’ of the 30 ton tank must have jarred the crew tremendously, but they had no time to recover.

“We pulled to the right & found ourselves in front of a very heavily sandbagged steel water tower. Small-arms fire met us. My 75 mm gunner dealt with this position.” (11)

They were supported by a 3.7-inch mountain gun, firing from the terrace above. Two platoons of Dorsets poured onto the tennis court.

Lieutenant Highett, inside the tank:

“My job was to fire one of the tank’s two machine-guns. This I did at point-blank range at the Japanese bunkers 20-30 yds away. You could still see that it had been a tennis court. There was nothing like a net, of course, but I could still see one or two white lines. We were met by small-arms fire which did us no damage. For some reason, the Japanese anti-tank gun did not fire at us.” (11)

Perhaps it had no ammunition left. In fact, there was little resistance. Forty or fifty Japanese fled down the hill to the road, pursued by fire from the British. In case anyone remained in the bunkers, pole charges were thrust inside. These consisted of about 10 pds of explosives with short fuses, on the end of bamboo poles.

Once it was clear that there was no more resistance from the tennis court terrace, the attack switched to the remains of the DC’s bungalow. Sergeant Waterhouse, inside the tank:

“The infantry commander told me by phone that all the tennis court positions had been captured & quite a few Japanese killed. We then went on to the edge of the tennis court terrace, where it overlooked the Deputy Commisioner’s bungalow, & gave the bungalow quite a pasting.

After everything in sight was well & truly plastered, the infantry went in & took the position. The infantry officer in the tank with me estimated that we ourselves had knocked out possibly forty of the enemy.” (11)

By 11.15, the entire sector down to the road junction was at last back in British hands.

Lieutenant Norman Havers of the Dorsets:

“All who could went to see the place for which so many had suffered, or had given their lives. Everywhere there was the debris of war, shattered & unrecognizable buildings, bunkers & trenches, discarded weapons & equipment, & crumpled corrugated iron. The ground, where not dug up for defences, was broken by shell bursts, so that few natural or original features remained unchanged. As everywhere, trees were reduced to little more than torn & broken stumps. There was no life. It was a place of desolation & very horrible.

By the pile of wreckage that was the bungalow, there were bodies [of Dorsets], some much as they fell in that first attack, some 17 days ago. Now someone had the grim task of identification by the removal of one of the two identity discs worn by each of our men on a cord around the neck. The Pioneer Platoon began the burials.

A particularly nauseous sight was a body of a Japanese officer who had squatted in an open space &, holding a grenade against his stomach, committed hari-kiri.” (11)

The bunkers were searched for documents, starting with one dug into the ground where it rose from the tennis court terrace. Lieutenant Havers:

“Being at the base of the high bank, they went horizontally for such a distance as to leave daylight behind. We progressed on hands & knees through a warren of narrow … low passages. We were thankful to return to the open air.” (11)

The Dorsets prepared to repel counter-attacks, but none came. This reflected the greatly weakened state of the Japanese at this stage in the battle.

Kuki Piquet was an isolated pocket of Japanese resistance, where many attacking troops had been massacred. On May 13, it was pelted by a heavy artillery barrage & then stormed by the Royal Welch Fusiliers. They captured a few shell-shocked Japanese, amongst the piles of dead.

On Supply Hill, the Berkshires could find no Japanese left alive, although countless numbers of their corpses remained, in various stages of decay. One of the bunkers was found to have been a battalion headquarters, “as big as a cathedral & full of galleries”. (11)

Jail Hill had been abandoned in a similar state, with twenty bunkers counted. Major Lowry of the Queen’s described the main one there:

“It had four strong points coming from its deep central bunker, which alone could have held about 40-50 Japanese. The openings of that central bunker had steel shutters on the inside, which could be closed. There was a quantity of rifles, ammunition, very rusty machine-guns, a battered Bren-gun & stacks of Japanese & British grenades. Several of the chaps found Japanese flags. We counted ten Japanese dead, who were searched, & five Japanese diaries were handed to me.

During the morning, we buried our dead. Most were taken down the hill & buried in a Queens’ site below the road. Others had to be buried on the hill itself. All arms, ammunition & equipment etc. were … collected by carriers & taken to the salvage dump-head. Barbed wire came up & we had the whole area wired in with trip & a single apron of wire by about 14.30 hours.

It smelt to high heaven. Flies were now so thick on this battered, barren & debris-scattered hillside, that complete corpses could be almost buried by them. I ate several large filthy-looking bluebottles which settled on a bully beef sandwich as it travelled between my hand & mouth. The fly problem at the best of times was bad, but since the 11th they were everywhere, & were now content to sit on the mud-blood hill itself. None of us ever saw a bird there. Jail Hill was, in fact, the acme of desolation, as, of course, was most of Kohima.” (11)

By dusk on May 13, the entire Kohima Ridge, from the DC’s bungalow to Transport Ridge, was firmly in the hands of British & Indian troops.

May 12. Omnia audax

Brigadier Hawkins of 5 Brigade was wounded by a sniper whilst reconnoitering the area below Naga Village. Following the deaths of Brigadiers Goschen on May 7 & Theobalds on May 11, Hawkins was the third Brigadier casualty that week, although in his case the injury was not fatal.

Under cover of darkness, Grant tanks of 149 Regiment RAC managed to get past the roadblock that, the previous day, had halted their progress along the main road. When they reached Supply & Detail Hills, they were greeted by cheers from the infantry. Two came onto Supply Hill, where their fire was directed by radio against enemy bunkers discovered by the Berkshires. Two more pounded recalcritant bunkers on Detail Hill. In all, twelve bunkers on these hills were destroyed by the tanks that afternoon.

At dusk, Major Arthur Marment of 4/15 Punjabs led a patrol to the top of Detail Hill & was delighted to find it unoccupied:

“The Japanese were either dead, buried, or had packed up. It had been a wonderful show. All was quiet & someone thrust a bacon sandwich into my hand. I have eaten a lot of bacon since then, but no bacon sandwich has ever tasted so good again.” (11)

From the road, additional Grants pounded bunkers on Jail Hill. Queensmen nearby on the hill cowered in the mud. Major Lowry:

“It was an amazing sensation as the tanks shelled these bunkers. We all had to lie flat on our stomachs to avoid debris & even the shells, as the positions they pounded were literally only 15 yds away. After a quarter of an hour of this, the tanks ceased firing their 75mm shells & Browning automatics.

The bunker near the road was shot to pieces, & Japanese were seen being blown clean up into the air. Lieutenant Hamilton’s D Company platoon dashed through the Jail buildings & old bunkers, as soon as all firing ceased. It encountered no opposition.” (11)

The Queensmen & 4/1 Gurkhas stormed “with great gallantry & determination” bunkers on Jail Hill that remained occupied.

The Japanese perspective was given by Saturo Yanagi, an officer of 1/124 Regiment:

“There were only about twenty soldiers of 58 Regiment left in front of us & we were ordered to cover their withdrawal. I sent two sections forward that night & the survivors were evacuated. I then ordered the firing of all remaining machine-gun ammunition & we withdrew.” (11)

The arrival of tanks was also a game-changer for Transport Ridge, where they were able to blast the lower bunkers that had resisted attacks by the infantry. With this support, Royal Scots finally succeeded in storming the ‘Norfolk Bunker’ complex. They found

“A rabbit warren, with passages that linked bunkers & concealed weapon placements. They were highly elaborate, burrowed out of the steep hillsides & reinforced inside.” (11)

In the evening, a few long-range shots came from Japanese 75 mm guns behind & above Transport Ridge. Despite these, the Allies felt extremely pleased with the progress they had made on May 12.

After the day’s tremendous success at the southern end of Kohima Ridge, an ambitious attempt to capture the tennis court was planned for next morning. Sappers had created a track that allowed a Grant tank up & across Hospital Spur to reach the terrace above the tennis court. Next day, it was to drive off the edge & drop ten feet, in the hope that it would land the right way up & be able to support an attack by the Dorsets. The night was filled with anticipation.

May 11. The last one I was thinking of

As Kuki Piquet, immediately south of Garrison Hill, had resisted several assaults, the Royal Berks bypassed it to attack Supply Hill instead, from the direction of Hospital Spur. Whilst they waited on the start line, several were hit by friendly artillery & mortar fire, intended for the Japanese. Nevertheless, they quickly achieved their objectives & spent the rest of the day consolidating their gains.

A 6pdr gun was dragged to a position that overlooked the tennis court. After it had pounded away for five minutes, the Dorsets attacked, but made little progress & were driven back by heavy fire.

In Naga village, a patrol of Worcesters was able to creep up to some bunkers & place explosive charges. Major Burrell:

“Suddenly there were rapid explosions & debris from bunkers went flying. Some Japanese tried to escape, but were shot down by Sten-gun fire from our men. Then there was silence, but not for long. The Japanese had apparently been caught resting & were taken completely by surprise. Now they started to fire their machine-guns & throw grenades in all directions. We heard them screaming.”

The Worcesters quickly returned to 5 Brigade’s defensive perimeter. Brigadier Hawkins told Major General Grover that the Japanese were constructing bunkers & it would need a substantial effort to shift them:

“I am convinced that it will take a full-scale attack by at least one brigade & possibly two, to capture these positions, & they will want all the artillery support they can get, even tanks.”

At the southern end of Kohima Ridge, the Queen’s Royal Regiment attacked Jail Hill again. Their first attempt, on May 7, had ended in bloody failure, at least partly due to flanking Japanese fire from Detail Hill on their left & Transport Ridge on their right. This time, their left flank would be protected by 4/15 Punjabs attacking Detail Hill, but the bunkers on Transport Ridge would remain a thorn in the Queensmens’ sides, as the Norfolks’ attempt to clear them the night before had again been unsuccessful.

Watching these attacks by the Queen’s & Punjabs was a BBC war correspondent, Richard Sharpe:

“It’s 38 minutes past four in the morning & I’m sitting in a dugout overlooking a high hill in Kohima. In just under two minutes, a considerable bombardment is going to begin. Guns & mortars are going to soften up the last Japanese-held hills & then infantry & armoured cars are going to make a simultaneous attack on all of them.” (11)

The claim that these were “the last Japanese-held hills” was wishful thinking. Jail & Detail Hills were the targets of the barrage, delivered by 2 Division artillery, supplemented with 3-inch mortars of 33 Brigade & Vickers machine-guns of 2 Manchesters. Sharpe continued:

“There is the crackle of small arms, the hammer-hammer of machine-guns, the crack of mortar bombs & over it all a roof of rumbling sound, the guns. The faintly discernible black ridge with the bumps of hill tops sticking above it is a focal point towards which red tracer curves slowly, sparks from mortar bombs swoop onto it &, as the sky gets lighter, you can see the skyline toss tumultuously into the air. You become aware of a thick white cloud drifting slowly down from the ridge. That is smoke. Underneath it, our men are moving forward under its darkness to assault the heights.” (11)

Major Lowry of Queen’s B Company:

“By 05.00 hours there were the first signs of daylight. I went over to each platoon & wished them the best of luck. We moved forward on to Jail Hill. Our speed & formation up the hill was grand & the chaps were in terrific form. The Japanese did not try to stop us until we were about three-quarters of the way from the top, & then they started.” (11)

Richard Sharpe, BBC:

“As the sun comes up, you can hear faint cheers as the men charge. Soon tiny black silhouettes can be seen moving slowly over the skyline, dropping to the ground or moving violently with hand grenades or pole charges.” (11)

Major Lowry, Queen’s:

“By 06.00 hours, we had reached the crest, taken one bunker & driven the Japanese out of another small one. But further progress was hard & costly. I told the men to remain where they were, to hold & contain the Japanese.” (11)

As they were under fire from both flanks, Lowry “got on the wireless” to call for a smoke screen. He then led his men down the reverse slope of Jail Hill, until they were forced to take cover from rifle & machine-gun fire. Lowry:

“Then followed a sniping duel, after which the air became thick with grenades, both theirs & ours. We all scurried about trying to avoid them as they burst. We did a fair amount of damage. Poor old Pen misjudged a grenade & did not crawl away in time. As a result, he was hit by a number of grenade fragments under the heart. He was soon dragged clear, but died about half an hour later.” (11)

It was decided that the Queensmen should consolidate & hold on to their gains. Two companies of 4/1 Gurkhas went forward to support them, eventually digging in on their left flank. Major Lowry:

“For the rest of the day we dug like beavers with everything we could find, plates, mugs, bayonets & entrenching tools, burrowing & tunnelling ourselves forward below ground level. By the evening we were completely dug in & all section posts linked up. At the first sign of dusk, a carrying party came up with ammunition, chiefly grenades. They also brought up some very welcome rum. It had been raining, so we were soaking wet.

We had a 50% stand-to all night, but we were all awake for most of it, as it poured with rain throughout & was one of the noisiest nights imaginable. The sounds of the Japanese machine-guns & our light machine-guns were punctuated by grenade & mortar fire. Three Japanese bunkers were only about ten or fifteen yards away. The Queens were fortunate in only having three more men wounded during the night.” (11)

Whilst the Queensmen were storming Jail Hill, 4/15 Punjabs advanced to attack Detail Hill, with pipes & drums playing. They soon came under heavy fire from Supply & Jail Hills & sustained 130 casualties. Their Commander, Colonel Conroy, was wounded in both arms, but continued to direct operations. However, they made little impression on the main bunker, despite support from 4/1 Gurkhas.

The assault on Detail Hill should have been supported by tanks, but the road was blocked & attempts to bypass the obstacle led to the front two tanks having tracks blown off by anti-tank mines.

The attacks on Jail & Detail Hills suffered from flanking fire from Transport Ridge. At first light, the Norfolks had made another unsuccessful attempt to take the ‘Norfolk Bunker’. The Royal Scots then had a go, in which Lance-Corporal Canham had managed to force his Bren gun into a loophole, but he was killed after firing his first burst. The Scots were ordered back. Major Menzies:

“We were still close to the Japanese. We tried to burn them out with petrol tins, which we set alight with Verey flares. Then our trenches began to fill with water. Soon we were standing on dead bodies to get a foothold.” (11)

Brigadier Theobalds, Lieutenant-Colonel Scott & several 4 Brigade staff assembled later opposite ‘Norfolk Bunker’ to discuss options. Sergeant Fred Hazell saw what happened:

“Theobalds came down looking all very spic & span, with his red braided cap on. He was with four or five others. He knelt down alongside my hole & said ‘I thought I’d come up & see where all the action is. How are things going?’ I said ‘It’s fairly quiet at the moment, but keep your eyes open for grenades. In fact, I wouldn’t stand there if I was you, there’s a grenade coming now!’

There was a fairly long slit trench just behind me & they all jammed into it. About six feet behind the trench was a tree stump. I saw the grenade hit the top of this tree stump & bounce back into the trench.” (11)

Scott was unharmed, but Brigadier Theobalds & the staff officers were badly injured. Hit in the back & paralysed, John Theobalds was evacuated, but died five days later. He asked a friend to tell his wife that

“…she was the last one I was thinking of”. (11)

May 10. Revolting

Lieutenant Gadsby led a sodden section of 2 Manchesters, with a Vickers machine-gun, from Garrison Hill down to join the Dorsets dug in at the northern tip of Kohima Ridge, where the blackened remains of the Deputy Commissioner’s bungalow were situated:

“The weather was foul with thick mist & it was pouring with rain. We were soon wet through. We had great difficulty in digging in as the ground had been so shelled that the earth just fell in as soon as we started to dig. We remained almost totally out in the open for the night with the Japanese only a few yards away. Fortunately, they kept quiet. I hate to think what would have happened to us if they hadn’t.” (11)

Lieutenant Norman Havers of the Dorsets was miserable too:

“We were increasingly plagued by flies, mostly bluebottles. They swarmed over everything. The knowledge that they had hatched from maggots infecting our own & enemy dead made them so much more revolting. Rats too were multiplying in this place where there was so much to feed on. Most of the dead lay out in the open where they had fallen & there they had to remain until the battle ended.” (11)

Brigadier Victor Hawkins sent a company of 1/8 Lancashire Fusiliers down from the top of Naga village to reconnoitre:

“Just below our position was a terrace which contained the Kohima Village schools, but they were now in a dilapidated condition because of air bombing. I watched the Lancashire Fusiliers’ company moving down … & once they got amongst the mass of bashas & houses they ran into a considerable number of snipers. When the Fusiliers tried to cross the road & get onto Treasury Ridge, they came up against stronger opposition & lost some men to a light machine-gun dug into a bank above the road. I ordered them to withdraw back to the Brigade perimeter. On their way back, a Japanese gun on Firs Hill suddenly opened up & put a round right in the middle of them.” (11)

Since the death of Brigadier Goschen, killed by a sniper on May 7, command of 4 Brigade had passed to Brigadier Jack Theobalds, who had been second-in-command of 5 Brigade. He spent the night of May 10 in the Norfolks’ command post with Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Scott & Captain John Howard, to be on hand for another attempt to clear the Japanese from Transport Ridge. They were only 200 yds from the ‘Norfolk Bunker’ complex, where Randle had been killed on May 6. Howard described how two 6pdr anti-tank guns were brought up by Gordon Highlanders of 100 Anti-tank Regiment:

“The Japanese positions were only a few yards from the Norfolks’ forward foxholes & it was impossible to use ordinary artillery support with our men so close. Two anti-tank guns had therefore been taken to bits & man-handled up to the Norfolks’ positions with great difficuly & very slowly. They were then to fire at a range of about 40 yds & blast the Japanese bunkers to pieces.” (11)

As they worked, the determined gunners crouched behind the shields of their guns, for protection against the furious fire coming from their targets. At the same time, a mortar barrage supported their efforts, delivering 1,500 rounds in half an hour.

Night had fallen when the bombardment ended, & in the darkness a platoon of Norfolks advanced to try again to clear the bunkers 50 yds from their trenches. They passed John Randle’s shattered remains, which lay where he had fallen on May 6, & reached their objective with only one casualty. But then a storm of grenades fell amongst them. A signaller with a telephone urgently reported that the platoon was being destroyed & Brigadier Theobalds ordered them to withdraw. The officers in the command post watched the survivors return. Captain John Howards:

“We then stayed miserably in that hole in the ground for the rest of the night. The Brigadier gave me some chocolate, which he had brought with him when he came to take over the Brigade. But we had been on short rations for two weeks & the sudden richness made me sick & I spent all night having recurring bouts of diarrhoea & vomiting.” (11)

May 9. Something nice

Private Manabu Wada of 3/138th Regiment, Imperial Japanese Army, had been told that they would feast their way to victory, seizing troves of British supplies, as they had in Malaya & Burma. But when they reached Kohima:

“The British had burned their food & supply depots so that not even a grain of rice or a round of ammunition was left for us in the captured enemy positions. Throughout our long seige of Kohima, enemy fighter aircraft flew along the face of the valley in front of us & cargo planes dropped arms & water to their leading troops. Without meat, rice & ammunition, we could only watch.” (3)

The huge imbalance in logistic support was made clear to the Japanese by the sight of supply planes delivering food to the British. In stark contrast, Private Masaoki Okoshi killed, cooked & ate a mangy dog that had strayed into his camp:

“It wasn’t a question of whether it tasted good or not. We didn’t care what it was as long as we could put something in our stomachs. It was just a case of eating & easing our empty stomachs a little, that was all.” (3)

To the starving Japanese, an attack offered the possibility of plundering rations from enemy dead. To Private Hidehiro Shingai, the announcement of a planned attack brought mixed feelings. The positive side was that

“We’ll get to have something nice for dinner today.” (3)

May 8. Most depressing

It was three weeks since 2 Division had locked horns with the Japanese at Kohima & British morale was sinking. One of the Staff Officers, Captain Arthur Swinson, described the previous day as

“probably the most depressing for the Allies in the whole battle.” (3)

Yet another attack had ended as a bloody failure & progress towards evicting the Japanese was painstakingly slow, despite the massive logistical superiority enjoyed by the British. It seemed that bringing tanks into close proximity was the only reliable way to destroy bunkers. Indeed, two tanks belonging to 149 Regiment climbed to the top of Supply Hill on May 8 & blasted Japanese positions at point-blank range. But many bunkers were inaccessible to tanks.

Lieutenant Lintorn Highett of the Dorsets admired the tenacity of his opponents:

“Every army in the world talks about holding positions to the last. Virtually no other army did – but the Japs did.” (3)

Colour Sergeant Fred Weedman of the Worcesters felt the same way, describing the Japanese as

“… fanatically stubborn defenders. Artillery attacks & Hurricane & Vengeance bombers had little effect. The British & Japanese were hopelessly intermingled. One side would attack, the other counter-attack: neither would give way. During daylight they fought ferociously ten or fifteen yards apart & at night they crept even closer, attacking with grenades & bayonets.” (3)

Whereas the British were able to bring in 33 Brigade to replace their losses in this grim attritional struggle, the Japanese had to rely on the dwindling units that had been fighting since they reached Kohima on April 4, not to mention the 20 day trek to get there & the battles fought at Sangshak & Jessami in March. They were scraping the bottom of the proverbial barrel to keep their defences manned:

“Even the invalids & the wounded were driven to the front to help supply manpower. Even those with broken legs in splints were herded into battle, malaria cases too. I have seen these going forward with yellow faces, the fever still in their bodies. I saw one man, whose shoulder had been shattered by a bullet, stagger forward to the front.” (3)

For how much longer could this go on?

May 7. Silly arses

After a few days of recuperation, the Berkshires returned to Garrison Hill to replace the Durhams, who were transported to Dimapur for a break from the purgatory of Kohima Ridge.

At first light, 4/1 Gurkhas attacked the bunkers on Transport Ridge that remained in Japanese hands. Their assault was preceeded by a bazooka barrage & then launched through a smoke screen, but it was repulsed by showers of grenades. The Gurkhas’ commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hedderwick, was killed by a sniper as he watched the attack from one of the Norfolks’ trenches.

A sniper also killed Brigadier Goschen, as he stood to observe the Gurkhas’ attack. His uniform may have attracted attention, according to Lieutenant Dickie Davis:

“Goschen came down with Robert Scott, full of red things on their hats, silly arses! I said ‘Excuse me, Sir, there are snipers there, could you get down!’ But he was a Guardsman & he still thought it was an exercise! You know, a Guardsman wouldn’t get down, so he didn’t & unfortunately got killed.” (11)

The assault by 4/1 Gurkhas had been intended to allow 1 Queen’s Royals to attack Jail Hill unmolested from Transport Ridge. After a short delay, the Queen’s went ahead despite the failure of the Gurkhas’ attack. They soon came under fire from Transport Ridge. Major Lowry was commanding their reserve company & followed progress ahead:

“As the haze & smoke of the bombardment lifted on Jail Hill, D Company came under very heavy cross-fire from Detail & Supply Hills & from the right by Japanese machine-guns firing straight down the road. Through my glasses, I could see what a terrible time they were having.” (11)

The Queen’s managed to overcome some lower bunkers on Jail Hill, but were mauled by withering fire from higher up, from Detail Hill on their left & from Transport Ridge on their right. Major Lowry’s reserve company was sent to bring back the casualties. To him

“The air seemed to be scorching hot from the heavy firing … from in front of us & from all sides. Getting in the casualties was a ghastly job. They were magnificent, some men making four or five journeys with casualties through this hell.” (11)

The Queen’s were ordered to withdraw. Their abortive attack had demonstrated the importance of overcoming the remaining bunkers on Transport Ridge before assaulting Jail Hill. In retrospect, the Queen’s attack should have been postponed when the 4/1 Gurkhas failed to achieve their objective, but Major General Grover was under urgent pressure from Corps Command to open the road to Imphal.

At Naga Village, 5 Brigade were also suffering. A temporary cemetry there grew every day. Evacuation of the wounded required

“… the nightmare of a three-hour journey … on a swaying stretcher, carried by four Nagas, often under mortar fire. Then a 43 mile trip by ambulance … into the torrid heat of Dimapur. [The casualties] lie still beneath the blankets, white with pain but uncomplaining.” (11)

Although Japanese 31 Division continued to thwart British attempts to displace them, Lieutenant General Sato knew that his men were starving & low on ammunition. In response to his demand for re-supply, Lieutenant General Mutaguchi had told him to forage. Sato went over his head, appealing to the Commander in Chief of South East Asia & to Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo.

May 6. Lights out

At dawn on May 6, Captain Randle led a frontal assault against the bunker complex on Transport Ridge. He was soon hit. Sergeant Bert Fitt described the attack:

“The Japanese had two light machine-gun posts which were carving us up terribly. Captain Randle had already been hit at least twice, fairly heavily in the upper part of his body, before we even got to the bottom. I shouted to him to go down & leave it to me, because I could see that he’d lost blood. He said ‘No! You take that left hand bunker; I’m going to take this right hand one.

The Japanese didn’t realise that I was coming up the slope ‘underneath’ them. I managed to push a grenade in through the slit & after four seconds it went off. Anybody inside that bunker was either dead or knocked out.

I immediately spun right. I saw Captain Randle at the bunker’s entrance. He had a grenade he was going to release into the bunker. I just stood there. I couldn’t do a thing to save him. If he could have held out for about three minutes, I would have got on top of the bunker & knocked it out without getting hurt. But unfortunately, he had been hit again at point blank-range. As he was going down he threw his grenade into the bunker & he sealed the bunker entrance with his own body. But he had got the occupants, killed them.

It was the main gun position & I am certain that’s why he went for it. He knew that if he didn’t knock it out it would be lights out for the rest of us. It was a quite deliberate act to block the opening of the bunker to save the remainder of the men. In doing so, he was unfortunately killed.” (11)

Sergeant Fitt charged 15 yards to the next bunker, where he threw in a grenade & shot a Japanese. He was then shot by someone outside his field of vision:

“He had come out of the back door of the bunker behind me. He got me through the side of the face under my jaw, took my top teeth out, fractured my maxilla & the bullet burnt along the side of my nose. I spat out a handful of teeth. He was only a few paces away. He had a rifle & bayonet & I had a light machine-gun. I pressed the trigger but found I’d got no ammunition left. He came towards me. I was an unarmed combat instructor & knew I could go hand-to-hand against anybody with a rifle & bayonet. I therefore let him come & I crashed the gun straight into his face. Before he hit the ground, I had my hand on his windpipe & I tried to tear it out. I then managed to get the bayonet from his rifle & I finished him with that.

As I stood up, I heard a shout from 12 Platoon telling me that they were pinned down by another bunker I couldn’t see. They told me where it was. I threw a grenade over the top of the bunker & a chap would could see it yelled back a correction. I threw a second one that bounced straight into it, killing the occupants.”

A fresh Norfolk platoon appeared, led by Second-Lieutenant Davies. Fitt told him that he couldn’t continue:

“I had been bleeding heavily & the front of me was pretty red with blood. I was getting weak, so I said to him ‘Well you’d better take over now, Sir.’ I went & sat just inside a bunker. Eventually someone put a field bandage around my head.” (11)

Sergeant Fitt was evacuated & eventually received the Distinguished Conduct Medal. Captain Randle was awarded a Victoria Cross.

Second-Lieutenant Davies took his platoon to attack bunkers on the other side of the slope, facing Jail Hill. Davies:

“We couldn’t throw grenades at them as they were facing away from us, so we made holes in the tops of them with bayonets, pulled the rings out of grenades & dropped them in through the holes.” (11)

However, as casualties mounted they stopped to consolidate in trenches amongst the captured bunkers. An order came that they should not risk bringing in the wounded.

As the Norfolks settled in to hold the positions they had taken, the bunkers further down the ridge remained a major challenge. Some of them faced Jail Hill, which was to be attacked the following day. Its size & position allowed Jail Hill to dominate Detail Hill & the main road to Imphal, which ran through a cutting at this point. The Japanese on Jail Hill also provided covering fire for part of Transport Ridge.

The attack on Jail Hill was to be carried out by the 1st Battalion Queen’s Royal Regiment. They belonged to 33 Brigade of 7 Indian Division, which had come under command of Major General Grover. The brigade had been air-lifted from the Arakan & had only just arrived at Kohima, exhausted & stricken with malaria. 33 Brigade’s other battalions were 4/15 Punjab & 4/1 King George V’s Own Gurkha Rifles. The 4/1 Gurkhas were required to clear the remainder of Transport Ridge to allow the Queens to assault Jail Hill.

Before the Gurkas could attack Transport Ridge, their path had to be cleared by 1/1 Punjab on Congress Hill.

1/1 Punjab was part of 161 Brigade, which had denied Kohima to the Japanese back in April & was now also under Grover’s command. The other battalions in 161 Brigade were 4/7 Rajputs & 4 Royal West Kents. The West Kents were now protecting lines of communication after their brief recuperation once the siege was lifted. The 4/7 Rajputs were sent to Garrison Hill, to reinforce 1 Royal Welch Fusiliers & 2 Durham Light Infantry. The Durhams had lost 175 men & 11 out of 15 officers, including their commander. A staff officer visiting Garrison Hill found it “indescribably beastly”, but the troops seemed cheerful, though “badly in need of a wash”. (11)

A small group of Durhams & Royal Welch were still clinging to some ground on Supply Hill that they had seized on May 4. Exhausted & severely depleted, they were evacuated by road under cover of tanks & a smoke screen. When the withdrawal was complete, Major Ezra Rhodes of 149 Royal Tank Regiment was ordered to attempt to drive his Grant north along Kohima Ridge from Supply Hill to Garrison Hill. As he attempted to follow a narrow track around the east side of Kuki Piquet, the tank ran out out of room & slithered down the hillside until stopped by a tree. The immobilised Grant was at the mercy of the Japanese, so the crew bailed out & sprinted up the road, zig-zagging to avoid rifle & machine-gun fire. They all managed to escape & eighty years later, the crashed tank can still be found where it came to rest in 1944.

May 5. Make it all right

The British 2nd Division, commanded by Major General Grover, was part of 33 Corps. The Corps Commander in Chief, Lieutenant General Montagu Stopford, met Grover on May 5 & pressed him for more progress. The meeting was at Zubza & coincided with an air raid by four Zeros. Harry Swinson of 7th Worcesters watched them attack & escape unscathed:

“… flying low & swept down the valley through the flak that was already filling the sky, to strafe Div HQ & the forward gun positions. A quick wheel before Kohima Ridge & they came roaring down on us, their cannons blazing. The flak by this time was thicker than ever, but the Zeros seemed equipped with immortality. Ten seconds & they were on us, so low that I felt I could reach up & pluck them out of the sky.” (3)

On Kohima Ridge, an isolated group of Durhams & Royal Welch Fusiliers remained on Supply Hill after the previous day’s attacks. They were delighted when tanks of 149 Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps, trundled up the road below them. These were lead by a Light Minesweeper Tank, but this hit a mine, which blew its track. Nevertheless, the following tanks reached Supply Hill, where they engaged with Japanese bunkers & succeeded in killing their occupants. Bypassing Kuki Piquet under cover of a smoke screen, some Royal Welch Fusiliers from Garrison Hill were able to reinforce the men on Supply Hill. Light tanks later delivered stores to them & three tanks stayed to support them overnight. At one point the tanks were threatened by six Japanese carrying mines, but these exploded under British fire.

In the early hours of May 5, the Cameron Highlanders in Naga village were attacked in strength, following a preliminary mortar barrage. After confused melees, they eventually fell back to the adjacent area held by the Lancashire Fusiliers. This withdrawal was covered by mortar fire from the Lancs & machine-gun fire from a platoon of the Manchesters.

The position of 5 Brigade in Naga village was strengthened by arrival of the Worcesters, with engineer & medical support, who built bunkers that could withstand a bombardment. Brigadier Victor Hawkins circulated a Special Order of the Day, to emphasize the importance of defending a hillock they had named West Knoll:

“On no account will anyone retire if they get overrun by the Japanese. If Japanese infiltrate into the positions, they will be dealt with by bayonet at the first opportunity. West Knoll must be held at all costs.” (11)

On Transport Ridge, the Norfolks sat miserably in foxholes full of muddy water. Lieutenant Colonel Scott toured the positions to provide encouragement. Sergeant Bert Fritt felt a grim determination, that he thought was shared by those around him:

“I think they all had the same feeling that I had, which was that come what may we were going to annihilate the Japanese”. (11)

The Norfolk’s location was very exposed to fire from mortars & snipers. Corporal ‘Dolly’ Payne was one of many victims:

“I heard a shot. Dolly had poked his head up & a sniper had shot him. The bullet entered the right hand side of his forehead so that the front had gone & his brain was visible. We got to him, put him down in the bottom of his trench & covered him with a monsoon cape. He said ‘You might as well fill the bloody hole up’.” (11)

By the time Payne was removed on a stretcher “He was moaning & whimpering like a child.” (11)

Higher up the slope, in the jungle overlooking Transport Ridge, the Royal Scots extracted retribution by ‘bagging’ many Japanese. The Adjutant Captain F. C. Currie:

“For the first day or two, we were continually sniped & harried. But gradually we got the better of them. First we blitzed the area between ourselves & the Norfolks & joined up the two Battalion boxes. Then we started counter-sniping, at which we had considerable success. RSM Brunton was particularly keen & efficient. He discovered a Japanese water point & sat over it. His bag was a welcome addition to the daily total. We also laid some very successful ambushes around our position. I remember that we counted 31 Japanese bodies.”

Perhaps the biggest challenge for 4 Brigade was the ‘Norfolk Bunker’ complex that straddled & dominated a track down from Transport Ridge to the main road to Imphal. Not only did it block progress along the Ridge, resupply & evacuation of the wounded, it also had Jail Hill & Detail Hill in its field of fire, undermining attempts to liberate these important hills from the Japanese. An assualt on Norfolk Bunker was planned for dawn next morning, so Captain Jack Randle led a patrol to identify the best point to attack. Later, Randle sat calmly with other officers in a trench full of water, planning the assault & musing about his wife Mavis & son, born after his departure. When he left, Randle’s last words were

“If I do not come back, make it all right with Mavis & the kid, will you?”

May 4. Right-ho boys, let’s go!

Two weeks had passed since the Siege of Kohima was lifted & the gallant garrison replaced by fresh troops of 2 Division. The British had suffered heavy losses during that time, but had made little progress in evicting the Japanese. The Battle of Imphal was raging eighty miles south & the supplies flown there were insufficient to maintain Allied 4 Corps. Unless the road from Dimapur could be opened soon, 4 Corps would need to start flying men out to reduce demand on food & ammunition. This would inevitably weaken the chances of holding Imphal. So Major General Grover was under intense pressure to open the road. He hoped that this would swiftly follow the concerted attacks he had prepared for May 4th.

On Kohima Ridge, the Royal Welch Fusiliers of 6 Brigade would attack from Garrison Hill to seize the adjacent hills of Kuki Piquet & Supply Hill. They would be supported by the Durham Light Infantry (DLI), attacking from the road, assisted by tanks. Simultaneously, the Cameron Highlanders & Worcesters (5 Brigade), with 1/8 Lancashire Fusiliers, would deliver the left hook against Naga Village, where the HQ of Japanese 31 Division was located on a hill. Meanwhile, the Royal Norfolks & Royal Scots (4 Brigade) would attack Transport Ridge in a right hook. These three simultaneous attacks should limit Japanese ability to reinforce threatened positions.

B & C Companies of the DLI had returned to Garrison Hill after a few days of recuperation. From 07.45, 2 Division artillery pounded Kuki Piquet & Supply Hill, the hills south of Garrison Hill on Kohima Ridge. The Royal Welch Fusiliers & the DLI then attacked, but were strongly resisted. Private Peter Wilson:

“We started our attack but were soon under fire from heavy machine-guns & mortars from Japanese secure in bunkers. Stretcher bearers were called constantly, but there was nowhere safe to take the wounded. During our attack we came upon a gully where the Japanese had piled hundreds of their dead from their recent attacks.” (11)

A & D Companies of the DLI were to be brought to Detail Hill by road in Bren Carriers, but these came under heavy fire as soon as they passed the junction. The troops jumped out of the carriers & took cover near the DC bungalow, before withdrawing to Garrison Hill. Their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel John Brown, was killed by artillery fire. Only a small group of DLI & Royal Welch got as far as Supply Hill, where they dug in, surrounded by Japanese.

The left hook attack began early on May 4th, with the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders & Lancashire Fusiliers advancing as quietly as possible in gym shoes. Their stealthy approach was successful & they reached Naga Village undetected. It was situated on high ground overlooking Kohima Ridge. The village had many buildings, but was “smashed up” & squalid, with flies everywhere.

The British dug themselves in & soon came under fire from artillery on Firs Hill, which had been bypassed after the Lancs’ costly attack on April 28. The British occupied much of Naga Village initially, but were forced back by heavy fighting to a box they established on a hillock dubbed West Knoll, which they circled with barbed wire.

The arduous right hook manoeuvre had brought the Norfolks & Royal Scots into jungle above Transport Ridge, ready to launch their attack. Setting off at 04.15, the Norfolks soon ran into the bunkers discovered by their patrols on the previous evening. As planned, they bypassed these & continued, leaving two platoons to contain the bunkers’ occupants. They scrambled on down a steep slope through thorny undergrowth. Encountering another Japanese defensive position, which could not be outflanked, they rushed & cleared it. As he was about to continue, Captain Fulton turned to Sam Horner & said

“Well Sam, better get off & earn my MC!” (11)

A few seconds later he was shot by a sniper. Sergeant Bert Fitt passed him lying there:

“I remember seeing some wounded, including poor old Captain Fulton. He had been hit through the top of the head & his scalp was laid open. You could see his brain actually moving & he had a pleading look in his eye as if asking for a bullet to finish him off. Well you couldn’t do that, but it was obvious that he hadn’t long to go.” (2)

As the Norfolks proceeded in single file, they came under fire from a series of bunkers higher up the slope, but they carried on. Stretcher bearers patched up the wounded & then left them for the following troops to pick up. Captain John Mather, Medical Officer:

“I kept up with the troops, I was running part of the way & so were my chaps. We dealt with anyone who was injured, gave them treatment & left them behind for other people to take back.” (11)

To conserve ammunition, the Norfolks maintained fire discipline & only returned fire when they could see a target. But their commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Scott, ordered

“Start blasting them & advance. Shoot up in the trees, get shooting.” (11)

Spraying the jungle around them felt better & kept Japanese heads down. When they reached the start line, the leading Norfolks waited for the rest to catch up. Sergeant Fitt:

“We should have had artillery support. That was all laid on to blast GPT Ridge before we attacked it. But things got rather desperate as we lay on the start line. We were getting shot up & hadn’t a chance.” (2)

Lieutenant Sam Horner, Signals Officer:

“Robert Scott decided, absolutely rightly, that the momentum was being lost & he kept it going. The battery commander said ‘What about the guns?’ ‘No, no. Forget it, we’ll just get straight on through.’ He ran off with A Company, who were then spearhead, & practically led the assault.” (2)

Sergeant William Robinson of A Company:

“Bob Scott lined us up with Bren-guns, a sling over our shoulders taking the weight & a man behind us with extra ammunition. All he had was a pistol & his khud stick. His famous words were ‘Right-ho boys, let’s go!’ That was it. The instructions were to fire at everything, spraying some down, some up & forward because there was a bunker there. Up to that time I hadn’t seen any Japanese at all. But in this semi-clearing several got up & started running away. They didn’t get far because the fire power was terrific, about twelve Bren guns. The bunker was taken.” (2)

Captain John Howard, 4 Brigade Intelligence Officer, described Scott’s appearance that day

“He was about six foot two & very big. His huge boots covered in mud. His trousers were covered in dried blood. He had grenades, a pistol & his dagger hanging round his huge waistline. He’d acquired a silk Japanese flag which he was using as a scarf. Like the rest of us, he had four or five days of beard & a bandaged head & his tin hat had a ragged bullet hole in it. His bravery was magnificent.” (11)

Despite this success, the Royal Scots were not sent forward to make the planned ‘follow through’ assault on Pimple, which may have been a missed opportunity. Instead, they formed a defensive box for 4 Brigade Tactical Headquarters about 200 metres above & behind the Norfolks, who dug in to defend the ground they had taken. Captain Jack Randle distinguished himself by helping bring the wounded into the Norfolk’s perimeter, although his knee had been injured by grenade splinters.

A complex of bunkers on the forward slope of Transport Ridge dominated the road to Imphal. This became known as the Norfolk Bunker. Captain David Glasse was ordered to storm it after dark, without artillery support. Sam Horner:

“David gave me his watch & said ‘Take that & write to Louise, won’t you, & see that she gets this.’ I said ‘We’re going to see you again shortly David!’ He said ‘I doubt it! I doubt it!’ He just knew he was going to get killed.” (11)

Although his platoon rushed & captured the bunker, they then came under machine-gun fire, which killed Glasse. They were ordered to withdraw, in case of a counter-attack.

An excellent webinar by Steve Snelling about Robert Scott & the Royal Norfolks at Kohima can be watched on the website of Kohima Educational Trust.

May 3. Lump in my throat

Protected by a smoke screen, B Company of the Dorsets reached the isolated positions held by A Company beside the ruined DC Bungalow at the northern tip of Kohima Ridge. Captain John Bowles then led the remnants of A Company back to Garrison Hill. Major Geoffrey White was moved by the spectacle:

“I confess to feeling a large lump in my throat as I watched the 28 survivors of the hundred-odd of my old ‘A’ Company clamber up the hillside into Battalion Headquarters. Blackened & red-eyed, John Bowles’s men had for five & a half days hung on by the skin of their teeth against almost overwhelming opposition in the most exposed position. They had fulfilled their task & had not only gained a lodgement on their objective, but had kept the road open & had killed a large number of Japanese. Under constant fire by day & continual ‘jittering’ by night, they had fought on with rapidly diminishing numbers.” (11)

A platoon of B Company charged from their new trenches to the bungalow, which they set alight. They killed five Japanese but lost six killed & 4 wounded to fire coming from bunkers in a bank below the tennis court. That night, B Company lost a further seven killed & eight wounded.

To help the left hook attack achieve surprise, 1st Cameron Highlanders, 7th Worcesters & 1/8th Lancashire Fusiliers replaced their hob-nailed army boots with gym shoes. To this end, 3,000 pairs of gym shoes were sent from Dimapur by lorry as far as Zubza & then carried to the troops by mules. The availability of so many gym shoes in provides demonstrates the extraordinary capacity of the supply depot at Dimapur.

The right hook was much less well prepared for its attack. Indeed, the terrain was so challenging that Brigadier Goschen, Commander of 4 Brigade, remained uncertain of their precise location. The jungle restricted visibility to five yards & they could not find landmarks to identify their position with any confidence. Lieutenant Sam Horner, Signals Officer with the Royal Norfolks, described another of the problems:

“There was a map showing where we were going. It was absolutely white because it had never been surveyed, nobody had ever been there, the Nagas said they didn’t go there, because there was a lot of superstition about it – witches & that sort of thing. All there was, drawn from aeroplanes, was a few little nalas, watercourses, & the rest of it was white – so it was a fat lot of use having a map.” (2)

In fact, they were higher up than they realised. With their attack planned for next day, Brigadier Goschen briefed his staff. Captain John Howard, 4 Brigade Intelligence Officer:

“That evening we sat in silence under the trees while Brigadier Goschen gave his orders. The Norfolks were to launch the attack with the object of securing the highest point of GPT [Transport] Ridge below the trees. Information was scanty. No one had seen the ground … but we believed that we were about 500 yards from the edge of the trees & that beyond lay the barren north-east end of GPT Ridge.

A plan based on such scanty information had to be fluid. Two platoons of the SS Company were … to patrol ahead of the Norfolks while they approached their start line which was to be 100 yds above the edge of the trees.

During this approach, [2 Division artillery] were to register on the barren portion of GPT & fire diversionary concentrations onto Jail Hill & the hillock [known as Pimple] at the end of GPT on the opposite side of the road to Jail Hill. When the Norfolks were ready to leave the start line they were to call for a concentration of all guns on to their objective. They were to leave the present concentration area at 07.00 hours the next day, the 4th May. The Royal Scots & the other two SS Company platoons were to be in the Brigade Reserve.” (11)

SS here stands for Special Service. The SS Company drew men from every regiment in 2 Division & was intended as a task force that might be used for quick reaction to urgent situations. However, they had been assigned to strengthen the right hook & had been in the vanguard of its gruelling advance, often responsible for hacking through jungle to allow progress by the long column behind them.

The plan for May 4th was for the Norfolks to form up at the jungle edge & advance behind a succession of barrages from 2 Division artillery. An initial 45 minute barrage would use two 5.5 inch guns that had been discovered in a railway siding at Dimapur to provide shell holes where the Norfolks could shelter after storming Transport/GPT Ridge. The Royal Scots would then pass through the Norfolks & attack the Pimple hillock at the north-east end of the ridge.

An immediate challenge arose when an enemy position was discovered between the brigade & its intended start line for the attack. Brigadier Goschen decided that the position would be contained & by-passed, to avoid delaying the assault. As part of the Norfolk’s vanguard, Sergeant Ben Macrae led a night patrol to familiarise himself with the route:

“I went down the hill. I think there’d been a skirmish the night before, because I discovered the body of one of the SS chaps. Someone had taken his boots. There were Japanese positions. I got right up close & could hear voices & movement. We got back & reported.”

May 2. Military Medals

On Kohima Ridge, the Dorsets were losing a lot of men to sniper fire, especially when they tried to recover supplies dropped by parachute. Private Tom Cattle described an example:

“Our trenches were about 20 feet apart. We had ropes passing between the trenches to enable supplies to be pulled along between us. We were short of water & rationed to a pint each day, if we were lucky, as our supplies were dropped to us by air.

On one occasion a 2-gallon can of water was passing from the trench on our left towards us, the rope being pulled by Corporal Woolford in our trench. Suddenly he stopped pulling, cursed & said ‘It’s caught on a tree stump’. He got up out of the trench to see if he could free it, there was a single shot & he fell back into our trench. He was dead before he fell onto us, shot straight through the head. We were stunned & shocked, we couldn’t believe it. His body had to stay in the trench until dark.” (11)

Shortly before nightfall, the Japanese brought a 75 mm gun along the road to fire at close range, about 300 yards, on A Company of the Dorsets in their isolated positions at the tip of the ridge near the bungalow. Despite counter-fire from British artillery at Jotsoma, the Japanese gun inflicted heavy casualties on A Company & damaged their radio. At 23.00 hours, Corporal Mansfield carried the broken radio through the Japanese lines to Battalion HQ on Garrison Hill, with a request for A Company to withdraw due to their losses. This was transmitted to Major General Grover, who insisted that the important position be held. Mansfield was given some rum & sent back with this message & an undertaking to relieve A Company in the morning. Such conduct later earned Corporal Mansfield the Military Medal, which is awarded ‘For Bravery in the Field’.

The British 4 Brigade continued to make slow progress through dense jungle, in a right hook movement to get behind Transport (GPT) Ridge. The Japanese had discovered this manouevre & attacked the Royal Scots on a feature named Pavilion Hill, where they were supported by two Machine Gun Platoons of the Manchesters. Major Menzies of the Royal Scots described how they fought off the attack:

“We’d had no time even to dig in that night before the Japanese were on us. Often the Japanese were so close we had to hold on to our grenades for some seconds after the pins were out to make sure they would do their work. The Japanese tried to post a machine-gun on a height that overlooked our whole position … but Lance-Corporal McKay picked off one crew after another with his Sten-gun.” (11)

McKay was the Manchesters’ section commander, who remained in action despite being wounded. He received a Military Medal, for which the citation stated:

“He showed great tactical ability & combined it with fearlessness & contempt for danger which had a marked effect on the fighting quality of his command.” (11)

After grappling hand-to-hand, the Japanese were driven off. Major Menzies concluded:

“The extraordinary thing was that we lost so few men, only about half a dozen all told. When daylight came, we found that we had killed a tremendous number of Japanese. They had rolled down that hillside until stopped by trees & bushes, or lay dead on narrow ledges.” (11)

The Manchester’s Platoon Commander, Lieutenant King, was also awarded a Military Medal for his part in this incident, bringing an impressive tally of three for 2nd Division on May 2nd 1944.

May 1. The Mound

On May 1st, a Stuart light tank succeded in reaching the terrace above the tennis court. This inevitably drew fire from Japanese artillery & the tank was quickly knocked out by a 3.7-inch anti-tank gun. The crew were lucky to survive.

Pre-war landscaping had left a large pile of soil that overlooked the tennis court & was known as the Mound. This feature was exploited to try to dominate the no-man’s land below. Private Tom Cattle was not keen:

“It was a ‘hill’ which had been dug out & was a series of tunnels. From it, we were able to look down onto the Japanese. Due to its exposed position, it could only serve as an observation post as it was continually being fired on by the Japanese & any movement seen by them brought down a concentration of shell & machine-gun fire. I hated this position, as there was only one tunnel entrance & exit.” (11)

However, Major Geoffrey White was more positive about it:

“Gradually, by constant observation, we pieced together some idea of the lie of the land & the habits of the Japanese. It was not too comfortable an observation post, as the Japanese was apt to throw quite a lot of stuff at it & it was constantly being sniped. However, we found that it was a grand place from which to throw things back & undertake our own sniping. The Mound observation post became the rendezvous of anyone who felt that he could shoot at all & I well remember how one evening when I went down to visit & bagged my first Japanese.” (11)

Captain Harry Swinson, 7 Worcestershires, recorded in his diary:

“Heard this morning that Johnnie Brazier was killed. Very sorry. He was a fine chap, small, sandy-haired, and with bags of guts. He shared my cabin on the voyage out. Big loss to the Worcestershires.

Teddy Edwards, the Dorsets’ Q.M., came to see me this afternoon. His unit is in an exposed position around the District Commissioner’s bungalow. They took over from an Indian battalion who liked their trenches wide & shallow as opposed to our chaps, who like them narrow & deep. The Dorsets are deepening the trenches gradually, but digging is difficult owing to the activity of snipers. The Japs, Teddy told me, have got dug in under the concrete base of the tennis court. This is peculiarly situated on the top of a twelve-foot bank, so that tanks cannot get at it & grenades & flame-throwers cannot reach it. Mortar bombs are ineffective & the troops are too thick on the ground for the mediums to have a crack. A nasty position, but I have no doubt that the Sappers will find a way out. They may be mad or Methodist, but when they’re set on something nothing can stop them.

Saw the Grants moving forward, great steel, noisy monsters. Wish the country were better for them.

The Gurkhas are up with us now. Saw them pitching camp just behind Divisional H.Q.’s. Small, wiry, rather Mongolian to look at, they are one of the finest races in the East.” (17)

When the Japanese of 31st Division had set off for Kohima on March 15th, they had carried with them only enough food to last twenty days. This reflected their aim to travel fast across very difficult, mountainous terrain. Their commander, Lieutenant-General Kotoku Sato, had understood that 31 Division was to be resupplied from bases in Burma, with 250 tons of food & ammunition delivered each day. By the end of April, they had received almost nothing. With his men starving & low on ammunition, Sato signalled Lieutenant General Mutaguchi, Commander of 15th Army & the invasion of India:

“31st Division at the limit of its endurance”. (3)

He waited angrily for a reply, but none was forthcoming.

Blog for April 1-30 can be found here

Blog for March 27-31 can be found here

Battle of Sangshak: The reckoning

The Japanese gave a casualty figure of 580 at Sangshak, of whom nearly half were killed. This included a disproportionate number of platoon & company commanders, which blunted the effectiveness of 58th Infantry Regiment. More importantly, their arrival at Kohima was delayed by 6 days, buying time for the Allies to rush in reinforcements.

Of the two thousand defenders at Sangshak, 900 were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. Worst hit was 152 Indian Parachute Battalion, which suffered roughly 80% casualties.

Lieutenant General W. J. Slim, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fourteenth Army wrote later:

“To the officers & men of the 50 Parachute Brigade I send my congratulations. Your Parachute Brigade bore the first brunt of the enemy’s powerful flanking attack, & by their staunchness gave the garrison of Imphal the vital time required to readjust their defences.”

March 26. Fight your way out

Major Maurice Bell of Brigade Signals Section:

“At 17.45 on the evening of 26th March, the signaller noted down a message received over the crackling radio from Major General Roberts: “Fight your way out. Go south then west. Air and transport on lookout. Good Luck. Our thoughts are with you.” (7)

“I could barely believe my ears or the accuracy of my morse reading! A moment of bliss as there dawned the possibility – however slim – of a future life. (7)

“Then came the doubts. Firstly, was this a genuine message or something sent by the enemy?  Secondly, had the Japs intercepted the message? We had destroyed our code books early in the battle to prevent them falling into Japanese hands & had been communicating ‘in clear’ ever since. On the first issue, we asked for information on personnel in Brigade Signals. This was personal stuff unlikely to be known by Japanese intelligence & included such details as the nicknames of various signalers. All the questions were answered promptly & correctly & we were reassured that the message was genuine. (7)

“On the second issue we could do nothing. I told the two operators to keep the news to themselves and took the message to Brigade HQ, wondering on the way how we would cope with the many wounded in the field hospital. (7)

There were about 150 severly wounded who could not be moved. Everyone knew that the Japanese routinely murdered such men, remembering the massacre of wounded in the Admin Box in February. “Much discussion & heart-searching” (8) preceded the decision to abandon the wounded. They were sedated & left in an opiate stupor.

The night was moonless & pitch black, allowing the survivors of 50th Indian Parachute Brigade to creep away in small groups. They made their way back to Imphal, a trek that took these exhausted men at least 3 days & demanded climbs of around 4,000 feet.

On this occasion, the wounded were spared because of the discovery that a popular Japanese officer, slain during the battle, had been wrapped in a blanket & buried. Lieutenant Shosaku Kameyama recorded that

“Our men were all moved by this. As the enemy treated our company commander respectfully, our regimental commander ordered that enemy wounded should … not be killed.” (8)

They were sent to Japanese field hospitals with orders to treat them mercifully.

March 25. None of us expected to get out alive

At 0400 hrs on March 25, after heavy artillery & mortar fire, a large Japanese assault broke into the church position, but was driven out.  This was repeated with fresh troops several times over the next few hours, fighting continuing inside the church, until all its defenders had fallen.

The Japanese were now established on the highest ground within the defensive perimeter, setting up their machine guns in the Indian’s trenches & gun pits.  Captain John Sanderson of 152 Battalion described this desperate combat: 

“My men and I were fighting for our lives, hand to hand, when a grenade exploded and knocked me out. A fellow soldier’s body fell on top of me. The Japanese came through bayoneting our men but they must have thought I was dead. A counter-attack finally drove the Japanese back again. When I regained consciousness, I found I was the only one left alive. The weapon pits were a shambles of dead and dying, both our own and Japanese. It was impossible to be certain who was still alive. Major Smith and Major Lock commanding the Mortar and Gun batteries were both killed fighting gallantly in counter-attacks to save their battery positions.” (7)

All the company commanders of 152 Battalion had been killed or badly wounded. Ordered to retake the church area, Lieutenant Robert de la Haye of the 152nd, calmly checked his equipment and combed his hair, before leading his men forward to fight their way up to the church with bayonet and kukri, but they were shot down in minutes. Some positions were retaken by further counterattacks, but could not be held because they had no more grenades.  

“We continued to fight by day & night.  The position became utterly gruesome & macabre.  The perimeter was littered with corpses, which could not be buried, & there were mule carcasses everywhere.  Some went into the cooking pot, but others very quickly rotted in that climate – and there were Japanese bodies, our own bodies, & excreta everywhere.  It was impossible to construct properly dug-down trenches, dysentery became rife & the situation was almost intolerable. We were getting weaker by the hour – our men were getting killed off one after the other, we were running out of ammunition & food & some men were almost delirious after many days without sleep. Some of us would drop off for a few minutes in mid-conversation.  The situation was desperate, & by 25 March, none of us expected to get out alive.  But somehow that didn’t seem to mean anything, either – we just went on, relentlessly.  I never heard a single man complain.” (3)

Captain Dicky Richards, 152 Indian Parachute Battalion.

Dicky Richards survived the Battle of Sangshak & rose to become a Brigadier in the British Army & a Commander of the British Empire.

March 24. Well done indeed

Lieutenant Kameyama Shosaku recalled: 

“We attacked every night from the 22nd to the 25th & every night many soldiers were killed. Despite that, we went forward.”

The defenders were under strict orders to stay put at night, so that any movement could be recognised as hostile & fired upon. A critically-wounded Gurkha filled the darkness with screams for his mother, before dying just before his comrades could reach him at dawn,  

Major Harry Butchard of 153 Battalion:

“Conditions on the plateau soon became pretty grim – bodies lying about, human & animal, decomposing rapidly.  Snipers were a constant nightmare – one morning I was speaking to two officers of 152 battalion, and when I returned that way a few minutes later, I found them both lying dead, in exactly the same place – shot through the head”.

High ground around the church was key to the whole position & under almost continuous attack.  If captured, the Japanese could sweep the area with fire.  Several times they reached the church, but were eventually driven back with heavy casualties.

A message of encouragement was received from HQ, saying

“Well done indeed.  Of greatest importance you hold your position.  Will give you maximum air support.”

March 23. The brave pilot

At daylight on 23rd March, Dakota transport aircraft dropped supplies, but were flying too fast & too high for accuracy, so that most parachutes floated down to the Japanese positions. Years later, John Sanderson, who in 1944 was a Captain in 152^nd Battalion of 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, told his son (7)

“Dakotas flew over with parachuted supplies of ammunition, water, food and equipment. We were frustrated to see almost all these containers floating down into the Japanese-held positions. The mountainous region and low clouds made the pilots’ task difficult.

“The aircraft came in high to avoid the enemy’s fire from the ground and slung their loads out in one run over the position. One aircraft, however, came over very low and made a number of runs over the hilltop, dropping only two parachute loads each run. The brave pilot made every flypast so low that the beseiged soldiers could see him waving. They could clearly make out the dispatchers in the doorway, as they watched and shouted encouragement. 

The Japanese directed intense small arms fire from the jungle as the single Dakota flew over their heads. All subsequent supply drops followed the same pattern. Of every flight on subsequent days, they could only rely on being able to collect this one precious load. The pilot and crew of this aircraft had taken part in the Brigade air training. 

On hearing that 50th Brigade was cut off, and having to rely entirely on supply from the air, they were determined that whatever happened, and regardless of the risk to themselves, the Brigade should at least get their entire aircraft load.” (7)

To try to recover parachuted supplies, an attack was launched by Gurkhas of 153 Battalion, 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, but they were driven back empty-handed.

Ammunition & supplies quickly became depleted & rations were cut to a minimum. Priority was given to the wounded for what little water remained.

During the morning, large Japanese columns including elephants reached Sangshak, bringing artillery.

Shelling began at midday, followed by large attacks. These were beaten off after fierce hand- to-hand fighting. A call for air support brought strikes by Spitfires, but targets were difficult to locate precisely & the defenders were strafed as well as the Japanese. 

March 22. No attempt at surprise

Once it got dark on March 22, Japanese of 2/58th Regiment charged in waves, without artillery support, up the slopes to Sangshak. They made no attempt at surprise, carrying lights & shouting as they ignited the village. Flames from the burning buildings lit the battlefield. Ninety Japanese were soon dead, including their battalion commander, but they kept attacking through the night, disregarding casualties. When dawn broke, the Japanese withdrew into the jungle & shooting subsided.

“From our experience in China we were confident of the success of the night attack.  But when 8^th Company broke through the enemy front line … very fierce enemy firing made their progress impossible.  Under a strong counter-attack the commander and most soldiers of 8^th Company were killed or wounded.  Though we wanted to advance we could not even lift our heads because of the heavy fire which we had never before experienced.” (3)

Lieutenant Shosaku Kameyama, 2^nd Battalion, 58th Infantry Regiment, 31 Division. March 1944.

March 22. Let everyone toast their lives to me

“Our battalion commander … ordered an attack during the coming night.”

“Company Commander Marukawa gave an address of instruction: “Let everyone toast their lives to me in this operation…” He was speaking in tears. Then about ten porcelain cups were brought in, filled with Japanese sake, and circulated among us. After we all had a sip, the cups were thrown at a rock to be broken in pieces – a ritual before going into a hard battle.” (5)

The Battle of Sangshak

“On the evening of 21^st March, we occupied the village of Sangshak.  The enemy mounted a heavy counter-attack on us after sunrise.  This was the first time that we had fought with the British-Indian forces, which was very different from our experience of fighting the Chinese army which had inferior weapons to ours.” (3)

Captain Shosaku Kameyama, 3^rd Battalion, 58 Infantry Regiment, 31 Division.

A webinar by Robert Lyman & Harry Fecitt describing the Battle of Sangshak can be found here.

March 21. Our great disappointment.

As instructed, 50th Indian Parachute Brigade prepared a defensive box at the Naga village of Sangshak, which was perched on a hill. The Allies had about 2,100 men, with mountain guns, machine guns & mortars. Digging in was hampered by hard rock just a few feet below the surface, so trenches were very shallow.

Although Sangshak was not on their way to Kohima, the Japanese were unwilling to leave a significant force threatening their flank. So they turned aside to deal with the unexpected threat of 50th Indian Parachute Brigade. Around 2,200 Japanese with mountain guns were initially engaged, but they were joined by more later.

Capturing supplies abandoned by their retreating enemies was a key part of Japanese strategy, as they had set off with only enough food for 20 days. Captain Shosaku Kameyama, of 3^rd Btn, 58 Infantry Regt, 31 Division, recorded

“After 6 days’ hard march we poured into Ukhrul, a small village on the road from Kohima to Sangshak. British troops seemed to have evacuated it only a few hours before & the village was burning. We then realised that the enemy had destroyed all their food & supplies, to our great disappointment.” (3)

March 20. Your task is to destroy Japanese

Brigadier Hope-Thomson, Commander of 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, received the following orders:

“Your task is to destroy Japanese moving west through Naga Hills. If unable to do so owing to superior enemy strength you will ensure security of your force by concentrating it into close defence box in general area of Sangshak.

In event of enemy by-passing your positions you will cut their lines of communication and harass their rear.
Your continued resistance in your present area of operations is an essential part of a plan for defence of Imphal.
If your communications are cut and cannot be opened you will be supplied by air.” (3)

March 19/20. Such a brave act.

Unknown to either side, the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade lay in the path of the Japanese advance. Formed of volunteers from many regiments, they were carrying out jungle training near the Naga village of Sangshak & were not yet prepared for combat.

The first Indian unit to make contact was C Company of 152 Battalion, who were several miles from most of the brigade, on a hilltop in an isolated position. On March 19, the seven British officers & 170 men of C Company found themselves surrounded by 900 Japanese of 58th Regiment. Repeated attacks were repelled until the following morning, when, according to the 58th regimental history

“Suddenly from the top of the hill, a small group of about 20 men charged down towards us, firing & shouting in a counter-attack … At the very top of the position an officer appeared, put a pistol to his head & shot himself in full view of everyone below. Our men fell silent, deeply impressed by such a brave act.” (3)

This futile gesture seems extraordinary for a British officer. It is far more consistent with the culture of the Imperial Japanese Army, where suicide could be considered heroic, even when nothing was gained. Perhaps this is why the Japanese were so impressed.

Of the 177 paratroops of C company, only twenty escaped.

Conditions were hard

Senior Private Manabu Wada, of 3^rd Battalion, 138 Infantry Regiment, 31 Division, recalled that

“Conditions were hard, well-nigh impossible.  At 3,000 metres the mountains were shrouded in freezing cloud, and the rocks and trees were covered in moss and lichen.  Matches struck at this altitude went out immediately, so we could not light cooking fires or boil water. 

Our cattle and horses fell down the mountainside, taking our provisions with them; the slopes were so steep we couldn’t go down to retrieve anything.” (5)

“We complained bitterly to one another of the incompetence of our generals who had sent us into the mountains without any proper climbing equipment or clothing, and hampered by large herds of cattle which could not climb the steep, rocky paths which even we soldiers found hard enough.” (5)

“But at last we reached the summit and could see, to the west beyond the boundless sea of clouds, Tibet and the Himalayas.” (5)

Beasts of Burden

Japanese 31st Division had to cross mountainous jungle terrain to reach Kohima, 120 miles away. There were a few narrow, winding tracks, but no roads that could take motor transport from the frontier. An average infantryman carried about 100 lbs, so heavy that he needed help to stand up; this included his personal supply of rice for 20 days. Mules could carry 160 lb & were used in huge numbers, as were horses. 

Mutaguchi attempted to use bullocks to transport stores & munitions, providing his army with a source of fresh meat when needed, but these beasts plodded far too slowly.  They were used to pulling carts or ploughs, not to carrying burdens on their backs, & they would stop frequently & stubbornly refuse to move. This was hugely frustrating for troops rushing to reach their objective. Captain Shosaku Kameyama expressed the opinion that

“These ideas of our top brass proved to be wishful thinking, which disregarded the harsh reality.” (5)

Captain Kameyama recorded that 700 oxen were allocated to his battalion & one of its four rifle companies was converted into a transportation unit responsible for them. This was less than popular for these young fighters, eager to prove themselves in battle.

17,000 of the beasts of burden supporting the Japanese, mules, pack ponies & bullocks, perished in the Invasion of India.

March 15.  Japanese 31 Division set off for Kohima

March 15^th 1944.  Japanese 15^th & 31^st Infantry Divisions crossed the Chindwin, heading for Imphal & Kohima, respectively.

Senior Private Manabu Wada, of 3^rd Battalion, 138 Infantry Regiment, 31 Division, recalled:

“I shall never forget the date of 15 March 1944. This was the dry season and the great Chindwin River was now so shallow that we were able to walk across to spearhead 31 Division’s rapid advance to attack the British and Indian forces beyond the Arakan Mountains and capture Kohima in India’s Manipur State.  At that time we thought only of victory, never of defeat.” (5)

In contrast to Manabu Wada’s 138 Infantry Regiment, most crossings were further south where the river was higher & needed pontoon bridges to get over the Chindwin.

Mutaguchi’s Plan

The Japanese 15th Army that invaded India was commanded by Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi. He was 56 years old & liked to brag of his prowess in combat & with women. Ambitious & political, he had been prominent in the belligerent faction that had precipitated war with China. He sacked his chief of staff for suggesting that the invasion of India would be unable to overcome the logistic challenges of supplying an army across mountainous territory with inadequate roads.

Mutaguchi’s primary objective was to destroy the Allied IV Corps, which was based at Imphal, using two of his divisions (15 & 33). His remaining division (31) would head for Kohima, a small town in the Naga Hills. Capturing Kohima would cut the main supply route to Imphal & isolate Allied IV Corps, allowing its destruction by 15 & 33 Divisions (his “Victory of Annihilation”).

The Allied supply base was at Dimapur, which had airfields, good rail connections & huge store depots. Dimapur was the source of supply not only for Allied IV Corps, but also for China, which had been at war with Japan since 1937. Mutaguchi planned for 31^st Division to push on from Kohima & take Dimapur. This would be catastrophic for the Allies. Not only would it cut the supply route to China, but the resources at Dimapur would springboard his triumphant “March on Delhi”. He imagined millions of grateful Indians overthrowing the British, their colonial oppressors, & welcoming their Japanese liberators, supported by the Indian National Army.

Airlift

Reacting to the Japanese invasion of India, Lieutenant General Slim, Commander of 14th Army, met Lord Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, on March 14th 1944 & requested a fleet of transport aircraft to transfer Indian 5th Division to Imphal from the Arakan region of Burma. This would require 260 flights by C47 Dakotas & would be the first airlift of such magnitude in history. Motor vehicles, guns & mules had to be transported, if the division was to operate effectively on arrival.

Ray Street remembered that the mules urinated as soon as the planes’ engines started & the urine collected under the floor amongst the electrics:

“In the heat the stench was awful. The aircrew went mad.” (6)

Indian 5th Division, “The Fighting Fifth”, was in good spirits after breaking through the Japanese to relieve the Admin Box in February, the first major victory by British & Indian troops in the Burma Campaign. The airlift began on March 17th and was complete by March 29th.

Indian 7th Division, heros of the Battle of Admin Box, were subsequently also flown up from the Arakan to meet the invasion. The rapid arrival of two entire divisions was not anticipated by the Japanese and had massive impact on the strategic situation. It was made possible by the huge increase in Allied air power in 1944.

Gurkha

Gurkhas are mercenaries from Nepal, renowned for their courage & fortitude. They have fought with the British since 1815, formerly as part of the Indian Army. A British officer of a Gurkha regiment recorded:

“Gurkhas were wonderful chaps to command. They had a lovely sense of humour. You had to prove yourself, but once they liked you they would do anything for you.” (4)

After Indian independance, Gurkhas transferred from the Indian Army to the British army, where the Gurkha Brigade continues to serve with distinction.

Indian National Army (INA)

Subhas Chandra Bose had been a leader of the radical, wing of the Indian National Congress, becoming Congress President in 1938. He was replaced in 1939 following differences with other leaders and later placed under house arrest by the British, for promoting civil unrest.

Bose escaped from India in 1941 and traveled to Berlin to appeal to Hitler for support in securing independence for India by force. A brigade was established, termed the Free India Legion, of 4,500 Indians captured by the Germans in North Africa.

Bose then turned to the Japanese and, with their assistance, organised the Indian National Army. A 16,000 strong Division was assembled, composed largely of Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army who had been captured by the Japanese when Malaya & Singapore were conquered. There were executions of some Indian prisoners of war who refused to join the INA.

The INA Division supported the Japanese 15th Army when it invaded India in March 1944, urged on by Bose with the slogan “Onward to Delhi”.

An anonymous Indian corporal explained:

“I joined the INA after hearing Netaji. The Japanese were not cruel to anyone. They said the Asians should fight for their independence, and all Asians should be independent. We were fully confident that the Japanese would hand independence to India, as they had done to the Burmese, the Malays, the Thais; all the Asians. The Japanese remained in Burma because Nehru said on the radio that he didn’t need any help from outside”. (2)

There was no mention of the 14 million, mostly civilians, who died during the Japanese occupation of China. Netaji means “Respected Leader” in Bengali, a title applied to Subhas Chandra Bose.

Two Million Indian Volunteers

Despite the civil unrest, more than 2 million Indians volunteered to join the Indian Army & fight alongside the British. It was the largest conscript army in history. Sometimes referred to as the British Indian Army, to avoid confusion with the Indian National Army (INA).

Although junior officers were often Indian, the senior offices were British. Many Indian Infantry Brigades contained one British and two Indian battalions. For example, the 161st Indian Brigade, which stopped the Japanese from taking Kohima, comprised the 4th Battalion Royal West Kents, the 1st Battalion 1st Punjab and the 4th Battalion 7th Rajputs.

By 1945, 14^th Army troops were 87% Indian, 10% British & 3% African. A report produced by the British War Office, based on interrogation of prisoners, was disappointed to record that the Japanese considered that Indians & Gurkhas were better soldiers than the British.

Quit India

General Mutaguchi, who launched the Japanese invasion of India in 1944, believed that its population would rise up against the British colonial oppressor. Civil unrest in India provided grounds for this belief.

India for the Indians

Since 1858, the British Crown had ruled the Indian subcontinent. Most Indians wanted the British to leave. Aware that this was inevitable, Britain promised a gradual devolution of power to give Dominian status to India, in return for supporting her in the war against Germany, Italy and Japan. Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian Congress Party rejected this proposal and launched the Quit India Movement in 1942.

The British authorities arrested & jailed the Congress Party leaders, including Gandhi. Wide-scale rioting erupted across India, leading to 100,000 arrests & hundreds of fatalities. Instead of fighting the Japanese, 57 British battalions were kept for internal security in India.

March On Delhi!

March 7th 1944. Tokyo Radio proclaimed “The March on Delhi has begun.  Our victorious troops will be in Imphal by March 27^th.” (3)

Invasion of India!

March 6^th 1944.  Japanese 33^rd Infantry Division began crossing Chindwin River, heading for Imphal.

A Victory of Annihilation! 

Lieutenant General Mutaguchi, Commander of Japanese 15^th Army, issued a proclamation:

  “The Army has now reached the stage of invincibility & the day when the Rising Sun shall proclaim our victory in India is not far off.

 When we strike we must be absolutely ready, reaching our objectives with the speed of wildfire … we must sweep aside the paltry opposition we encounter & add lustre to the army’s tradition of achieving a victory of annihilation.” (3)

Queen of the Nagas

The photograph & caption below is from the Bombay Chronicle, 9 September 1945, and shows the marriage of Ursula Graham-Bower, who lived with the Naga people. She led a group of Naga tribesmen to provide valuable intelligence about the strength and activities of the Japanese. Her husband was a British intelligence officer of V-force.

In her own words:

“My parents could not afford to send me to Oxford, so instead I went to live among the Naga tribes and carried out ethnographic work.  When war broke out I … helped start a Watch and Ward scheme in Nagaland. My job was to collect information on the Japanese and send it back by runner.  But it had problems.  There was no hope I could conceal myself in the Naga village.  I am too tall and light skinned. In Burma when British officers were occasionally hidden, the Japs tortured the villagers until the officer gave himself up. I fixed up with Namkia, the headman, that I wasn’t going to be taken alive.  So I would shoot myself, and he would take my head in, if the pressure on the villagers became unendurable”. (2)

Forgotten Army

The 14th Army was formed in late 1943 to fight the Japanese. Thirteen infantry divisions served within it, of which eight were Indian, three African and two British.

The British referred to themselves as the Forgotten Army, because press coverage back home always focused much more on events in Europe.

Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander South East Asia, used to get a laugh from the troops by joking:

“I know you think of yourselves as the forgotten army, well let me tell you you are not forgotten…”

…pause for effect…

“…nobody even knows you’re here!” (1)

Quotations are cited from:

(1) “Burma ’44” by James Holland (2016) Transworld Publishers.

(2) “Forgotten Voices of Burma” by Julian Thompson (2009) Ebury Press.

(3) “Japan’s Last Bid for Victory” by Robert Lyman (2011) Praetorian Press.

(4) “Nemesis. The Battle for Japan, 1944-45” by Max Hastings (2007) HarperCollins.

(5) “Tales by Japanese Soldiers of the Burma Campaign 1942-1945” by  Kazuo Tamayama & John Nunneley (2000) Cassell Military Paperbacks.

(6) “The Siege of Kohima” by Robert Street (2003) Barny Books.

(7) “The Indian Arnhem” by Myles Sanderson (2024) Hermes Messenger of the Gods, digital magazine of The Parachute Regimental Association.

(8) “Road of Bones” by Fergal Keane (2010) HarperPress.

(9) “The advance toward Kohima”. The Soldier’s Burden.

(10) “The History of the Assam Regiment” by Peter Steyn (1959) Orient Longmans, India. 

(11) “Kohima: The Furthest Battle” by Leslie Edwards (2009) The History Press.

(12) “The Trees Are All Young on Garrison Hill” by Gordon Graham (2005) Kohima Educational Trust.

(13) “Kohima, An Historic Village” by John McCann (1988) John McCann.

(14) “March On” by Norman Havers (1992) Square One Publications.

(15) “Burma. The Longest War 1941-45” by Louis Allen (1984) Phoenix Press.

(16) “Soldier Poets of the Second British Infantry Division” edited by Bob Cook & Robin McDermott (2018) Dragon Publications.

(17) “Conflict at Kohima” by Harry Swinson (1944) Extracts from the diary of Captain Harry Swinson, who served with 7th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment and at 5th Infantry Brigade Headquarters.

(18) “After the war my father didn’t recognize me” by Chris Summers (2004) BBC News Online.