Bob Cook, Author at Kohima Museum - York

Reflections on Kohima
British Gurkhas Pokhara Battlefield Tour to Kohima, 14-22 April 2010

As I write I am looking at a photograph we took of the Kohima battlefield from near the Cameron Memorial on Naga Hill. It is a cloudy April day with grey cumulus threatening rain. In the background is the dark jungle covered peak of Mount Pulebadze. A tall radio mast now stands above the village of Jotsoma where 161st Indian Infantry Brigade formed its defensive box and allowed 24th Indian Mountain Regiment to bring down supportive fire to assist the besieged garrison. As you come down the jungle-clad slopes of Aradura Spur, where Captain Jack Randle won his Victoria Cross, the jungle now gives way to Officers’ quarters and the rust-red roof of the Catholic Church. In the photograph Kohima Ridge forms a gentle parabola from Naga Hill to Aradura Spur but the ridge is now covered with an ugly rash of buildings. There are still some pink, green and yellow splashes of simple Naga homes made of wood and corrugated tin and occasionally, in Naga Village, you come across an Angami house with its traditional crossed roof beams. In the heart of the photograph is a green oasis of trees on Garrison Hill that is the Commonwealth War Cemetery. The azaleas were all in flower in riotous pink when we visited and the roses lovingly tended in their Regimental plots. It is difficult to imagine that just over a half century ago two fading empires collided along their peripheries on these hills and that so many of their sons lie there still.

The study of former battles and campaigns can provide insights and tactical lessons relevant to today’s campaigns. The Battle of Imphal in 1944 was an excellent example of this tenet. General Slim (later Field Marshal, 1st Viscount Slim) remembered the advice he had been given by a Chinese General on how to defeat the Japanese. He was told that the Japanese always planned operations on the slimmest of logistic margins. If they could be held long enough they would over-reach themselves, run out of supplies, and could be defeated. Slim recalled this advice when he drew up 14th Army’s plan of battle for Imphal.

What Slim had not counted on was 31st Japanese Division crossing the Somra hills, in a march as epic as Hannibal’s across the Alps, to besiege the Garrison in Kohima and cut the vital road and supply line to Imphal. The battles of Kohima-Imphal, which were contemporaneous, are excellent examples of planned and reactive battles.

Kohima is a not an easy battle to study. It involved the best parts of 3 Divisions: 31st Japanese Division, 2nd British Division and Brigades from 5th and 7th Indian Divisions. The fighting went on for 64 days over incredibly difficult terrain and involved many Regiments fighting different actions simultaneously. In order to effectively study this complex battle we used the Functions in Combat, the British Army’s principles of war in the military decision making process, as a framework. Our reflections are summarised below.

Command and Control

At the highest level the Battle of Kohima-Imphal was fought between Generals Slim and Mutaguchi. It can be said that Slim nearly lost the battle of Kohima by failing to realise that a Division could move across the Somra Hills to Kohima. However, Mutaguchi and Sato definitely lost the battle, largely due to their inflexible style of command. Lieutenant General Sato did not utilise auftragstaktik or mission command to achieve his commander’s intent.

If Lieutenant General Sato had masked Kohima and pushed on to attack Dimapur the Japanese would have captured the vital supplies they needed and denied them to 4th Corps in Imphal. However, he had been told to capture and hold Kohima and this is precisely what he tried to do, failing to exploit the opportunity to achieve his commander’s intent by taking Dimapur instead.

Once Slim realised that his plan was in danger he rapidly corrected it by moving 161st Indian Infantry Brigade to Dimapur by air and 2nd British Division to Dimapur by rail whilst flying elements of 5th and 7th Indian Divisions to reinforce Imphal.

Slim was also a master at improving morale. If soldiers on the front line were on half rations he made sure that staff officers in rear headquarters were also on half rations. This usually meant that problems were rapidly resolved.

Information and Intelligence

14th Army had very good intelligence. At the start of the battle V Force agents, patrols, scouts and local tribes all provided information about the Japanese crossing the River Chindwin and advancing on Kohima-Imphal. 14th Army also had a good system of acquiring and exploiting information. Dead Japanese were searched for documents and maps which were rapidly sent back for Intelligence staff to translate and analyse. At the Battle of Sangshak, 50th Indian Parachute Brigade recovered the 15th Army plan of attack from a dead Japanese Officer. Despite being surrounded by Japanese forces they realised the value of this information and managed to smuggle it out. Slim was able to exploit this intelligence and it allowed him to readjust his plan of battle by reinforcing Kohima and Imphal.

Firepower

Kohima would almost certainly have fallen if it had not been for the indirect firepower provided by 24th Indian Mountain Regiment based inside 161st Indian Infantry Brigade’s defensive box at Jotsoma, 2 miles across the valley from Kohima. Time and again, Japanese attacks on Kohima Garrison were broken up in the FUP by rapid and accurate artillery support.

Although the Allies had tanks it was very difficult to use them in the mountainous terrain of Nagaland. Often roads had to be specially built to bring them into action. Where they could be used they were a decisive factor, especially at the battle of the tennis court on Garrison Hill, where a Lee-Grant tank was finally manoeuvred into a position to blast the Japanese out of their bunkers.

Protection

Troops that were dug in, especially in deep bunkers with overhead protection, were relatively safe from the effects of indirect fire. This is why it took so long for 2nd British Division to retake Kohima Ridge from the Japanese. As soon as the indirect fire lifted, the Japanese would pop out of their bunkers and start firing at attacking troops.

Tanks were very useful in attacking bunkers because they offered protection against small arms and indirect fire. Tanks often played a crucial part in many attacks at Kohima despite the limitations of their mobility.

Mobility

Slim did not believe that a Division could move across the mountainous jungle from the Chindwin to Kohima. He was wrong. 31st Division managed to move its forces along jungle tracks and used mules, porters and elephants to carry their supplies.

In order to defeat 31st Division, the British had to outflank the dug-in Japanese positions by moving on foot through the dense jungle-covered mountains. Navigation was extremely difficult and often units relied on local Nagas to act as their guides.

Finally, victory at Kohima-Imphal was achieved by Slim’s ability to reinforce and resupply Imphal and Dimapur by air. He was able to reinforce and support Kohima Garrison by redeploying units such as 161st Indian Infantry Brigade, moving them from the Arakan to Dimapur by air at short notice. This allowed Kohima Garrison to be held until further reinforcements arrived.

Combat Service Support

Slim had not forgotten the lesson he had learnt from the Chinese General about defeating the Japanese. At Kohima-Imphal he exploited the fact that the Japanese operated with limited scales of supplies. On the Allied side, the supply depot at Dimapur was 2 miles wide and 11 miles long – a lot of combat service support – with a railhead and airfields. Slim deliberately designed a plan of battle that shortened his supply line whilst lengthening that of the Japanese. When the Japanese failed to capture the supply dumps at Imphal and Dimapur they literally starved. During the battle the 14th Army also used aircraft to re-supply and reinforce their troops, something that had not been done before on such a large scale.

Conclusion

Although Functions in Combat are a relatively new concept in British military doctrine they are applicable to a study of Kohima. Although Kohima was a completely different type of operational environment to ongoing British Army operations in Afghanistan lessons can be drawn. The first is the over-arching importance of intelligence to plan and conduct operations. To this can be added the utilisation of indigenous forces to help procure information and the ability to translate, analyse and utilise it. The main difference is that 14th Army’s objectives were very clear: to defeat a brutal, expansionist enemy. The objectives in Afghanistan are far more complex and make the prosecution of the campaign more difficult. As one of General Stanley McChrystal’s staff officers recently commented, victory in Afghanistan “… is not going to look like a win, smell like a win, or taste like a win.”

Major R G J Beven RGR and Captain D J McKerr QGE June 2010

Why I visited Lieutenant General Kotoku Sato’s Tombstone and his Memorial Shonai-machi, Yamagata Prefecture on 16th and 17th November 2010

My Link with Lieutenant General Kotoku Sato

I became very interested in Lieutenant General Sato, because my father, Taiji Urayama, was a lieutenant (veterinary surgeon, 31st Regiment Mountain Artillery) in the 31st Division which was under the command of General Sato. Mr. Hirakubo, a previous chairman of the Burma Campaign Society (I am the present chairman), was also a lieutenant (supply officer, 31st Regiment Mountain Artillery) in the 31st Division. I strongly believe that both my father and Mr Hirakubo owe their lives to the battlefield decisions taken by General Sato.

Thus I became motivated to look not just into the exploits of Lieutenant General Kotoku Sato, (1896 to1961), but also his character and personality. Lt General Sato, who was once stigmatised as dishonourable and insane, made such a crucial decision to withdraw his men of the 31st Division of the 15th Army from the Kohima Battle, the front line of the Imphal Operation.

During the battle Lt. General Sato disobeyed his General’s order to advance, and instead pulled his troops back to the nearest food and ammunition dump to save his men from starvation, deadly diseases and dying from their wounds.
Not long after this the British-Indian army regained the Naga area completely, thus ending the Imphal operation.

Anti-Japanese

The catalyst for my realisation about the lingering animosity of some ex British soldiers was the visit to the UK by the Japanese Emperor in 1998, which brought about demonstrations and anti-Japanese sentiment. About this same time I met Mr Hirakubo, who was chairman of the Burma Campaign Society (BCS), an organisation set up to bring about reconciliation between Japanese and British old soldiers who had fought in Burma. On the death of Mr. Hirakubo in 2008 I became chairwoman of BCS.

So this is how I became involved in BCS trying to bring about reconciliation between old foes. Also I have been living in the UK for over 20 years now and I have been married to a British man for 28 years, which has helped me understand both sides and viewpoints.

Yamagata Prefecture – Shonai machi

Yamagata Prefecture is situated in the North-West of the Japanese main island and has a population of roughly 1,250,000 and an area of 9,323 km2. Shonai region is located in the North West of Yamagata Pref. Its population of about 40,000 is mainly agricultural. It produces a well known brand of rice called “Koshi-hikari”.

I knew that General Sato came from Shonai City in the Yamagata region of Japan and was interested in visiting his home town and visiting his grave and memorial. I also hoped that I could meet his relatives to gain more knowledge about him. So I contacted the local government in Shonai City in August 2010 and Mr Keinichi Okuyama, Deputy Mayor of Shonai invited me to give lectures at the University and their town office when he learned that my husband and myself were planning to go to Japan in November.

General Sato’s decision during the Kohima battle to withdraw his men to a position at the rear branded him a disgraced officer in the eyes of his superior, General Mutaguchi. Mutaguchi had a military doctor examine General Sato and he was deliberately diagnosed as insane, purely because he refused to sacrifice his men in a battle he knew was impossible to win. Then General Mutaguchi demoted General Sato and transferred him to the Philippines as a punishment for disobeying his orders. Mutaguchi did not have General Sato court martialed because he did not want his own incompetence in planning and executing the mission to be scrutinised in a courtroom, thus General Sato never had a chance to clear his name and show how his men were sent into battle with insufficient food, ammunition, medicine, etc.
The Mayor and people of Shonai-Machi were very happy to invite me to their town, someone who knew and understood about the true character of General Sato i.e. that he was an honourable man who only withdrew the 31st Division from the Kohima battle because he had the safety and welfare of his men at heart.

On my arrival in Shonai-Machi I was greeted by the deputy mayor Mr Okuyama and by a regional TV cameraman by the name of Masahiko Hasegawa. I had not been informed that TV camera would be waiting for me at the station together with the deputy mayor. Next I met Mr. Sachio Sato who is chairman of an association that has been set up to honour the memory of Lieutenant General Sato. Then Mr. Okuyama, the deputy mayor, drove Mr. Sato and me to the cemetery to pay respects at the grave and memorial to General Sato. Here I dedicated the poppies and translated the messages which had been kindly given by Mr Bob Cook, curator of the Kohima Museum in York. At the cemetery I was overwhelmed to find that there were many heads of local associations and several newspaper and TV reporters waiting to ask me questions about the reasons for my visit. I really wanted to visit General Sato’s grave so that I could thank him for saving my father’s life during the Kohima battle by withdrawing his men. Because it is evident to see that I would not be here today if it was not for this decision. I also felt very strongly that I should be a bridge between Japan and the UK to bring about a much better understanding between our nations.

In the afternoon I was invited by Professor Machiko Ito of Tohoku University of Community Services and Science to give a lecture to about 150 people mainly consisting of students and general public about how to bring about reconciliation by citizens activities and develop mutual understanding. As part of the lecture I explained about what has been achieved at BCS (formerly Burma Campaign Fellowship Group) to bring about reconciliation between UK and Japan. This organisation was formed by Mr. Masao Hirakubo, Mr .Guilym Davies and Mr. Hirwen James in 1983 all of whom were former foes. Later in the evening I was invited to a welcoming party attended by Mr. Jun Hino, local historian and curator of the Shonai Machi regional museum, General Sato’s nephew Shigehiko Sato, a banker, Mr. Maki Harada, the town mayor and Mr. Toru Togashi who is Chairman of the Shonai Town Assembly.

At this meeting I explained to the assembled twenty or so guests about how, at all levels of society we should be more grounded in the culture, histories and people of other nations so as to avoid misunderstanding that could lead to chaos and war. Especially Japanese people should try to express their feelings and views to the outside world more often and with a louder voice because far too often they hesitate to voice their opinions clearly.

Just before this meeting I met Mr Koichiro Wajima (private 2nd class) who is 88 years old and served during the Imphal mission. He told me and the assembled reporters how he and his platoon encountered a group of British soldiers in the jungle during the night. The British side started to fire at them, at which point they counterattacked, using their out-date weapons, aiming to knock out their heavy machine gun. The following morning they discovered British soldiers lying dead as well as several of their own men. At this point he burst out crying and said “I remember now clearly” After a pause he went on with tears “I regret that I could not bring them back home to their families.” I held his arm to comfort him and said to him that I was also told by ex-British soldiers that, whichever side wins it does not matter because war just brings misery to everyone involved. He then repeatedly said “Whichever side wins war is no good, war is no good, never engage in war”.

Note: 85,600 Japanese soldiers participated in the Imphal Mission, 30,000 died in action, of starvation and illness and 20,000 were injured or succumbed to malnutrition and illness. The road between Kohima and Imphal was called “White Bone Road” on which lay the remains of many corpses in military uniform who have never been taken back to their home.

Mrs Akiko Macdonald – Burma Campaign Society Chairman